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The empirical analysis is conducted in three sections. First, using a cross-sectional 
time-series regression analysis with fixed effects, a negative relationship is found 
between changes in the attitudes of respondents from the Jiji polls in a particular 
month and the presence of a threat. A negative relationship is also found in 
changes in attitudes and media coverage of each type of threat, suggesting an 
interaction effect where higher media coverage of an issue is associated with 
changes of greater magnitude. Second, through a series of case studies of realistic 
threats; symbolic threats; and threats to national identity, a correlation is found 
between many, though not all, such issues and events and negative changes in 
public perceptions of the foreign nation in the same month. A closer examination 
finds that in many months in which public attitudes did change, elite and media 
rhetoric framing an issue as a threat were also present. Finally, I examine 
long-term trends in public attitudes towards the ten nations in the Jiji polls and find 
greater levels of stability towards nations that I assume are not salient to the 
Japanese public and greater evidence of change in those which I assume are. 
Overall, this study finds evidence that Japanese public opinion is stable over long 
periods of time and, although abrupt changes do occur, they tend to be small in 
magnitude, short-term and are associated mainly with those issues and events 
perceived as threats. This corresponds with the findings of researchers in the 
United States who have found that public opinion about foreign policy is relatively 
rational. 
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1. Introduction 
Japanese Public Opinion about China 
Japanese public opinion about China appears to have become increasingly hostile. 
In 2004, the Japanese Cabinet Office released a survey showing that within one 
year the percentage of citizens with friendly feelings toward China dropped by 
10.3 percentage points from the previous year (Cabinet Office, Government of 
Japan 2004 ). This was the lowest figure recorded since the survey began in 1978. 
Despite being Japan's largest source of imports and second largest export market 
after the United States, collective opinion towards China was even more negative 
than following the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. 
Despite their negative attitudes, most Japanese people have very little actual direct 
contact with anyone or anything to do with China. According to the 2000 
population census, the 253,096 Chinese in Japan made up a mere 0.2 per cent of 
the overall population. 1 In an Asahi Shimbun poll ("Nichikanchu 3-kakoku yoron 
chousa - shitsumon to kaitou [Japan-South Korea-China Three Country Public 
Opinion Poll - Questions and Answers]", 27 April 2005, p.9), despite only six per 
cent of respondents saying that they had actually had any kind of contact with a 
Chinese person, the most common response among Japanese respondents when 
asked about their image of Chinese people was that they were "nationalistic" (64. 7 
per cent of respondents). When Japanese respondents were asked in the same poll 
1 According to the 2000 census, Japan's overall population at the time was 126,925,843. 
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about their thoughts on the Japanese Government's decision to cut foreign aid to 
China, 63 per cent said that they agreed and when asked about whether they were 
concerned about China hosting the Beijing Olympics in 2008, another 61 per cent 
said yes. A Pew Global Attitudes (2006) survey also found that most Japanese saw 
Chinese as "competitive" (84 per cent); "nationalistic" (82 per cent); "selfish" (75 
per cent); and "greedy" (69 per cent). The image of China in Japan is currently not 
a positive one. 
The quality of public opinion regarding foreign policy issues in Japan is crucial 
because of its implications for democracy. A citizenry that is well-informed and 
responsive to changing circumstances is more likely to elect better political leaders 
and support better policies than one that is ill-informed and overly emotional. 
Japanese public opinion has historically acted as a constraint on the preferences of 
policymakers, especially with regard to militarisation and the possession of nuclear 
weapons. Pyle (2007:23) believes that in the post war period "articulate opinion 
contributed to the structuring of debates among the elite, and the mass mood set the 
parameters for debate". Eldridge and Midford (2008:5) argue that Japanese public 
opinion has prevented those politicians, such as Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro, 
from expanding Japan's military role overseas. Public opinion also affects relations 
with particular nations. Johnson (1986) notes that "all political, economic, and 
diplomatic ties [with China] are subtly skewed by the popular attitudes and 
aspirations of the Japanese people as these are mobilised by the Japanese press". In 
an increasingly interdependent and complex world, understanding how the 
Japanese public makes sense of its external environment is becoming ever more 
important. 
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The main variable of interest in this study is Japanese public opinion about foreign 
nations. This has the same meaning as both Wanta et al.' s (2004) term "public 
perceptions of foreign nations" and Page and Bouton's (2006) "feelings about 
foreign nations". 2 Understanding the dynamics of public opinion towards foreign 
nations is important because citizens use these beliefs as mental shortcuts to make 
sense of world affairs (P. R. Brewer 2004:324). They also provide citizens with 
guidance for specific policy preferences (Page et al. 2008:32). For example, 
Hurwitz and Peffley (1990:5) argue that during the Cold War, citizens of the 
United States relied on images of Eastern bloc countries to guide their support for 
increases in defence spending. An image defines a template for a particular country 
that then provides a picture citizens use to fill in gaps of missing information.3 As 
Page and Bouton (2006) put it in their study on American public opinion and 
foreign policy: 
Countries seen as hostile or threatening to the United States engender cold 
feelings and tend to be regarded as appropriate objects of wary 
preparedness, economic sanctions, or even military attack. Countries 
regarded as friendly elicit warm feelings and are viewed as suitable to be 
alliance partners, recipients of foreign aid (if needed), and providers of U.S. 
military bases. In individuals' minds, evaluations of foreign countries and 
their leaders often have substantial effects on specific policy preferences 
(p.238). 
2 Although many terms have been used to describe variation in country attitudes such as "friendly" 
and "unfriendly" (Page and Bouton 2006), "favourable" or "non-favourable" (Manheim and 
Albritton 1984) and "trustworthy" or "untrustworthy" (P.R. Brewer 2004), I use the more neutral 
terms "positive" and "negative". When I use the term "public perceptions of a foreign nation", I am 
referring to the positive or negative feelings held by a particular percentage of the public towards a 
particular nation at a specific point in time. 
3 A problem with this is that they affect memory of information, the reception of new information 
and the process ofleaming. The ordinary citizen is likely to forget which pieces of information about 
the other actor were derived from the empirical evidence and which were derived from schema. 
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Understanding how the Japanese public thinks about particular nations may go a 
long way in explaining why they support or oppose such policies as foreign aid, 
defence spending, and the US-Japan alliance. 
Statement of the Problem 
Japan is a nation in which the public's view of foreign nations is often considered 
to be highly susceptible to the influence of political elites. Eldridge and Midford 
(2008:2) characterise this as a belief that "Japanese public opinion is malleable and 
able to be manipulated". In recent years, various commentators have argued that 
nationalist politicians hoping to promote their own agendas have generated 
negative impressions of foreign nations among the public, especially China and the 
two Koreas. Fujiwara was quoted in the Japan Times ("Public opinion, 
conservative media alter policy on North Korea", 19 November 2007) as saying 
that Japanese public opinion was traditionally dovish until "supporters of national 
defence and traditional values came to be heavily represented in the media and the 
Internet during the 1990s." According to the New York Times (Onishi, N., 2006, 
"Japan rightists fan fury over North Korea abductions", 17 December, p.14 ), the 
issue of North Korean abductions of Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s is 
"kept alive in the news media every day by nationalist politicians and groups that 
pound at the topic as firmly as their cherished goals." 
Some commentators also attribute responsibility for the increase in negative 
feelings towards Japan's Asian neighbours to the mass media. After Prime 
Minister Koizumi Junichiro's visits to Yasukuni Shrine, a fonper Japanese 
ambassador to Thailand and Saudi Arabia stated that "the mass media in Japan 
hampered Chinese moves to ease tensions over the [Yasukuni] issue" by 
4 
"highlighting the prime minister's shrine visit day and night, pestering Chinese 
officials for comments" (Okazaki, H., 2006, "Media role helps inflame the 
Yasukuni Issue", Daily Yomiuri, 3 September, p.10). The Asia Times Online 
(Curtin, S., 2004, "China hits all-time low on Japan pop charts", 25 December)4 
claims that "the Japanese media, which have exaggerated the activities of a small 
number of Chinese criminals operating in Japan, and right-wing politicians, who 
have exploited anti-Chinese sentiment for political advantage, must also shoulder a 
very large portion of the blame for the very negative poll result." Sakamoto and 
Allen (2007) argue that "explicit hostility" towards South Korea and China in 
Japan is the product of how the mass media report incidents such as Korean 
supporters booing the Japanese soccer team and 2005 anti-Japanese demonstrations 
in China. 
While understanding the reasons for the worsening of the Japanese public's views 
towards a specific country such as China or North Korea is certainly important, a 
more fundamental question remains unanswered. What factors influence changes 
in public opinion towards a foreign nation in the first place? Existing theories of 
public opinion about foreign policy have given some attention to changes in public 
attitudes but an explanation of why they should turn positive or negative has yet to 
be a topic of central concern. The dominant view in the theoretical literature is that 
although individuals may know little about politics or foreign policy, collective 
opinion is nonetheless relatively rational (Page and Shapiro 1992; Jentleson 1992). 
Citizens are not policy experts but they do manage to cope with political issues by 
4 Available at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/FL25Dh0l.html [Accessed 12 December 
2008] 
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applying informational shortcuts, called "cognitive heuristics," that help them 
make decisions with minimal mental effort (Kahneman et al. 1982). 
However, if the dominant view in the theoretical literature is that public opinion is 
relatively stable over time and that cognitive heuristics serve people relatively well, 
then why have Japanese attitudes towards China turned so negative? Along with 
the United States, China is Japan's most important economic partner. Although 
various minor disputes between the two nations exist, these are primarily over 
relatively unimportant matters, such as sovereignty over the small and uninhabited 
Senkaku Islands, the publication of history textbooks, and the visits by politicians 
to Yasukuni Shrine. A simple consideration by citizens of the positive effect of 
China's economic growth on Japan should far outweigh these minor concerns. Yet 
such issues are often stated to be central to the relationship between the two 
nations. If the public is rational then why do Japanese citizens get so upset over the 
actions of a few unruly fans at a soccer match, as they did in August 2004 during 
the final of the Asian Cup? The most common approach to public opinion and 
foreign policy cannot explain why Japanese public opinion will tum negative 
towards a foreign nation over seemingly inconsequential issues. 
Argument and Theoretical Framework 
My purpose in this study is to answer the following question-under what 
conditions, and to what extent, do public perceptions of a foreign nation in Japan 
change? The main argument is as follows: changes in negative public perceptions 
of a foreign nation are related to issues or events perceived as a threat. Rouhana 
and Fiske (1995 :54) define threat "as the extent to which the party feels danger to 
(or security in) its physical existence, social and economic well-being, or its 
6 
identity and values". For the purpose of this study, a perceived threat is an 
exogenous issue or event that can elicit negative emotions among citizens such as 
anger, fear and hatred. Such negative emotions will turn in to feelings of hostility 
towards the nation viewed as the source of the threat and this will be associated 
with a negative change in public attitudes towards that particular nation. Thus, it 
can be said that changes in negative changes in public attitudes towards a foreign 
nation are caused by the perceptions of an issue or event as a threat. 
According to scholars of intergroup threat, the concept of threat is not unitary but 
can be sub-divided into three types. These are first, "realistic threats" to a group's 
resources, power and well-being; second, "symbolic threats" to an in-group's 
values, beliefs, and worldview; and third, "threats to group identity". The 
definitions of these will be explained further in Chapter Two. Together, these three 
conceptualisations of threat provide a theoretical explanation for not only why 
Japanese citizens pay attention to foreign policy issues associated with aggressive 
intentions and military capabilities but also why they choose to voice their negative 
opinion about those events which violate their values and worldview. 
The mass media interprets issues and gives them greater or lesser significance. As 
a result, the magnitude of the effect of a threat on public opinion can be moderated 
by media coverage (Wood and Peake 1998: 174). At any particular moment in time, 
the mass public concerns itself with various domestic and foreign policy issues 
representing the agenda of the nation (Erbring et al. 1980:45). To put it simply, 
Japanese citizens will not pay attention to foreign policy issues until they are 
salient. High media coverage increases the salience of particular threats and, 
therefore, the magnitude of their impact. Just by increasing the number of stories 
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about an issue, media organisations can make it stand out from amongst the 
confusing mass of other information that the public is exposed to every day. 
The concern of this study is primarily with short-term opinion dynamics. Since the 
key factor in the activation of public opinion is issue salience, threats will only 
have an impact on public opinion so long as media coverage is high. As news 
organisations start to reduce their coverage of a particular issue, the public's 
attention will begin to wander before moving on to the next problem. Even those 
issues that may have generated a powerful emotional response at the time will 
eventually stop being part of the considerations of citizens when evaluating a 
particular foreign nation. When this occurs, public opinion should regress back to 
its previous level. 
In sum, short-term opinion change is a function of the presence of an issue or event 
interpreted as a threat and the volume of media coverage that it receives. Although 
the public may not pay close attention to the finer details of international politics, it 
does pay attention to salient information. If that information generates negative 
emotions, such as what happens when citizens perceive a threat, this will tend to 
produce an increase in hostility towards the nation involved. The level of hostility 
among the general public is usually greater when a threat receives high volumes of 
media coverage because it is more salient. These effects, however, will tend to 
only be short-term. 
Data and Methods 
Although I explain my data and methods in greater detail in Chapter Three, I 
briefly introduce how I will be conducting the empirical analysis. The purpose of 
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the empirical analysis is to determine whether there is a regular association of 
perceived threats to Japan and negative changes in public attitudes towards the 
nation viewed as the source of the threat. This study uses publicly available 
aggregate-level media and government public opinion polls. My main dataset is 
compiled from monthly polls conducted by the Japanese media organisation Jiji 
Press and includes compositional aggregate Japanese public opinion towards ten 
countries-Switzerland, India, Germany/West Germany, France, the United 
Kingdom, South Korea, Russia/the Soviet Union, China, North Korea, and the 
United States. 5 The monthly data cover the period between June 1960 and March 
2007, which includes the administrations of twenty-one Japanese prime ministers, 
from the last days of the Kishi Cabinet through to the Abe Cabinet. The number of 
country-month observations is 5,501. Ofthese, 314 ofthem were associated with a 
perceived threat to Japan. This provides an abundance of issues perceived as 
threats for analysis but which also vary in terms of media coverage. The case 
studies also include polls from Asahi Shimbun and Yomiuri Shimbun as support for 
the qualitative analysis. 
Since no empirical indicator allows for the direct measure of the concepts of threat 
and media coverage, I generated my own measures by conducting a content 
analysis. A perceived threat to Japan is defined as any issue or event involving a 
foreign nation that could be interpreted as a danger to Japan's physical existence, 
social and economic well-being, or its identity and values. I generated measures for 
5 I am grateful to Professor Kohno Masaru of Waseda University who supplied me with the data 
from 1960 to 1995 in electronic form. I collected the rest directly from Jiji's own publications during 
my fieldwork in Tokyo as a Japan Foundation visiting fellow at Waseda University from September 
2006 to April 2007. 
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my two independent variables through content analysis. First, for an unbiased 
compendium of what issues and events could qualify as threats to Japan, I used 
Sasaki et al. (2005) and Kodama (2008), both of which contain a list of domestic 
and international events relevant to Japan between the years 1960 and 2004 for the 
first book, and 1960 and 2007 for the second. I identified those months in which an 
event occurred involving the ten nations in my dataset and that was likely to be 
interpreted by Japanese citizens as a threat. 
Second, to measure media coverage, I used a keyword search from two of Asahi 
Shimbun 's electronic databases, Asahi Kikizou II Bijuaru and Asahi.com Perfect 
and then counted the number of front-page news stories referring to a particular 
threat. The total number of stories that included references to a particular threat 
was used as the measure for media coverage in a particular month. 
For the analysis, this study uses a mixed-methods approach. First, I conducted a 
time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) regression analysis with country and month 
fixed effects to estimate the effects of the presence of a threat and the volume of 
media coverage that it received on changes in public opinion. Second, I used the 
comparative case study method to examine in greater detail the changes in public 
opinion following the occurrence of a threat, but with varying volumes of media 
coverage. The case studies build on the statistical analysis by allowing for greater 
description of specific events and, most importantly, the identification of specific 
factors that could lead an issue or event to be perceived as a threat in the first place. 
I use newspaper reports at the time to examine how a particular threat was framed. 
Finally, I looked at trends in Japanese public opinion towards the ten different 
10 
nations in my data to examine the long-term dynamics in public perceptions of 
each country. I explain my methods in greater detail in Chapter Three. 
Significance of Study 
Introducing the concept of threat to studies of public opinion and foreign policy 
assists greatly in increasing understanding of the dynamics of short-term public 
opinion, especially for why attitudes tum negative following particular events. Past 
studies of public opinion and foreign policy have identified political elites and 
media coverage as important variables in attracting the public's attention to foreign 
affairs issues. Only a few studies, however, have identified the types of issues 
likely to influence public opinion. Without a typology of issues likely to activate 
public opinion, a gap will continue to exist in explaining not only why public 
opinion changes but why it changes in a negative direction. Furthermore, moving 
away from the non-unitary conceptualisation of threat allows for an explanation for 
why such a wide range of issues can activate public opinion. Japanese citizens 
worry not only about their national security but also those issues and events that 
violate their values as well. 
This study examines Japan, a democratic nation quite different from those ofNorth 
America, Western Europe and Australia, but which is rarely the subject of public 
opinion research in English-language political science. Despite the call among 
researchers for greater generalisation in public opinion research, the core 
established democracies of North America, Western Europe, and Australia still 
dominate comparative studies (Heath et al. 2005). Foyle (2003) argues that the 
focus on such a small number of cases weakens theoretical generalisability since 
most theory and empirical evidence comes almost exclusively from research 
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conducted in the United States. In their review of public opinion and foreign policy, 
Baum and Potter (2008) explicitly call for greater comparative research to 
distinguish country-specific variables from generalisable ones. This study builds 
on the work by Eldridge and Midford (2008) who also seek to gain a greater 
understanding of how the Japanese public thinks about foreign policy while also 
using the theoretical literature in political science. If the generalisations made in 
studies on the United States are also found to apply to Japan then this increases the 
utility of these theories. 
Road map 
This study is divided into eight chapters. In Chapter Two, I first review the public 
opinion and foreign policy literature to show that a gap exists in explaining why 
public opinion towards foreign nations should tum negative and second, I 
introduce the two key concepts that will be used to explain short-term changes in 
public perceptions of foreign nations. These are threats and media coverage. The 
theory presented here is a simple one. Events that the Japanese public perceive as a 
threat will increase public hostility towards a foreign nation and negative public 
attitudes towards that nation will increase. Higher volumes of media coverage of a 
threat will increase the magnitude of the effect. 
In Chapter Three, I explain the data and methods that I use to test my hypotheses 
followed by Chapter Four in which I conduct a cross-sectional time-series analysis 
using country and month fixed effects to measure the impact of media coverage on 
Japanese perceptions of nine countries in my dataset. I find a negative and 
statistically significant relationship between both threats and media coverage to 
changes in country attitudes. I also find an interaction effect between threats and 
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media coverage, suggesting that the greater the media coverage, the greater the 
effect on public opinion. The non-unitary conceptualisation of threat is also 
supported by my finding that each of the different types of threat is associated with 
negative changes in public opinion. 
In Chapter Five, I conduct a series of case studies mixing qualitative and 
quantitative data to examine whether media coverage of realistic threats on public 
opinion has a major effect on Japanese public opinion.6 I operationalise the 
concept of realistic threat by examining those cases in which Japan faced economic 
threats; violations of national sovereignty; and military threats to its security. I find 
that, under certain conditions, these issues do tend to be associated with negative 
changes in public attitudes towards the nations i?volved. 
In Chapter Six, my case studies of symbolic threats examine how the Japanese 
public reacts to those issues and events framed such that they are perceived to 
violate two of the most important norms of post-war Japan, anti-militarism and 
anti-nuclearism (Berger 1993). The operationalised definition of symbolic threats 
included nuclear tests; the use of military force; and the killing of civilians. 
Changes in public opinion tended to be associated with these classes of events 
suggesting they are causal factors. 
In Chapter Seven, I look at cases of threats to Japanese national identity. As 
operationalised definitions of such threats, I examine the Japanese public's reaction 
to nations that that criticised Japan; violated diplomatic protocol; and conducted 
6 I defme a major effect as any change in public opinion greater than six percentage points. This is 
explained in greater detail in Chapter Three. 
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large-scale anti-Japanese demonstrations. While these types of events do appear to 
be correlated with changes in public opinion, they do appear to be more affected by 
media coverage than realistic and symbolic threats. 
In Chapter Eight, I use time-series data to examine the long-term dynamics of 
Japanese public perceptions of the ten nations in my dataset. I found that although 
public perceptions towards foreign nations were highly stable over long periods of 
time, they were much less stable for those nations that tended to be involved in 
issues and events that the Japanese public interpreted as a threat. Public attitudes 
towards Switzerland, Germany/West Germany, India, France and the United 
Kingdom showed higher levels of stability than those towards the United States, 
South Korea, Russia/the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. I also found that 
the effect of salient issues on public opinion tended to be relatively short-lived. 
Finally, in Chapter Nine, I conclude the study with a discussion ofthe implications 
of my findings and suggestions for future research. 
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2. Theoretical Framework 
Introduction 
Why does public opinion about a foreign nation change? Despite evidence showing 
that general beliefs shape more specific policy preferences, existing theories of 
public opinion and foreign policy have given this question only limited attention. 
In this chapter, my two goals are: first, to show that the current literature on public 
opinion and foreign policy is limited in its ability to explain why it is that negative 
changes in public opinion about foreign nations are likely to occur; and second, to 
present a theoretical framework filling in this gap in the literature. 
Any theory explaining what causes public perceptions of a foreign nation to 
change must be able to explain first, why citizens increase their attentiveness to a 
particular foreign nation and second, why this attentiveness produces a response 
that is negative. I argue that the current literature on public opinion and foreign 
policy does well on the first point but is less successful on the second. It is only 
recently that political scientists have begun to take an interest in how public 
opinion responds to the foreign policies of other nations (Foyle 2003; Goldsmith et 
al. 2005; Goldsmith and Horiuchi 2009). With the exception ofthe literature on the 
"rally round the flag" effect, until now, the aim of most previous work in the public 
opinion and foreign policy literature has been to explain how the public responds 
to the foreign policies of their own government and how governments respond to 
public opinion in their own country. Abrupt changes are often treated as 
fluctuations and do not tend to be of primary concern. As a result, the focus has 
been primarily on endogenous factors and long-term change. The literature 
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identifies the two most important actors in the relationship between public opinion 
and foreign policy as political elites and the mass media but, as I will show below, 
the focus on these two actors by themselves is not sufficient for understanding 
short-term changes in public opinion. 
Exogenous factors are essential to any theory of changes in public perceptions of a 
foreign nation. The concept most useful in understanding such changes is that of 
"issues". In particular, issues that elicit an emotional reaction among citizens are 
most likely to have an effect. The issues most likely to cause such a reaction to 
foreign affairs are those perceived as intergroup threats. I will argue below that 
changes in public opinion towards a foreign nation are a function of a threat to 
Japan or Japanese values and the amount of media coverage that it receives. 
This chapter is divided into two sections. First, I briefly review past research on 
public opinion and foreign policy to argue that a gap exists in the literature that 
limits our ability to explain changes of public perceptions of foreign nations. 
Second, I present my theory which emphasises two variables: threat and media 
coverage. Although most of the literature on public opinion and foreign policy, as 
well as intergroup threat, has been developed in the United States, I assume that 
their theoretical insights are also applicable to other countries, including that of 
Japan. 
Past Research 
Before proceeding, it is necessary to establish three main assumptions that inform 
the current study of public opinion and foreign policy. First, the main assumption 
is that the public is relatively rational (B. Page and Shapiro 1992; Jentleson 1992). 
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Although citizens may not have a great deal of factual knowledge about foreign 
affairs, public opinion tends to be stable and people do a pretty good job at making 
decisions about foreign policy. Abrupt fluctuations in public opinion are treated as 
exceptions to the rule rather than the subject of study. Second, people are 
"cognitive misers", meaning that they have severe cognitive limitations 
(Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1993). Most citizens cannot deal with the 
overwhelming volume of information that they face in the sphere of foreign affairs. 
As Hurwitz and Peffley (1987:1103) put it, "political judgments in the 
international sphere must be made under considerable uncertainty and without 
many of the interpretive aids commonly used in the domestic arena". To deal with 
this ambiguity, humans rely on simple mental shortcuts to reduce complex tasks 
and to manage the informational environment. These are known as "cognitive 
heuristics" (Tversky and Kahneman 1982:3). Heuristics compensate for people's 
lack of knowledge and attention to politics and allow them to make reasoned 
judgments about foreign policy with small amounts of information. Third, people 
also rely on cues from better-informed sources to guide them as to how to think 
about politics (Zaller 1992). The two main sources of information about foreign 
policy are political elites and the mass media. In short, public opinion appears to be 
stable and to change in a reasonable manner because people use mental shortcuts 
and cues from better-informed elites to simplify complex information (Krosnick 
and Kinder 1990). 
The main reason that the current literature on public opinion and foreign policy is 
limited in explaining how the public thinks about foreign nations is that it has 
primarily been developed to explain the dynamics of public opinion with regard to 
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foreign policy in a particular country. For example, in Aldrich et al.'s (2006:478) 
recent review of the literature, their primary concern was to understand how the 
public makes sense of foreign affairs to increase understanding of how people 
make "reasonable policy-based electoral choices". Since this literature is based 
primarily on the assumption that public opinion about foreign policy is a function 
of domestic factors, these theories have limited explanatory capability in 
explaining changes in public perceptions of foreign actors. I expand on the 
limitations of the mainstream approach to public opinion and foreign policy below. 
Elite Debate 
Public discussions among foreign policy elites are a crucial factor in determining 
whether or not the public comes to see a particular foreign policy as important. By 
foreign policy elites, most scholars are referring to members of the executive 
branch of government, the legislative branch, organised interest groups and 
commentators from the mass media, academia and think tanks.7 Jacobs and Page 
(2005) also suggest including business leaders and organised labour in this 
definition. According to Powlick and Katz (1998:34), public discussion involves 
reporting by major news media of government policies and important events, the 
reporting of elite reactions over a period of time and other analysis of policies and 
events. Numerous scholars have found, for example, that the American president 
has great powers in agenda-setting in foreign policy (Jones and Baumgartner 2005). 
Powlick (1995) proposed a model linking foreign policy decision-making to elites, 
interest groups, the news media, elected officials, and the mass public. Foreign 
7 This definition is adapted from Holsti's (1996:102) use of the definition used in the surveys by the 
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. 
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policies that do not lead to debate among political elites are unlikely to attract the 
interest of citizens. When foreign policy decisions result in what Page (1996:2) 
calls "public deliberation", the reasoning and discussion about a policy among 
elites will activate the public interest. Since as Cohen (1995) shows, political elites 
can use public rhetoric to generate support for their policies, they may occasionally 
have incentives to directly generate positive or negative attitudes towards a foreign 
nation. 
Political elites attempt to shape public opinion through framing (R. M. Entman 
2004 ). Although many definitions exist, I refer to "framing" as the process by 
which citizens develop a particular conceptualisation of an issue or reorient their 
thinking about it (Chong and Druckman 2007:104). A frame is the central story 
line in a communication that suggests to the receivers of information what a 
particular issue is really about. Political leaders care about public perceptions and 
so to maintain their popularity, they must attend in some measure to what the 
public perceives as important (Nincic and Hinckley 1991). As the public pays 
greater attention to a foreign policy, so also must political leaders. 
Although political elites are certainly important in shaping public opinion about 
foreign policy, by themselves they cannot explain short-term opinion change for 
four reasons. First, political leaders do not have the same monopoly of information 
over images of foreign nations that they do in other areas of foreign policy. Baum 
and Potter's (2008:56) model of a "foreign policy marketplace" suggests that in 
international affairs, leaders enjoy a large informational advantage over the 
electorate that allows them to dictate foreign policy. However, while citizens may 
have little knowledge about complicated issues like the defence budget or a trade 
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agreement, they have a far greater number of sources of information, including 
direct contact, when it comes to evaluating a foreign nation. 
Second, although occasionally political leaders may occasionally want to shape 
public opinion about particular nations, their incentives to invest attention or 
political capital to directly improve or denigrate the image of a particular foreign 
country are minimal. The actions of government officials with foreign policy 
authority are a function of bargaining with domestic groups who try to pressure the 
government to select those policies likely to benefit their members (Jacobs and B. I. 
Page 2005:1 07). While business interests, organised labour, defence contractors, 
and a few other interest groups may have some minor incentives to pressure 
elected officials to generate negative or positive attitudes towards a particular 
country when, for example, negotiating a trade agreement, lobbying for more 
foreign aid, or trying to increase the defence budget, this is unlikely to be a 
common request. 
Third, although elites may frame foreign policies, the link to such frames with 
public perceptions of a particular nation is usually indirect. Unless a political 
leader goes out their way to label a nation as "good" or "bad", as Ronald Reagan 
did with his "evil empire" comment, or George W. Bush in his "axis of evil" 
speech, citizens must make the mental step themselves linking a particular frame to 
an attitude. Assuming that people are cognitive misers, this added step increases 
complexity and, therefore, decreases the likelihood that all but the most politically 
attentive will allow a frame that does not elicit an emotional reaction to influence 
their attitudes. 
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Finally, the evidence that political elites even have the capacity to move public 
opinion at all is limited (Page et al. 1987). Most political officials have a credibility 
problem because citizens are aware of bipartisan differences and electoral 
incentives and so often do not trust what they have to say (Groeling and Baum 
2008). In fact, Page and Shapiro (1984) found that the only group of elites that had 
any major influence in the American case was "popular presidents". In sum, while 
over the long term elites may influence the debate regarding a particular foreign 
policy, it is unlikely that they have the incentives or the capacity to move opinion 
towards a particular nation in a particular direction, at least in the short term. 
The Mass Media 
Since Kinder and Iyengar's (1987) pioneering work on agenda-setting, framing and 
priming, political scientists have believed that television news influences political 
judgments. Scholars of public opinion and foreign policy agree that in addition to 
political elites, the key actor is the mass media. By the mass media, I refer to those 
mainstream organisations in a country that are able to set the national agenda. In 
addition to its own incentives as an independent actor, the media is seen as the link 
between policymakers and the public. Policymakers follow media reports on public 
opinion and the media is the public's primary source of information on 
policymakers (Soroka 2003 :28). 
Unless news organisations decide to cover a particular problem, public opinion 
will not be aroused (Powlick and A. Z. Katz 1998:39). According to the 
agenda-setting hypothesis, national media attention to a particular problem leads 
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treaty, it is less useful in understanding short-term changes for four main reasons. 
First, as with political leaders, the media do not have as large a monopoly on 
information about foreign nations as they do about foreign policy. Citizens can 
access any number of sources other than the news on which they can base their 
impressions of a particular country. 
Second, except for some special cases, such as rallying public support for an 
international conflict, the media does not have incentives to generate negative 
attitudes towards a particular country. Bennett's (1990) "indexing theory" posits 
that the media closely links its coverage of politics to elite rhetoric because it 
depends on political leaders for access to information. But if policymakers do not 
have incentives to generate negative feelings towards a particular nation, it is 
unlikely that media organisations will either since they link their coverage to elite 
statements. 
Third, the probability of citizens being influenced only by media coverage without 
a sudden or dramatic event is limited. In the absence of such events, any influence 
on public attitudes towards a foreign nation will most likely be indirect and gradual. 
Repeated exposure to a frame that portrays a particular nation as responsible for a 
foreign policy problem may lead to causal attribution and learning (Iyengar 1991). 
However, without some kind of focusing event, the media is not likely-by 
itself-to be able to cause an abrupt change in public attitudes towards a particular 
nation. 
Finally, while the media does have the capacity to increase attention to an issue, 
this by itself will not determine the direction of change. High levels of media 
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coverage independent of a policy or issue cannot cause opinion change to move in 
a positive or negative direction. 
The relationship between policymakers, the media and the mass public is complex. 
As Baum and Potter (2008) put it, "scholars have investigated every conceivable 
causal link between the public, decision makers (foreign and domestic), and the 
media", but no consensus exists as to who influences whom. Although evidence 
does exist that the media shapes mass public views of foreign policy to a certain 
extent, a good understanding of the dynamics of such effects remains limited. The 
emphasis in the literature on endogenous factors, namely elite debate, media 
coverage, and frames, limits understanding of public opinion about foreign nations. 
Most importantly, neither political elites nor the mass media have strong incentives 
to directly influence how the public views foreign countries. In short, a gap in the 
literature exists in explaining the factors that can cause such changes. To 
understand this process, it is more useful to shift attention away from the 
incentives of political elites and the mass media and towards the impact of 
exogenous factors. 
The Importance of Issue Salience 
To understand the dynamics of short-term public opinion about foreign nations, it 
makes sense to begin any effort by focusing on issue salience. An issue is a 
disputed point or question, usually the subject of a conflict or controversy (Diehl 
1992:333). Salience refers to the fact that colourful, dynamic or other distinctive 
stimuli may disproportionately engage citizens' attention and, therefore, 
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disproportionately affect judgments (Ross and Anderson 1982: 192). 10 In this study, 
salience refers to the degree of attention that citizens give to a particular issue 
(Edwards, Mitchell, and Welch 1995:11 0). Issue salience is important because it is 
likely that citizens will tend to use whatever information is most easily available 
about a nation at a particular point in time as a cognitive heuristic .11 McGraw and 
Dolan (2007:316) posit that so long as people do not "personify the state", 
meaning that they do not associate it with a salient figure in the political system 
such as a particular president or prime minister, attitudes will be formed by 
retrieving those pieces of information about the country most easily available in 
memory at the time that an attitude needs to be expressed. 
The focus on issues in understanding changes in short-term public opinion about 
foreign nations is appropriate because unlike domestic politics, the process of 
foreign policy agenda-setting is primarily event-driven. Domestically, the process 
of getting public attention proceeds incrementally with occasional "focusing events" 
suddenly causing policymaking elites and the public to pay attention (Kingdon 
2002). In those cases, examining elite debate and media attention is critical for 
understanding opinion change. In contrast, foreign affairs issues do not tend to 
arise in such a gradual fashion but rather "burst onto the scene as a result of crises 
or other dramatic occurrences" (Wood and Peake 1998:174). Such events 
involving foreign nations, and most importantly, the reaction of political elites and 
the mass media to them, are crucial if they are going to capture the attention of an 
inattentive public. It is only once an issue is on the national agenda that it is 
1
° Kahneman and Tversky (1982: 11) point out that the effect of seeing a house burning is likely to 
have a greater effect on memory than reading about a fire in the newspaper. 
11 This is known as the "availability heuristic" (Sniderman et a!. 1993 ). 
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possible for it to have an impact on public opinion. If the goal is to understand 
changes in short-term public opinion then, rather than focusing on long-running 
debates between political elites over particular policies, it may be more useful to 
look at those issues that suddenly become a part of the national discourse. 
What kinds of issues are likely to attract attention? Large scale transformations in 
the bases of mass opinion usually require a "critical moment", an intense 
communication with wide exposure and unmistakable value referents (Pollock 
1994:427). For citizens who do not care very much about foreign affairs, the most 
likely issues to draw their notice are those that invoke their emotions. This goes 
partly towards explaining why media organisations are drawn to international 
stories involving violence and conflict. Powlick and Katz (1998 :40) note that 
rather than international meeting or agreements, the media is biased in favour of 
such stories as disagreements among policy officials, wars, riots, and massacres. It 
is logical to assume that an issue that activates positive emotions will produce a 
positive response among citizens while one that activates negative emotions will 
produce a negative response. Therefore, any theoretical framework seeking to 
explain changes in public opinion must identify a typology of issues likely to first, 
capture the attention of the public and, second, elicit negative emotions. In the 
section below, I explain the theoretical framework that will guide the remainder of 
this study by focusing on a typology of issues likely to capture public attention 
based on theories of intergroup threat. 
Theoretical Framework 
For the purpose of this study, I focus on two key variables, perceived threats, or 
from here on, just "threats", and media coverage. A threat is conceptualised as a 
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specific type of issue. The presence of a threat in the informational environment 
produces feelings of hostility towards the object that is perceived to be its source. 
High media coverage increases the salience of a threat and, therefore, its influence 
on the evaluations of the nation involved. When this occurs, public opinion 
towards that nation turns negative. In short, I posit that threat perception is the 
variable that explains the link between media coverage and changes in public 
opinion that are negative. 
Threats 
The following framework is based on theories of intergroup bias, most importantly 
"realistic conflict theory (RCT)" and "social identity theory". Both of these bodies 
of literature are based on the assumption that social identity is derived primarily 
from group memberships. A group is a collection of individuals who perceive 
themselves to be members of the same social category, share some emotional 
involvement in the common definition of themselves, and achieve some degree of 
consensus about the evaluation of the group and their involvement in it (Tajfel and 
Turner 2004:56). In this study, the Japanese public is conceptualised as just such a 
group. 
To explain the roots of hostility towards particular groups, scholars of intergroup 
relations, such as Tajfel (1971) and Brewer (200 1 ), use the concept of threat. Both 
RCT and social identity theory have different explanations for the roots of hostility 
towards out-groups. RCT posits that it is a function of competition for scarce 
resources such as territory, wealth, or natural resources (LeVine and Campbell 
1972). Social identity theory suggests that the purpose of intergroup bias is 
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motivational. People want to maintain a high in-group status relative to other 
groups so that group members can create a positive social identity, thus satisfying 
their need for positive self-esteem (Tajfel and Turner 2004 ). In political science, 
threat has been used to explain the motivations behind public support for the 
European Union (McLaren 2002), anti-immigrant sentiment among voters 
(Mughan and Paxton 2006), political positions on racial issues (Glaser 1994), and 
support for anti-terrorist policies (Huddy et al. 2005). 
The diverse body of literature on intergroup threat begins with the basic 
assumption that human needs are often articulated and fulfilled through groups (M. 
B. Brewer 1991 ). Fears of an external threat can arise when a group is faced with a 
threat to the fulfilment of its basic needs. These can include material needs, like 
food, shelter, and physical wellbeing, but also psychological needs such as identity, 
security, recognition, autonomy, self-esteem and a sense of justice. The collective 
fears and needs of citizens combine with objective factors to determine whether or 
not a specific issue is perceived as a threat. 
The presence of a perceived threat will activate negative emotions and, therefore, 
increase feelings of hostility by an in-group towards an out-group. The perception 
of threat occurs when an out-group's actions, beliefs or characteristics challenge 
the goal attainment or wellbeing of an in-group (Riek 2006). Although at first this 
hostility is generated because citizens seek to differentiate themselves from the 
source of the threat, this soon turns in to derogation when citizens associate an 
out-group with strong emotions such as fear, hatred, or disgust. When threatened, 
individuals can increase their self-esteem by denigrating an out-group (Fein and 
Spencer 1997). This denigration can then lead to prejudice against the threatening 
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out-group (Bettencourt et al. 2001). Brewer (2001) found that the normal 
constraints limiting intergroup hostility disappear when out-groups are associated 
with strong emotions. Those negative emotions are translated into hostility towards 
the source of the threat and can be an important factor in explaining not only 
prejudice but also verbal or physical attacks. 
Since citizens have such a limited knowledge of foreign affairs, they can more 
easily determine whether an issue is important by judging whether or not it elicits 
an emotional reaction. Political scientists have found that citizens use emotions as 
a tool for information processing when thinking about politics. 12 For example, 
Marcus and Mackuen (1993:680) found that anxiety, a negative emotion, enhances 
learning about policies and political candidates. It should be noted, however, that 
emotions can also impair decision making. Using public opinion poll data from 
Israel, Gordon and Arian (200 1) argued that if people feel threatened then their 
decision making about specific policies is dominated not by logic or rationality but 
by emotion. In contrast, when threat perception is low, both emotions and logic 
play a role in policy preferences. 
As applied to this study, the proposition that threats to the in-group produce 
hostility towards the out-group suggests that a perceived threat to Japan should 
lead to an increase in public hostility towards the nation viewed as the source of 
the threat due to the activation of negative emotions. Japanese hostility towards a 
particular nation, in other words, is a product of an emotional response to threat. 
Vivid, concrete, and image-oriented events are especially likely to elicit feelings 
12 For a review of the literature on the use of emotions to make political evaluations see Marcus 
(2000). 
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like fear and hostility, as well as be retained in memory for a longer period than 
more abstract information (Nisbett 1980).13 
Although the vast majority of foreign affairs issues will elicit no response from 
Japanese citizens and, therefore, have no significant impact on public opinion, a 
small minority of cases that are interpreted as threats should have a negative 
impact on public opinion. Foreign affairs issues perceived as threats are likely to 
generate negative emotions such as fear, anger and hatred. Negative feelings 
elicited by a salient threat should prime the public to attribute its cause to the 
nation viewed as its source. After artificially creating minimal in-groups and 
out-groups, Desteno et al. (2004) found evidence of this effect in experiments 
where stimuli that generated anger created automatic prejudice toward the 
out-group. An increase in negative attitudes towards a particular country is a 
function of the Japanese public attempting to differentiate itself from the foreign 
nation viewed as the source ofthe threat. For example, the almost visceral feelings 
of some Japanese to North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il may be an example of 
citizens attempting to differentiate themselves from a threat through denigration. A 
column in the Japan Times (McNeill, D. and Hippin, A., 2003, "Has rightwing 
hijacked Japan abductee issue?", 15 April) described this general view in the 
Japanese tabloid press "who portray Kim as a cross between Dr. Evil and Charlie 
Chaplin, fuming and 'stamping his feet' over Japanese skulduggery". Citizens 
direct these negative emotions towards the perceived source of the threat which 
then increases hostility and negative public opinion change. 
13 While weaker emotions are associated only with avoidance, stronger emotions suggest actual 
behaviour director towards the out-group. 
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Scholars of intergroup threat do not treat the concept of threat as unitary. Rather 
they identify three different types of threats: realistic threats, symbolic threats, and 
threats to group identity. Figure 2.1 shows the theoretical framework for this study 
using the three different types of threat. 
Figure 2.1: Theoretical Classifications of Threats to the Mass Public 
Threats 
Issues 
Non-Threats 
Realistic 
Threats 
Symbolic 
Threats 
Threats to 
National 
Identity 
Realistic threats jeopardise the existence, political and economic power and 
physical or material wellbeing of an in-group. Symbolic threats, which may not 
directly involve the in-group, are a function of intergroup differences in basic 
values, norms and beliefs. 14 Threats to group identity, which directly involve the 
in-group, are those which endanger the in-group's positive social identity. 15 I 
explain in greater detail the nature of each type of threat below. 
14 The major difference between realistic and symbolic threats is that symbolic threats do not involve 
competition over conflicting goals but conflict over values and beliefs. 
15 Rather than conflicts over realistic interests, affronts to the prestige, status and pride of national 
and ethnic groups appear to be one cause of intergroup hostility. 
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The proposition that realistic threats will cause an increase in negative attitudes 
towards a foreign nation is derived from Realistic Conflict Theory which proposes 
that hostility towards an out-group comes from intergroup conflict over "real" 
issues like land, jobs, power and economic benefits. Realistic threats are those that 
may have a negative effect on the existence of the in-group; threats to the political 
and economic power of the in-group; and threats to physical or material wellbeing 
ofthe in-group and its members (W. G. Stephan, Ybarra, and Bachman 1999:2222). 
In their interest model of public opinion Goldsmith et al. (2005:409) call these 
"material" interests, which they define as shared security and economic interests, 
and which are factors in public support for particular foreign policies. 
The difference between realistic threat and the other two types is that it emphasises 
the physical threat posed to the welfare of the group and its members. For example, 
people in the American south who felt their economic interests were threatened by 
progress by African-Americans had negative political-racial attitudes towards 
blacks (Glaser 1994). However, while recognising that citizens do respond to 
events and issues that may cause them actual harm, it is also important to 
emphasise the subjective nature of realistic threats. Perceptions can lead to 
negative attitudes towards an out-group regardless of whether or not a threat is 
"real". The greater the threat that the out-group is perceived to pose to the in-group, 
the more negative the attitude toward the out-group will be. 
In terms of foreign affairs issues, I assume that realistic threats include any issue 
that citizens perceive to be a potential threat to the wellbeing of Japan or Japanese 
citizens. Evidence of concern over the deaths of fellow citizens has been found, for 
example, in the "casualty-aversion hypothesis" which suggests that the public 
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reacts negatively to casualties from their own country during wars (Mueller 1971 ). 
Gartner (2004) argues that local media organisations report on local casualties 
during international terrorist attacks because citizens are likely to take an interest if 
people from their community are affected. As posited by Realism, those larger 
issues that directly menace the existence of the Japanese nation, such as issues 
associated with warfare, as well as those that involve Japanese sovereignty, should 
also be perceived as a threat and, therefore, generate negative emotions. 
Katzenstein and Okawara (1993:98) also posit that Japan has an "uncontested norm 
of economic security" in which a general consensus exists that Japan should make 
every effort to reduce its economic vulnerability. As a result, economic threats 
such as trade sanctions or cheap imports may also be considered to be a threat to 
the nation. 
The concept of symbolic threats comes from social identity theory. A person's 
hostility towards out-groups is produced by comparisons to other groups meant to 
bolster or maintain self-esteem, self-worth or social identity. Symbolic threats are 
concerns by citizens over group differences in morals, values, norms, standards, 
beliefs and attitudes (W. G. Stephan et al. 1999:2222). These elicit a negative and 
emotional reaction among in-group members because they appear to undermine or 
challenge the in-group's worldview. Threats arise due to the belief in the moral 
rightness of the in-group's system of values. Ethnocentrism comes from these 
types of beliefs in which groups holding different values threaten the in-group's 
ethnocentric worldview (Grant and Brown 1995; Grant 1993). Symbolic threat is 
closely related to the concept of symbolic racism, which posits White American 
hostility towards African-Americans is a response to the manner in which 
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African-Americans are perceived to violate traditional values shared by most 
Whites. This includes feeling that they violate values like self-reliance, the work 
ethic, obedience, and discipline (Sears et al. 1979). Symbolic racial politics may 
reflect social competition aimed at enhancing self-esteem through group 
identification (Bovasso 1993 ). 
For the purpose of this study, I assume symbolic threats are those issues that 
violate the worldview of the Japanese public. I assume that the two most important 
values for the public in terms of international affairs are the norms of 
anti-militarism and anti-nuclearism. These norms are the product of collective 
Japanese memories of the militarism of the 1930s and the decision to go to war 
against the United States (Berger 1993: 120). The Japanese view of foreign policy 
is summarised by Katzenstein and Okawara (1993: 1 01) who note that the public 
favours economic strength, peaceful diplomacy and a low-key consensus approach 
to foreign policy. Although Japanese opinion appears to be moving towards a 
"defensive realism" (Eldridge and Midford 2008), I assume that those issues which 
involve the use of force abroad, such as the killing of civilians, wars, terrorism and 
crises should activate negative emotions among a public that believes international 
disputes should be resolved by peaceful means. Even though Japan may not be 
directly involved in an issue or event, the use of force by a foreign nation to 
resolve an international dispute or the testing of a nuclear device should be viewed 
as violations of Japanese values. 
Like symbolic threats, the concept of threats to national identity is derived from 
social identity theory. People can feel personally threaten~d in intergroup 
interactions because they are concerned about negative outcomes for the self such 
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as being embarrassed, rejected, ridiculed, or exploited (Stephan and Stephan 1985). 
Hostility towards an out-group creates or protects relatively high in-group status 
and, therefore, provides positive social identity for in-group members and satisfies 
their need for positive self-esteem. Since in-group members associate their 
self-image with belonging to a positively valued group, just the words of an 
out-group may challenge their sense of value. Anxiety will be especially high if 
groups have a history of antagonism. Successful bias towards the out-group should 
enhance self-esteem ofthe in-group. 
I assume that any issue involving a threat to the value of Japanese group identity 
will produce a negative feeling among citizens towards the nation involved. The 
main difference between a realistic threat and a threat to national identity is that the 
latter does not involve an issue that could harm Japan's material interests. The 
difference between symbolic threats and threats to group identity is that threats to 
group identity involve both a symbolic action and Japan. Rather than coming from 
issues involving the actions of a foreign nations, threats to Japanese identity tend to 
be a function of communications. Such threats can be direct, such as when a 
policymaker from a foreign nation criticises Japan or when citizens from that 
nation engage in anti-Japanese demonstrations. They can also be indirect, however, 
like when Japan is the subject of a diplomatic snub. The negative feelings that such 
issues elicit from citizens are a product of a threat to their country's standing in the 
world. 
Although scholars of intergroup theory recognise the different types of threats, this 
does not allow us to answer the question as to which of these types of issues will 
have the greatest impact on public opinion. This is important because policymakers 
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should know what types of issues are likely to cause a negative reaction among 
foreign publics. If the three types of threat can be differentiated then it may be 
possible to determine whether they differ in terms of the magnitude of their effect 
on public opinion. The literature, however, does not provide a clear answer to this 
question and so it must be answered empirically. 
Media Coverage 
Understanding changes in attitudes towards a foreign nation requires identifying 
the degree of salience the public places on particular threats. When attributing 
causality for a particular event, people tend to give greatest consideration to salient 
information (Ross and Anderson 1982:13 8). Threats influencing attitudes towards 
a foreign nation do not have a constant salience. Zaller (1992) has shown that when 
asked to express an attitude, people tend to state whatever information is most 
easily accessible in memory. If media coverage is high then an issue should be 
more salient. For example, media coverage can boost the impact of a presidential 
candidate's performance on a particular issue as a criterion for evaluation 
(Edwards, et al. 1995). Valentino (1999), for instance, found that evaluations of 
Bill Clinton were influenced by coverage in the media of stories about crime. The 
same process should be at work with foreign nations. When a particular foreign 
policy issue is made salient, citizens' evaluations of that country should be 
influenced by their perceptions of its role in that issue. 
Like any issue, a threat will only be used to evaluate a foreign nation if it is salient. 
A problem that only attracts the attention of a few people, usually the most 
attentive and the most educated in a population, is likely to have only a minor 
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effect on public opmwn. On the other hand, high media coverage of a threat 
increases its importance in the public's evaluations of a foreign nation because it 
draws the attention of even normally inattentive citizens. This increases the 
awareness of an issue for even that segment of the public who do not usually pay 
attention to foreign affairs. When this occurs, public opinion is activated. 
Although people can form many different beliefs about a particular country, I 
assume that only those beliefs that are readily accessible in memory are able to 
influence attitude at any given moment (Tversky and Kahneman 1973). The 
implication is that once an issue no longer receives coverage in the media, it should 
no longer be a major factor in public evaluations of the nation in question (Zaller 
and Feldman 1992). Instead, citizens will access whatever information is most 
easily accessible. Salient issues will tend to only have a short-term impact on 
public opinion because as an issue's salience fades, public opinion will, on most 
occasions, return to its previous level. 
In sum, understanding changes in public perceptions of a foreign nation requires 
not only thinking about what issues Japanese citizens consider to be realistic 
threats, symbolic threats or threats to their identity, but also their degree of salience. 
If an issue is interpreted as a threat then it will activate negative emotions among 
citizens which will then be used to evaluate the nation viewed as responsible for 
the threat. The increase in negative public attitudes towards a foreign nation is a 
function ofthis threat perception and the volume of media coverage. However, the 
impact of such issues on aggregate opinion should be temporary as media coverage 
subsides and the memory of a particular issue fades from the public's memory. 
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Propositions 
Based on the discussion above, I have derived four propositions that will provide a 
framework for the remainder of this study. 
Proposition 1: Issues interpreted as threats produce an increase in negative public 
perceptions of the nation viewed as the source of the threat. 
Proposition 2: High media coverage of a threat increases the magnitude of the 
effect on public opinion. 
Proposition 3: Realistic threats, symbolic threats, and threats to national identity all 
have a negative effect on public attitudes towards a foreign nation. 
Proposition 4: The effects of threats on public opinion will be short-term. 
In the following chapter, I explain the research design, data and methods that I use 
to empirically examine these propositions. 
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3. Methods 
Research Design 
This chapter presents an observational research design used to empirically test the 
propositions derived from the theory in the previous chapter. The primary aim of 
the empirical analysis is to discover whether or not the evidence shows that the 
presence of an issue or event interpreted as a threat is regularly associated with 
negative changes in public perceptions of the nation involved. Evidence of such a 
relationship will go towards supporting the argument that such threats are the cause 
of negative changes in public attitudes towards foreign nations. Furthermore, I am 
looking for evidence that threats that receive higher media coverage are associated 
with greater changes in public opinion than threats that receive lower levels of 
media coverage. The inference would be that any differences in the reaction of the 
mass public to similar types of threats but with different levels of media coverage 
is due in part to variations in media coverage and, therefore, salience. 16 
It is important to note that rather than objective threats, it is threat perceptions that 
are assumed to affect public opinion. The general assumption informing this study 
is that similar types of threats (realistic, symbolic, threats to national identity) elicit 
a relatively similar emotional response from the public. These perceptions held by 
Japanese citizens are a mix of pre-existing beliefs, beliefs derived from objective 
conditions, elite debate and media frames. Although I recognize the diversity of 
16 I have chosen to examine only cases in which the public is exposed to information that a foreign 
nation is engaging in threatening words or actions because no theoretical reason exists for assuming 
that public opinion should change when the public is not exposed to such information. 
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threat perceptions and the fact that some events are likely to elicit a stronger 
response than other, for the purpose of empirical analysis, the magnitude of the 
effect of all types of threat is treated as relatively similar. 
This study uses a mixed-methods approach. First, a large-n statistical analysis is 
conducted; second, a series of case studies using a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative data are compared; and finally, long-term trends in public opinion 
towards the ten nations in the dataset are examined. The goal of the statistical 
analysis is to estimate the effects of the presence of a threat and the media 
coverage that it receives on public attitudes towards a foreign nation. The purpose 
of the case studies is somewhat different. Although their main aim is to examine 
whether or not threats are associated with negative changes in public attitudes, 
their secondary function is to find out just what it is about particular issues that 
leads them to be perceived as threats in the first place. Finally, the goal of 
examining the trends in Japanese attitudes is to find out whether the impact of 
particular threats on the dynamics of long-term public opinion is short-term or 
long-term. In the remainder of this chapter, the subject of the study is introduced, 
the measures are operationalised, and how the analysis was conducted is explained. 
Why Japan? 
Although the goal of this study is theoretical generalisation, the subject is the 
Japanese public. Until now, political scientists have conducted most empirical 
analyses of public opinion and foreign policy in the United States and, to a lesser 
extent, other Western democracies. Given that each state faces a different series of 
foreign policy challenges, it is necessary to use data from as many countries as 
possible to test the literature's main hypotheses. 
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The most important reason to move beyond the case of the United States derives 
from its domestic politics and unique position in the international system. Its 
superpower status, decentralised media structure, and the policy differences 
between Republicans and Democrats over foreign policy raise serious questions as 
to the general applicability of any theories derived from this case and applied to 
other countries. Scholars interested in a theoretical understanding of public opinion 
and foreign policy should look to other democratic nations with high levels of 
media saturation but with a different position in the international system, such as 
Japan. Japan provides an excellent case for examining the impact of the media on 
public opinion about foreign policy. According to Krauss (1996): 
Japan is a particularly good context to try to answer these questions of 
the universality or differences in the impact of the media. It is the 
society most similar to the United States in media use, but most 
different from Western democracies m societal, political and 
journalistic institutional arrangements. Japan thus provides an 
especially interesting laboratory for evaluating the universal or variant 
consequences of the media on politics (p.356). 
The consensus among scholars and opinion leaders is that the Japanese mass media 
is the public's main source of information about politics.17 In a survey of various 
actors in Japanese political life, including the LDP, the bureaucracy, academics 
and opposition parties, the majority of respondents stated that they considered the 
mass media to be the institution with the greatest impact on politics (Kabashima et 
al. 2007:43). 
17The most important works in English on the Japanese media are Feldman (1993), Pharr and Krauss 
(1996), and Krauss (2000). 
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Although some Japanese citizens may get their information about foreign nations 
through direct experience, this is unlikely to be the most important source. What is 
more, a large number of Japanese have never even been abroad. In a 2008 survey 
by the Japanese Cabinet Office, 57.3 per cent of respondents said that they had 
visited a foreign nation at least once. However, only 4.6 per cent of respondents 
said that they had lived abroad for more than three months and a rather large 
number of respondents, 38.1 per cent, said that they had never been abroad 
(Cabinet Office, Government of Japan 2008). Perceptions of foreign nations are 
unlikely to be a product of direct experience. 
The most important source of information about politics in Japan is the mass media. 
Table 3.1 shows a summary of four public opinion polls conducted by the Japanese 
Government between 2004 and 2007 asking citizens where they got their 
information about foreign affairs issues. 
Table 3.1: Japanese Sources oflnformation about Foreign Affairs, 2004-2007 
"What is your main source of information about foreign affairs?" 
Source Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
TV 4 94.00 0.88 92.7 94.6 
Newspaper 4 78.08 3.13 74.4 81.9 
Radio 4 18.73 0.53 18.1 19.3 
Magazines 4 14.83 1.20 13.4 16.2 
Internet 4 12.80 3.17 9.6 16.3 
Movies 4 7.13 0.53 6.4 7.6 
Travelling Abroad 4 6.05 0.65 5.5 6.9 
Meeting Foreigners 4 3.58 0.26 3.3 3.8 
Government Publications 4 3.23 0.49 2.6 3.8 
Other 4 0.33 0.13 0.2 0.5 
None 4 1.83 0.36 1.5 2.3 
NOTE: Respondents were allowed more than one response. 
SOURCE: Japanese Cabinet Office (2007). 
44 
Television and newspapers are by far the most important sources of information. 
Television is especially dominant with 94 per cent of respondents citing it as their 
main source of information. This survey supports Krauss's (2000) work on the 
importance of television news as the Japanese public's main source of information 
about politics. As expected in a highly literate and educated society such as Japan, 
78.08 percent of the population gets information about foreign affairs also from 
newspapers. Although the use of the Internet as a source of information increased 
substantially from 9.6 per cent to 16.3 percent in four years, it still remains far less 
popular as a source of information than either newspapers or television. In sum, the 
Japanese public seems to get most of its information about foreign affairs from the 
mass media, especially television and newspapers, and so it makes sense for media 
coverage to be one of the key variables of interest. 
Variables 
Dependent Variable 
The Japanese public's attitudes towards foreign nations were measured using 
responses to two questions in the Jiji polls conducted between June 1960 and 
March 2007. 
What three countries do you like? 
What three countries do you dislike? 
Respondents were given a choice often countries-the United States, China, South 
Korea, North Korea (from 1970), the Soviet Union/Russia, the United Kingdom, 
France, West Germany/Germany, India, and Switzerland-from which they could 
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state their preferences. Since 1960, Jiji Press, a private media company, has 
monitored public opinion in Japan with coordinated, monthly surveys of public 
attitudes asking a series of identical questions about public approval of Japanese 
political parties, the Cabinet, the economy, and foreign nations. Between June 
1960 and March 1971, Jiji collected monthly stratified samples of approximately 
1,250 respondents. 18 Since April 1971, the size of the monthly sample has been 
between 1,000 and 1,700 respondents (Miyake, Nishizawa, and Kohno 2001 :14). 
This variation in the choices available for respondents allowed for the analysis of 
public attitudes towards ten common stimulus objects using a regularly repeated 
standard question. 
Although any public opinion research faces challenges due to question wording, 
irregularity in the timing or frequency of surveys, and changes in the sampling 
frame or survey procedure, the Jiji data avoid many of these issues. For example, a 
commonly used measure for public opinion about foreign nations is the annual 
polls about foreign policy conducted by the Japanese Cabinet Office asking the 
question: "Do you feel close to the United States (same questions for Russia, China, 
and South Korea) or not?"19 However, these polls cannot be used to address the 
question of short-term opinion change because they are conducted annually. As a 
result, inferences must be made based on public opinion change that may have 
occurred a significant period of time after the events themselves. 
18 Stratification means that the population is classified into subpopulations based on supplementary 
information and then separate samples are selected from each subpopulation (Kalton 1983:19). 
19 Available at: http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/index-gai.html. English translations of some of these 
polls are available at the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation Asian Opinion Poll Database 
http://www .mansfieldfdn.org/po lls/index.htm 
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Although only the national-level aggregate results of the Jiji surveys could be 
obtained, this should not be considered a limitation but rather an advantage. 
Aggregate public opinion poll data is appropriate for analysis by political scientists 
because it is collective, not individual, opinion that affects policymakers. Although 
the microfoundations of the theoretical framework of this study come from the 
individual level, it is assumed that collective opinion reflects the processing of 
political information by citizens. 
The cross-national and cross-temporal comparability of the Jiji polls improves on 
past research on public opinion and foreign policy for two reasons. First, it allows 
for greater accuracy in the examination of not only long-term trends, but also 
short-term change due to temporal proximity of the explanatory variables to the 
dependent variable. Second, since Jiji asked the same question throughout the 
entire period of the study, this avoids the problem of question-wording effects. 
Zaller (1992:33) demonstrated that even a small change in the way that a question 
is asked can change people's responses. The examination of mass attitudes in a 
single country, over time and using the same survey questions, marks a consistency 
of methodology that allows for the analysis of change because both sample design 
and country-specific interpretations of questions remain constant. The assumption 
is that any reported change in attitudes results not from changes in how the public 
interpreted the questions but from changes in the informational environment. In 
sum, the Jiji polls provide a regularity, continuity and consistency of methodology 
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that make this dataset particularly useful for answenng questions about public 
opinion and foreign policy.20 
Before generating a variable for changes in public opm10n, it IS necessary to 
measure public attitudes towards each foreign nation in each month. This is done 
using the percentage of respondents in the Jiji polls in a particular month who state 
that they like a country minus the percentage of respondents in the same poll who 
state that they dislike a country. For example, if 50 per cent of respondents said 
that they liked the United States, and 10 per cent of respondents said that they 
disliked the United States, then my measure for Japanese attitudes towards the 
United States in that particular month would be 40 per cent. When the percentage 
of respondents stating that they dislike a particular country is greater than the 
percentage of respondents saying that they like a country then I interpret this as 
negative public perceptions of that nation.21 
Two different measures for change in public attitudes towards a foreign nation 
were generated from the Jiji polls. The first, for the statistical analysis, is an 
interval variable. The second, for the case studies, is an ordinal variable. For the 
statistical analysis, the variable for monthly change in public attitudes towards a 
foreign nation was calculated by taking the difference between two consecutive 
20 Despite the reliability and validity of the Jiji poll data, measuring change in public attitudes 
towards an object as ambiguous as a foreign nation is not an exact science. Since there is no way of 
knowing exactly what it is that citizens are thinking about at the time of the poll, it is assumed that 
only salient issues have a significant effect on public opinion. Since the polls may be subject to a 
certain amount of measurement error, or "noise", both the results and any conclusions are treated 
with caution. 
21 I do exercise some caution in interpreting the results of the polls because the data is compositional. 
Katz and King, (1999: 19) define this as "a term that describes data sets that sum to unity for each 
observation." This means that citizens were able to state three countries that they liked and three 
countries that they disliked. For the current study, however, I do not treat the data as compositional. 
Instead, I leave a more complex analysis for future research. 
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months in the public attitudes variable for a particular country. So, for example, if 
Japanese perceptions of the United States were a positive 10 per cent in June and 5 
percent in July, change between June and July would be -5 percentage points. 
For the case studies, as shown in Table 3.2, rather than using interval variables, an 
ordinal variable was generated for changes in public opinion to create a smaller 
number of easier to understand categories for the case studies. 
Table 3.2: Operationalisation of Changes in Public Opinion for Case Studies 
Changes in Public Opinion 
No Change 
Minor Change 
Major Change 
Jiji Poll Monthly Change 
Less than 3% points 
Greater than 3% points and Less than 6% points 
Greater than and equal to 6 % points 
The variable for changes in public opinion consists of three categories. "No change" 
is any monthly change in the Jiji data less than three percentage points. "Minor 
change" is a monthly change greater than three percentage points but less than six 
percentage points. "Major change" is any monthly change greater than or equal to 
six percentage points. 
Independent Variables 
Threat was measured by conducting a content analysis of the Encyclopaedia of 
Postwar Japan 1945-2004, 2nd edition (Sasaki et al. 2005:1056-1100) and 
Nihonshi Nenpyo Chizu [Chronological Tables and Maps of Japanese History] 
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(Kodama 2008:36-49).22 The tables from these two sources provide an annual list 
of issues and events involving Japanese politics, economics, and international 
issues from 1945 to 2007. The rarity of threats to Japan involving the countries in 
the Jiji data make it possible to examine the entire universe of events. It was 
important to use a Japanese source to identify issues and events so only those that 
were likely to be relevant to the Japanese public were included. The assumption is 
that what appears in this list was also interpreted as an issue of concern by the 
Japanese public at the time that it occurred. A major advantage of using the list of 
events from these two sources is that they provide the exact month, rather than year, 
which can then be matched with the monthly public opinion poll data. 
The unit of coding is the occurrence of an issue or event interpreted as a threat in a 
particular month. To identify months in which a threat was present, a content 
analysis was conducted of the two sources mentioned above to identify all cases in 
which an issue or event occurred involving one of the ten nations in the dataset. 
Events were coded as either a threat or not a threat to Japan. All issues and events 
not classified as threats and/or which did not involve the ten nations in the Jiji polls 
were discarded. After identifying all issues that could be interpreted as threats by 
the Japanese public, they were then classified into one of three types of threat: 
realistic; symbolic; or a threat to Japanese identity. The definitions of each are 
explained below. 
First, realistic threats were defined as those issues and events that could pose a 
threat to Japan's security or economic interests. Examples included economic 
22 A list of these events can be found in Appendix 1. 
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disputes between Japan and the United States, such as when the United States 
introduced safeguards against Japanese steel; the use or display of military force, 
such as when North Korea launched a missile over Japan; and infringements on 
Japanese sovereignty, such as the negotiations with the United States over the 
reversion of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty and the abduction of South Korean 
dissident Kim Dae Jung from a Tokyo hotel room. 
Second, symbolic threats were defined as those issues and events that could be 
considered to be violations of the Japanese values of anti-militarism and 
anti-nuclearism. This included events such as nuclear tests; actions associated with 
the use of military force to settle an international dispute; and the killing of 
civilians, such as the Tiananmen Square incident and the shooting down ofKorean 
Air Flight 007. 
Third, threats to Japanese identity were defined as those issues that did not pose a 
threat to Japanese security but may have had a negative impact on Japanese 
citizens' self-esteem. These included criticism of Japan and Japanese leaders by 
foreign governments; diplomatic snubs, such as the sudden cancellation of a visit 
to Japan by Boris Yeltsin in 1991; and public anti-Japanese demonstrations. 
The second independent variable, media coverage, was measured by counting the 
number of front page stories mentioning a threat in Asahi Shimbun. According to 
the World Association of Newspapers (WAN), in terms of circulation, Asahi is the 
second-largest paper in the world after only the Yomiuri Shimbun. 23 What appears 
23 According to WAN, in 2003, Yomiuri's circulation was 14,067,000 while Asahi's was 12,121,000. 
Available at: http://www.wan-press.org/article2825.html [Accessed 11 September 2009]. 
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in headlines on the front page of Asahi is likely to reflect what also appears in 
other media sources. Although based on a study conducted in the United States on 
presidential approval, Edwards et al. (1995: 119) argued that front page newspaper 
coverage was the measure most closely related to television coverage. 
For the purpose of this study, it is assumed that what appears on the front pages of 
Asahi Shimbun reflects what appears in other Japanese media. Although not a 
direct measure of the concept of media coverage, short of asking citizens to 
identify those threats that they deemed salient at the time of the Jiji polls, front 
page news in Asahi provides a valid measure for a threat's salience from the 
perspective of Japanese citizens. The decision to use this as the measure for media 
coverage was based on Epstein and Segal (2000:72) who measured issue salience 
by examining what appeared on the front pages of the New York Times. They 
selected the Times as their source for content analysis because of its general 
readership and national orientation which meant that it was unlikely to be biased 
towards regional events, especially on the front page. I assume that these 
characteristics are also common to Asahi. In his study of media exposure and 
political participation in Japan, Flanagan (1996:278) called Asahi Shimbun the 
Japanese equivalent to the New York Times while Krauss (1996:246) identified it 
as Japan's leading newspaper of record. The centralised nature of Japan's media 
market should also increase the probability that what appears prominently in Asahi 
should also appear prominently in other media as well. 
The unit of coding for media coverage was the individual news story. To measure 
the volume of media coverage of a particular threat to Japan, front page Asahi 
Shimbun articles from 1960 to 2007 were content analysed. For each of the cases 
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previously coded as a threat to Japan, a keyword search was used to count the 
number of articles appearing on the front page of the morning and evening editions 
of Asahi in a particular month that mentioned a threat in the text of the article. This 
produced an interval variable ranging from 0 and up. For example, if a particular 
issue that had previously been coded as a threat was mentioned in 20 Asahi front 
page articles then the measure for media coverage with regard to that particular 
issue was 20. The content analysis for media coverage comes from the Asahi 
Kikizou II Bijuaru database which contains the full text of all Asahi articles from 
1945 to 1985 and the website Asahi.com Perfect which contains the full text for all 
Asahi articles for the years 1985 to the present. These two databases allow 
keyword searches and the sorting of articles based on their page number. 
For the case studies, as shown in Table 3.3, an ordinal variable was generated to 
operationalise media coverage. For each category, the number of front page stories 
covering a particular threat was counted using the Asahi Shimbun data collected in 
the content analysis. 
Table 3.3: Operationalisation of Media Coverage for Case Studies 
Media Coverage 
Low 
Moderate 
High 
Number of Asahi Front-Page Stories on Issue 
0-5 
6-15 
Greater than 15 
Threats that received 0-5 front page stories were classified as having "Low" media 
coverage; those that received 6-15 front page stories were classified as having 
"moderate" media coverage; and those that received greater than 15 stories were 
classified as having "high" media coverage. 
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The manual coding of threats and media coverage has two methodological 
limitations. First, since the measure for threats was coded from two sources, some 
issues and events that the authors did not include may have been missed. To 
compensate for this shortcoming, the content analysis was conducted as carefully 
as possible and crosschecked with other sources. Second, and more problematic, is 
the question of the validity of the measure for media coverage. The use of 
individual articles as the unit of coding analysis means the effects of media 
coverage may be underestimated since no distinction is made between the length of 
articles, their position on the front page, whether they included photographs, maps 
or figures. However, since only a single source is used with a large number of 
cases, this should help to minimise random error caused by particular cases. In 
other words, the number of Asahi Shimbun front-page articles should capture the 
key concept of issues salience at a particular point in time. Nonetheless, caution is 
exercised in interpreting the magnitude of the effect of media coverage. 
Analysis 
The following section outlines how the variables were analysed. The purpose of 
each method is to examine the empirical evidence for evidence that the presence of 
events interpreted as threats were associated with increases in the Japanese public's 
negative perceptions of foreign nations. The analysis consists of time-series 
cross-sectional regressions, a series of comparative case studies, and an 
examination of trend data. 
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Time-Series Cross-Sectional (TSCS) Analysis 
To estimate the effects of threat and media coverage, a total of six time-series 
cross-sectional analyses were conducted using ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression with country-specific and month-specific fixed effects. The dependent 
variable in each model was the monthly change in public opinion towards each 
foreign nation except Switzerland, which was dropped to avoid multicollinearity. 
Standard errors were robust clustered standard errors where clusters were countries. 
The total number of country-month observations was 5491 with 314 months in 
which a threat was present. 
The fixed effects allowed for the control of all observable and unobservable 
country-specific and period-specific factors. Since country-specific factors, such as 
history, culture, geographical proximity to Japan, and political system, were 
included in the fixed effects, it was unnecessary to include other control variables. 
For example, any bias in the Japanese public's feelings towards democracies and 
non-democracies; Asian and Western countries; and specific nations such as North 
Korea, China, Russia, South Korea and the United States were all captured in the 
fixed effects. 
The month-specific fixed effects captured any time-specific factors. The most 
important factor during the period of this study was the Cold War. Entman (2004) 
has suggested that in the United States, contemporary public opinion about foreign 
policy faces far greater uncertainty than during the Cold War because of the 
breakdown of a mental framework to understand international relations. The 
Japanese public may have been more sensitive to threats during the Cold War than 
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after because of the possibility this could lead to a wider conflict. On the other 
hand, actions that people took for granted during the Cold War, such as nuclear 
testing, may no longer have been seen as necessary in the post-Cold War period. 
Factors specific to Japan, such as differences in overall attitudes between the 
period of high economic growth until the first oil shock in 1973 or the impact of a 
specific prime minister and cabinet, were also captured in the month-specific fixed 
effects.24 In short, since many factors can be controlled by fixed effects, this 
allows for a close focus on the two main variables of threat and media coverage. 
For all six models, the dependent variable was changes in public attitudes towards 
a foreign nation. The generation of this variable was described in the section above. 
In the first three models, two independent variables were used. First, a dummy 
variable was generated for threat in which the presence of a threat by a particular 
country in a given month was coded as 1. In those months where threats were 
absent, threat was coded as 0.25 Dummy variables for realistic threats, symbolic 
threats, and threats to Japanese identity were also created. For example, in the 
August 1968-Soviet Union intercept, threat was coded as 1 because of the invasion 
of Czechoslovakia and symbolic threat was also coded as 1 because this involved 
the use of military force and, therefore, violated the Japanese norm of 
anti-militarism. In another example, for the September 1998-North Korea intercept, 
24 In my models, the two types of fixed effects can control a range of factors. However, variables 
which are country-specific time-variant factors cannot be controlled in my specification. For example, 
this might include the effects of Vietnam War on only attitudes towards the United States or the war 
in Afghanistan on only attitudes towards the Soviet Union. Collecting such variables requires 
significant time and so is beyond the scope of this study. I leave this for future research. 
25 Since previous research has found that the mass public is inattentive to foreign affairs, I have no 
theoretical reason to expect any significant changes beyond random measurement error in public 
perceptions of a foreign nation in those months in which no threat occurred. 
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threat was coded as 1 due to the missile test over Japan and realistic threat was also 
coded as 1 because it involved a military threat to Japan. 
Second, media coverage, an interval variable was measured by counting the 
number of front-page news stories from Asahi about a particular threat. In the last 
three models, the hypothesis that each of the three different types of threats and 
media coverage has a negative effect on public perceptions of foreign nations was 
tested. Since the research in political communication on agenda-setting suggests 
that media coverage is likely to moderate the effects of information, it is possible 
that an interaction effect between threat and media coverage may exist. It is also 
possible that the effects of each different type of threat are not constant. For 
instance, high media coverage of a realistic threat may have a greater or lesser 
effect on public perceptions than high media coverage of a symbolic threat. To 
examine this question, three interaction variables for each type of threat and media 
coverage were included in the model. For all models, since dummy variables for 
each country and each month were incorporated, no other control variables were 
included. 
Case Studies 
While the large-n analysis estimates the effects of threats on collective opinion 
change, it cannot explain what it is about threats that cause changes to actually 
occur. As a result, following the statistical analysis are a series of brief case studies 
mixing quantitative and qualitative data.26 The impact on changes in Japanese 
26 These studies are informed by suggestions found in George and Bennett (2005) and Gehring 
(2007). 
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public opinion of the different types of threats to Japan and the levels of media 
coverage that they received are compared. Through a description of how the media 
framed particular events, a more nuanced understanding of the types of issues that 
the Japanese public tends to interpret as threats is presented. 
To test whether a causal relationship exists between threats and changes in public 
opinion, evidence must be provided that such changes tend to occur in the same 
months as events and issues that can be classified as threats. Furthermore, to test 
whether media coverage has an impact on public opinion, evidence must be 
provided that those threats associated with greater changes in attitudes tended to 
receive higher media coverage than those threats associated with smaller changes 
in attitudes. In each case, alternative causal explanations for the changes were 
considered and, if possible, eliminated. Assuming that the effect of different types 
of threats is not constant, cases were classified into subsets of realistic threats, 
symbolic threats, and threats to Japanese identity. To understand why the Japanese 
public may have perceived an issue to be a threat, various sources of reliable media 
coverage at the time were examined, including Yomiuri Shimbun and its English 
counterpart, the Daily Yomiuri; Asahi Shimbun; Kyodo News; the Japan Times; 
and the New York Times. 
The selection of cases for each type of threat was based on an operationalisation of 
the concepts of realistic threats, symbolic threats and threats to Japanese identity. 
Table 3.4 shows the operationalised definitions of each variable. 
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Table 3.4: Selection of Cases 
Type of Threat Operationalised Operationalised Operationalised Definition # 1 Definition #2 Definition #3 
Realistic Threats Economic disputes Threats to Japanese Threats to national 
sovereignty Security 
Symbolic Threats Nuclear tests Use or threat of use of Killing of Civilians 
military force 
Threats to National Criticism of Japan by Violations of diplomatic Anti-Japanese 
Identity foreign government protocol directed at demonstrations 
Japan 
For realistic threats, cases were operationalised as any issue in which Japan faced a 
threat to its economic or political well-being. This included economic disputes, 
threats to Japanese sovereignty, and threats to national security. For symbolic 
threats, cases were selected if they involved nuclear tests, the use of or threat to use 
military force against another nation, and the killing of civilians by a foreign 
government. For threats to national identity, cases were selected in which a foreign 
nation criticized Japan, a foreign nation violated diplomatic protocol, and 
anti-Japanese demonstrations. 
Long-Term Trend Analysis 
In the final part of the analysis, the long-term dynamics of Japanese public 
perceptions of foreign nations was examined by analysing the continuity and 
change in public attitudes toward each country. By examining trends between 1960 
and 2007, it is possible to see whether or not Japanese collective opinion is stable 
and whether exogenous factors have long-term effects. Based on the assumption 
that the public pays greater attention to some nations than others, the countries 
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were divided into two categories, non-salient and salient. Public opinion about 
salient countries IS expected to change with greater frequency than that of 
non-salient countries since citizens are exposed to a greater number of issues, some 
of them threats, and media coverage. Evidence that trends tend to regress to the 
mean following exogenous shocks will suggest that the effects of threats are only 
temporary. 
To summarise, this study is concerned with empirically testing the four 
propositions outlined in the previous chapter. To do this, it is necessary to have 
operationalised definitions for changes in public attitudes about foreign nations; 
threats to Japan; and media coverage of threats to Japan. This chapter has outlined 
how each variable was operationalised and the methods used to test each 
proposition. In the next chapter, a large-n statistical analysis of the Jiji data is 
conducted to estimate the effects of threats and media coverage on public opinion. 
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4. Perceived Threats, Media Coverage and Monthly 
Changes in Public Perceptions of a Foreign Nation in 
Japan, 1960-2007 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to use a large-n analysis to estimate the effects of 
threats and media coverage on public perceptions of foreign nations in Japan. I 
argue that issues or events that the Japanese public perceives to be a threat cause 
increases in negative attitudes towards the foreign nation believed to be responsible. 
Although ordinary citizens in Japan do not generally spend much time thinking 
about foreign affairs, as shown by Baum (2002) in the case of the United States, a 
salient issue or event can encourage people to suddenly, but briefly, increase their 
attention to the world outside their borders. Since issues that activate emotions are 
most likely to attract their attention, it is logical to assume that citizens will take an 
interest in those events that elicit negative emotions, such as threats. As discussed 
in Chapter Two, psychologists have found that an external threat will produce a 
feeling of solidarity among an in-group and a feeling of psychological distance 
from the out-group believed to be its source.27 This can tum into hostility as 
in-group members attempt to differentiate themselves from the out-group (Tajfel 
and Turner 2004). The presence of an external threat to Japan should produce 
negative changes among the public towards the foreign nation viewed as the source 
of the threat. 
27 For a review of this literature see Hewstone eta!. (2002). 
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This chapter is divided into four sections. First, the propositions about threats, 
media coverage and changes in public opinion from Chapter Two are briefly 
reviewed. Second, a summary of the variables and the methods discussed in 
Chapter Two are presented and the hypotheses to be tested are introduced. Third, 
the descriptive statistics of the main variables are presented. Finally, the results of 
the analysis are shown and discussed. 
Theoretical Propositions 
Three of the four propositions presented in Chapter Two are applicable to the 
large-n analysis. First, Proposition 1 was that issues interpreted as threats produce 
increases in negative public perceptions of the nation viewed as responsible. When 
the public receives information about a foreign affairs issue or event that can be 
interpreted as a threat this is likely to generate negative emotions among citizens. 
Citizens will direct their emotions towards the nation viewed as the source of the 
threat and opinion will change. 
Second, Proposition 2 was that high media coverage increases the magnitude of the 
effect of a threat on the Japanese public. Since citizens are confronted with a 
deluge of information about politics and international affairs, they face a high level 
of uncertainty as they attempt to discern what types of issues they should take time 
thinking about and which can be safely ignored (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987). The 
main cognitive shortcut that people use to deal with uncertainty is to rely on cues 
from better-informed sources, namely the mass media (Zaller 1992). As suggested 
by the concept of issue salience, the media tells citizens what is important in 
political affairs. When an issue is salient, it will prime citizens to use it in their 
evaluations ofthe nation with which it is associated. Therefore, rather than additive 
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effect, it may be that threats and media coverage have an interaction effect. This 
possibility is examined in the analysis below. 
Third, Proposition 3 was that each of the three different types of threats will all 
have a negative effect on public attitudes towards the nations involved. Scholars of 
intergroup relations have argued that the concept of threat is not unitary but can be 
classified into three types: realistic threats, symbolic threats, and threats to national 
identity (Riek 2006). Each of these should generate feelings of hostility towards 
their source. Although it is possible that the effects of these threats are not constant, 
the theoretical literature does not provide a guide as to which should have the 
greatest effect. This is an empirical question and one that I will attempt to answer 
in this analysis. 
Review of Measures and Methods 
A detailed discussion of the data and methods used in the following analysis can be 
found in Chapter Three. For the purpose of the statistical analysis, I briefly provide 
the reader with a summary explanation of each variable as follows: 
Y -changes in public perceptions of a foreign country: Monthly change in the 
percentage of respondents in the Jiji polls for nine nations in the dataset. 
Switzerland was dropped to avoid multicollinearity. 
X1 - threat --dummy variable coded 0 for months in which an event likely to be 
perceived as a threat to Japan was absent and 1 for months in which such an event 
was present. Events were taken from a content analysis of the Encyclopedia of 
Postwar Japan 1945-2004, 2nd edition (Sasaki et al. 2005:1056-11 00) and 
Nihonshi Nenpyo Chizu [Chronological Tables and Maps of Japanese History] 
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(Kodama 2008:36-49). The list of events coded as threats can be found m 
Appendix 1. 
X2 - media coverage -total number of front-page stories in Asahi Shimbun in a 
particular month covering a particular threat to Japan. The measure for media 
coverage for each threat can be found in Appendix 1. 
X3 - realistic threat -dummy variable coded 0 for months in which an event coded 
as a realistic threat was absent and 1 for months in which such an event was present. 
Realistic threats include those issues and events that could potentially affect 
Japan's resources, power and wellbeing such as trade disputes; military actions 
involving Japan; violations of state sovereignty by foreign actors; disputes over 
territory; and any injury or damage to Japanese citizens or property. Those events 
coded as realistic threats can be found in Appendix 1. 
X4 - symbolic threat -dummy variable coded 0 for months in which an event 
coded as a symbolic threat was absent and 1 for months that such an event was 
present. Symbolic threats constitute all references to events that did not directly 
involve Japan but did violate Japanese values, beliefs and worldview, including the 
killing of civilians; the use of military force; and the development or testing of 
nuclear weapons. Those events coded as symbolic threats can be found in 
Appendix 1. 
X5 - threat to national identity -dummy variable coded as 0 for months in which 
an event coded as a threat to national identity was absent and 1 for months that 
such a threat was present. Threats to Japanese identity include issues associated 
with non-material threats related to Japanese prestige, such as criticism of Japan by 
a foreign leader; diplomatic insults directed at Japan; and anti-Japanese 
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demonstrations. Those events coded as threats to national identity can be found in 
Appendix 1. 
X3X2 Rea/media -interaction variable created with realistic threat and media 
coverage. 
X4X2 Symbolmedia -interaction variable created with symbolic threat and media 
coverage. 
X5X2 Identitymedia -interaction variable created with threat to national identity 
and media coverage. 
Country Dummy -Dummy variables were included for each of the nine nations in 
the analysis to control for country-specific effects. 
Year-Month Dummy -Dummy variables were included for each year-month to 
control for time-specific effects. 
I conduct a total of six time-series cross-sectional analyses using ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression with country-specific and month-specific fixed effects. 
Standard errors were robust clustered standard errors where clusters were countries. 
For a more detailed discussion of the methods used in this analysis, please see 
Chapter Three. 
Before continuing on to the analysis, it is necessary to point out four assumptions 
and limitations inherent in the data. First, even though the dataset contains a 
diverse set of issues and events, all types of threats are assumed to exert an effect 
of relatively similar magnitude on public opinion. Second, interpretations of the 
coefficients are conducted with some caution since the Jiji data are compositional. 
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Third, since the events were coded by the author, a certain element of subjectivity 
was involved in deciding which issues to classify as threats and which to exclude. 
A full list of events and their coding as realistic threat, symbolic threat, and threat 
to Japanese national identity can be found in Appendix 1. Fourth, the measure used 
here for media coverage is indirect rather than direct. The assumption is not that 
the entire Japanese public is reading Asahi Shimbun but that what appears on the 
front page is a reflection of the information that the general public is exposed to at 
that particular time. With these caveats in mind, the hypotheses to be tested are as 
follows: 
Hl: Threats have a negative relationship with changes in public perceptions of the 
nation involved. 
H2: Media coverage has a negative relationship with changes in public perceptions 
of nations viewed as the source of a threat. 
H3: Realistic threats, symbolic threats, and threats to identity all have a negative 
relationship with changes in public perceptions of the nation involved. 
H4: Realmedia, symbolmedia and identitymedia all have a negative relationship 
with changes in public perceptions of the nation involved. 
Threats and Public Perceptions of Foreign Nations 
Table 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the magnitude of monthly changes in 
public perceptions of foreign nations using 5,491 country-month observations. 
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Table 4.1: Monthly Changes in Public Perceptions ofTen Foreign Nations by Threat, 
1960-2007 
Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Total 5491 0.00 2.83 -34.1 13.7 
No threat 5177 0.20 2.56 -11.5 13.7 
Threat 314 -3.25 4.57 -34.1 8.5 
Symbolic 155 -3.53 5.25 -34.1 8.5 
Realistic 122 -3.05 3.53 -13.1 5.5 
Identity 37 -2.79 4.64 -15.3 3.7 
Note: The observations are the change in the difference in the percentage of respondents who said 
they liked a particular country minus the percentage of respondents who said they disliked a country. 
Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, eta!. (2005), Kodama (2008) and Jiji polls. A list of 
threats can be found in Appendix I. 
The mean of changes in attitudes towards a foreign nation in months when no 
threat was present was 0.20 percentage points. The range of monthly changes in 
public opinion was large with variations between -34.1 and 13.7 percentage points. 
When a threat was present, the mean of change in attitudes was -3.25 percentage 
points. The greatest single month negative change in public perceptions of a 
foreign nation was -34.1 percentage points towards China in June 1989 following 
the Tiananmen Square incident. The greatest single month positive change in 
public opinion was 13.7 percentage points towards France in November 1995, a 
positive fluctuation that occurred just after it conducted its nuclear test and public 
opinion regressed back to the mean. 
Each of the three different types of threats was also associated with negative 
changes in public perceptions of foreign nations. Symbolic threats were associated 
with the greatest magnitude of attitude change with a mean of -3.53 percentage 
points. As mentioned above, the greatest single-month change was towards China 
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following the events of Tiananmen Square. The most positive single-month change 
was 8.5 percentage points, coming despite a nuclear test by the Soviet Union in 
February 1962. The positive change suggests that the nuclear test may not have 
been the most salient information received by Japanese citizens at that time. The 
same month, the Soviets also released Francis Gary Powers, the American who was 
shot down over the Soviet Union in a CIA spy plane in 1960, so this may have 
been the issue that was at the top of most respondents' heads when the poll was 
conducted. 
Realistic threats were associated with the second greatest magnitude of opinion 
change with a mean of -3.05 percentage points. The realistic threat associated with 
the greatest change in public perceptions of a foreign nation was towards North 
Korea following its testing of a Taepodong missile over Japan in September 1998 
at -13.1 percentage points. The realistic threat that produced a positive change of 
5.5 percentage points was towards the United States in October 1969, despite an 
acrimonious meeting over the return of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty. Public 
attitudes towards the United States may already have been low just prior to these 
negotiations due to the Vietnam War and so the Jiji polls did not detect any change. 
Threats to Japanese identity were not only much less frequent than either realistic 
or symbolic threats but were also associated with the smallest magnitude changes 
in public opinion at -2.79 percentage points. The largest single-month change in 
opinion was -15.3 percentage points towards China in August 2004 following the 
Asian Cup soccer match final in which Chinese fans booed the Japanese team and 
pelted them with bottles and other objects. The positive change in opinion of 3.7 
percentage points was towards China, despite its criticism of Prime Minister 
Koizumi Junichiro's visit to Yasukuni Shrine in January 2003. The decision to visit 
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Yasukuni suddenly and on New Year's Day, along with the limited foreign 
criticism by China and South Korea on this occasion, likely meant that the 
Japanese public was just not paying attention to this issue at this particular time. 
The positive change detected in the polls was probably nothing more than random 
error. 
Threats and Media Coverage 
Table 4.2 presents the descriptive statistics for media coverage of the three 
different types of threats. 
Table 4.2: Media Coverage by Type of Threat, 1960-2007 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Symbolic 155 33.88 42.72 0 295 
Realistic 122 26.57 30.03 0 179 
Identity 37 10.73 9.72 41 
Threats 314 28.31 36.20 0 295 
No Threat 5,177 0.00 0.00 0 0 
Total 5,491 1.62 10.85 0 295 
Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et a!. (2005), Kodama (2008) and various Asahi 
Shimbun. A list of threats and the media coverage they received can be found in Appendix I. 
Between 1960 and 2007, the mean of front page stories in Asahi Shimbun of events 
classified as a threat was 28.31. Symbolic threats were the most salient with a mean 
of 33.88 front page stories in a single month. The maximum was 295 front-page 
stories in Asahi during the Indo-Pakistani War in September 1965. 28 Four 
symbolic threats to Japan attracted no front page stories in Asahi. Two of these 
involved bombing missions by the United States during the Vietnam War in 
February and December 1967. These may have been so common at the time that 
28 I wish to remind the reader that the measure for media coverage includes all front page stories in 
both the morning and evening editions of Asahi Shimbun. 
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they were not considered as worthy of prominent attention. The other two events 
did not involve any deaths and are even questionable as being defined as symbolic 
threats: the United Kingdom's mobilisation of its ships in the Persian Gulf to deter 
Iraqi President Abdul Karim Kassem from taking action against Kuwait following 
its independence in June 1961 and the US announcement that it was going to 
establish a new headquarters for military operations in the Middle East in 
December 1982.29 
Realistic threats also tended to attract relatively high levels of media attention with 
a mean of 26.57 front page articles in a month in Asahi. The maximum was 179 in 
November 1969 during the Sato-Nixon meetings over the reversion of Okinawa to 
Japanese sovereignty. In contrast, the media gave little attention to trade disputes 
with the US over the export of electronic pagers in June 1983 and over accusations 
by the US that Japan was dumping steel in August 1983 and again in December 
1984. None of these stories received even a single front page news story in Asahi 
Shimbun. 
Media coverage of events that Japanese citizens perceived as threats to their 
identity tended to be much lower than either symbolic or realistic threats, with a 
mean of 10.73 Asahi front page stories. In September 1985, anti-Japanese 
demonstrations by students in China over the visit of Prime Minister Nakasone to 
Yasukuni Shrine attracted only a single front page story. In contrast, Asahi reported 
41 front page stories during the anti-Japanese demonstrations in China in April 
2005. In sum, media coverage of events classified as threats tended to be highest 
29 I code the mobilisation ofBritish ships in the Persian Gulf as a symbolic threat because it involves 
the possibility of military action. The same goes for the establishment of American bases and 
headquarters in the Middle East. Japan has a strong antimilitarist norm. 
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for symbolic threats and lowest for threats to national identity. In the next section, I 
estimate the effects of threats and media coverage on public attitudes towards 
foreign nations. 
The Effect of Threats and Media Coverage on Changes in Public 
Perceptions of Foreign Nations 
According to the first two hypotheses, both threats and media coverage should be 
associated with negative changes in public perceptions of foreign nations. Treating 
threat as a unitary concept, Table 4.3 shows the results of Models I-III which 
estimate the effects of threat and media coverage on public attitudes. Unless 
otherwise stated, all statistical significance is at the 0.1 per cent level. 
Table 4.3: OLS Regression with Country and Month Fixed Effects for Aggregate 
Japanese Public Opinion about Nine Foreign Nations, 1960-2007 
I II Ill 
Threat -3.64··· -2. 71··· 
(0.39) (0.44) 
Media -o.ot** -0.03 ••• 
(0.0 1) (0.00) 
N 5491 5491 5491 
adj. R2 0.08 0.06 0.09 
Notes:* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses 
where clusters are countries. All models include country fixed effects and month fixed effects. 
Switzerland has been dropped from the analysis to avoid multicollinearity. 
Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et a!. (2005), Kodama (2008), various Asahi 
Shimbun, and Jiji polls. A list of threats can be found in Appendix I. 
Model I shows that the presence of a threat in a particular month has a negative and 
statistically significant relationship to changes in public perceptions of a foreign 
nation. In those months that the Japanese public was exposed to information that a 
foreign nation's actions or communications could be interpreted as a threat, public 
attitudes towards the nation involved tended to drop by -3.65 percentage points. 
This is a relatively large increase in public opinion since most of the time public 
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opinion tends to remain stable. This suggests that without controlling for media 
coverage the presence of an issue interpreted as a threat is related to increases in 
negative public perceptions of a foreign nation. 
Model II estimates the effect of media coverage on public opm10n without 
including threat. The relationship is negative and statistically significant but the 
magnitude of the effect of media coverage is small. The fact that a single front page 
news story is associated with a change in public opinion of only -0.07 percentage 
points makes sense. Still, the finding that front page news stories in Asahi Shimbun 
have a negative and statistically significant effect on public perceptions of foreign 
nations does support the hypothesis that media coverage produce increases in 
negative perceptions of a foreign nation. 
Model III estimates the effects of both threats and media coverage. Although the 
magnitude of the effect decreases to -2.71 percentage points, the presence of a 
threat still has a negative and statistically significant relationship to public 
perceptions of a foreign nation. This reduction in the size of the coefficient, 
however, does suggest that an important part of the explanation for the effect of 
threats on public opinion is the high media coverage that they tend to receive. 
However, even after controlling for this, the presence of an event perceived as a 
threat is still likely to have an impact on public opinion. This suggests that a large 
part of the effect of threats may come from how issues are framed by elites and the 
mass media. Furthermore, although smaller at -0.03 percentage points, the effect of 
media coverage remains negative and statistically significant, also suggesting that 
media coverage has a negative effect on public perceptions of a foreign nation. 
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The findings in each of the three models are consistent with the first two 
hypotheses. First, threats have a negative relationship with changes in public 
perceptions of a foreign nation. Second, media coverage also has a negative 
relationship with changes in public perceptions of a foreign nation. It is important 
to note, however, that this does not tell us what it is about the presences of threats 
that produce change in collective opinion. Since citizens do not directly experience 
international events, as Entman (1989) argues it is more likely how the media and 
political elites frame a particular issue that play a significant role in determining 
the extent to which a particular issue is viewed as a threat. This question will be 
examined further in the case studies. 
The Effect of Realistic Threats, Symbolic Threats, Threats to 
Japanese Identity, Media Coverage on Public Perceptions of 
Foreign Nations 
To test the third and fourth hypotheses, it is necessary to subdivide the cases in to 
the three categories of threat identified in the literature on intergroup relations and 
to estimate the effects of each type of threat. Since it is also possible that the effects 
of a threat on public attitudes may be moderated by the level of media coverage 
that it receives, three interaction variables are included. A type of threat that 
receives low media coverage may be less likely to have as strong an effect on 
public attitudes as when it receives high coverage. The results of the statistical 
analysis can be found in Table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4: OLS Regression with Country and Month Fixed Effects for Aggregate 
Japanese Public Opinion about Foreign Nations, 1960-2007 
IV v VI 
Realistic Threat -3.46 ... -2.34 ... 
(0.28) (0.23) 
Symbolic Threat -3.91'** -2.95 ... 
(0.49) (0.59) 
Threat to Identity -3.18 .. -1.54 
(0.74) (0.95) 
Realmedia -0.09 ... -0.04 ••• 
(0.0 1) (0.00) 
Symbolmedia -O.o5·· -0.03 .. 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Identitymedia -0.23 ... -0.15 .. 
(0.04) (0.04) 
N 5491 5491 5491 
adj. R2 0.08 0.07 0.10 
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses 
where clusters are countries. All models include country fixed effects and month fixed effects. 
Switzerland has been dropped from the analysis to avoid multicollinearity. 
Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et a!. (2005), Kodama (2008), various Asahi 
Shimbun, and Jiji polls. A list of threats can be found in Appendix 1. 
Model IV shows that the relationship between each type of threat and changes in 
public perceptions of a foreign nation are negative and statistically significant 
although threats to identity are significant at the 1 per cent level. Symbolic threats 
had the strongest relationship with an average change in public attitudes of -3.91 
percentage points. Even though such events may not involve Japan, a foreign 
nation which violates Japanese values may become the target of hostility among its 
citizens. Realistic threats had the second strongest effect on public attitudes with an 
average change of -3.46 percentage points. As would be expected if the public is 
rational and concerned with its wellbeing, those issues and events that could harm 
or weaken Japan elicit negative emotions. Threats to Japanese identity also had a 
negative effect on public~opinion with an average change in monthly opinion of 
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-3.18 percentage points. The smaller size of the effect may have to do with the fact 
that such events and issues tend to receive lower levels of media coverage than 
either realistic or symbolic threats. Another reason could be due to the fact that 
such issues tend to only involve communications rather than actions and, therefore, 
are less salient. 
Model V shows that the relationship between each of the interaction variables and 
changes in public perceptions of a foreign nation are negative and statistically 
significant. However, the interaction between symbolic threats and media coverage 
is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. Interestingly, the strongest effect is 
the interaction between threats to identity and media coverage at -0.23 percentage 
points. This suggests that the effect of a threat to identity may not be constant but 
gets stronger when media coverage is higher. The magnitude of the interaction 
effect in cases of realistic threats is -0.08 percentage points while in cases of 
symbolic threats it is -0.06 percentage points. These findings suggest that an 
interaction effect is at work and that as media coverage increases so does the effect 
of each threat on public opinion. 
Model VI include each type of threat and the interaction variables. Consistent with 
expectations, the effects of each type of threat and each interaction variable is 
negative. However, the effects of all variables are not statistically significant. The 
direct effects of realistic threats and symbolic threats are statistically significant but 
threats to identity are not. It may be that without media coverage, threats to identity 
have no impact on public opinion. Unlike realistic threats and symbolic threats, 
threats to identity tend to involve the interpretation of communications rather than 
actions. Such events may require much higher levels of media coverage for them to 
become salient than those that involve more easily interpretable actions. 
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The direct effect of a symbolic threat on public attitudes is strongest at -2.94 
percentage points and a realistic threat is -2.34 percentage points. Since both of 
these types of threats tend to involve actions with low levels of ambiguity, they 
may be more easily interpreted by citizens and so will tend to have an effect on 
public opinion even without media coverage. The impact of these types of threats 
may come from how they are framed and from the fact that they are likely to attract 
elite debate. Although threats to identity are not statistically significant, the 
findings do support the hypothesis that symbolic threats and realistic threats have a 
negative relationship with public perceptions of foreign nations. 
The fact that the interaction variables all have a negative and statistically 
significant effect on public opinion supports the fourth hypothesis. However, it 
should be noted that the interaction between symbolic threats and media coverage 
and threats to identity and media coverage are significant at the 1 per cent level. 
Interestingly, the effect of the each type of threat does not appear to be constant. 
The effects of both realistic threats and symbolic threats were greater when media 
coverage was high, -0.04 percentage points and -0.03 percentage points 
respectively. However, the magnitude of this effect in cases of national identity is 
much larger. Higher volumes of media coverage of such threats are associated with 
a change in public perceptions of -0.15 percentage points. This may be because 
when media coverage is high, threats to national identity may elicit a more 
emotional reaction than the other two types of threat because it activates nationalist 
sentiment. While low levels of media coverage of a threat to national identity, such 
as an insult to the nation or an anti-Japanese demonstration, may be ignored as 
nothing more than cheap talk or an event that can be ignored because it has no 
effect, higher media coverage may send a signal to citizens that the honour of the 
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Japanese nation has been infringed upon. Evidence of this interaction effect is an 
important finding and one that makes the study of public opinion and foreign 
policy more complicated. 
Discussion 
While much of the public opm10n and foreign policy literature has quite 
understandably focused on long-term trends in public opinion, relatively less 
attention has been given to examining the causes of short-term opinion change. 
Since we have such little understanding ofthis phenomenon, it is necessary, at least 
for now, to include exogenous variables in any analysis because short-term public 
opinion change is most likely to be mainly reactive. Therefore, in addition to 
building on the work of public opinion and foreign policy, it may also be useful to 
reexamine the literature in psychology, especially that on intergroup relations and 
attitudes, to identify those exogenous variables likely to have an impact on public 
opinion (Hewstone et al. 2002; Ajzen 2001). Furthermore, it is especially important 
to understand not only what causes changes in collective opinion but also to 
understand what causes opinion to change in a particular direction. The concept of 
threat, derived deductively from the literature on intergroup relations, predicts that 
when exposed to a threat the direction of public opinion change will be negative. 
Empirically this appears to be the case. 
The effects of media coverage on public opinion are subtle. Once media coverage 
is removed, the magnitude of the effects of all three types of threats goes down, but 
especially for threats to Japanese identity. Instead of a direct effect, media coverage 
appears to moderate the effects of a threat. This is not the first time such an effect 
has been detected. The media has been found, for example, to be able to affect 
evaluations of presidential candidates by reporting on crime (Valentino 1999). 
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Although all three types of threats were found to have a negative effect on public 
perceptions of a foreign nation, the greatest effect was found in media coverage of 
threats to national identity. As such threats could be considered as activating 
ethnocentrism, high media coverage of such issues may lead citizens to feel a direct 
threat to their self-esteem (Grant 1993). For example, information that Chinese or 
South Korean leaders have made comments deriding Japan is likely to be ignored if 
media attention is low. However, high media coverage may be able to whip up 
populist sentiment and lead to an increase in negative perceptions of those nations. 
Although the variable for threat captures numerous factors that are difficult to 
measure quantitatively, such as how an issue is framed by the mass media and 
political elites, not much is known as to what exactly it is about a particular threat 
that moves public opinion. Is it the event itself, how the event is reported, or how 
political elites respond? For now, the claim here is limited to the empirical finding 
that perceived threats are associated with negative changes in public opinion. In the 
case studies in the following chapters, what it is about a particular threat that leads 
to collective opinion change will be examined. 
While this chapter has presented a big picture v1ew of changes in public 
perceptions of a foreign nation, I have said nothing about particular cases or the 
dynamics of long-term collective opinion change. As I pointed out, while I have 
shown that the presence of a perceived threat is associated with a negative change 
in public opinion towards a foreign nation, little is known about what causes an 
issue to be perceived as a threat in the first place. For the reader to get a good idea 
of how threats and media coverage interact with one another to activate public 
opinion, it is necessary to examine specific cases. In the next three chapters, the 
methodological approach switches to qualitative case studies that allow for the 
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examination of the process by which specific events classified as threats actually 
lead the Japanese public to increase negative feelings towards a foreign nation. The 
framing of events and issues by political elites and the mass media is found to be 
essential. 
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5. Realistic Threats to Japan and Public Perceptions of 
Foreign Nations 
Introduction 
The goal ofthe following three chapters is to build on the findings in the statistical 
analysis. The primary purpose of this chapter is to investigate whether cases of 
realistic threats to Japan tend to be associated with negative changes in public 
attitudes towards the nation involved. Realistic threats involve those issues and 
events that threaten an in-group's physical or material wellbeing; political and 
economic power; or existence (LeVine and Campbell 1972). The first argument is 
that realistic threats will produce negative changes in public perceptions of the 
nation viewed as its source because this activates negative emotions such as anger 
and fear. When two groups compete with one another over scarce resources, this 
can lead to an increase in in-group solidarity and out-group hostility. As applied to 
this study, the proposition that realistic threats to an in-group can produce hostility 
towards an out-group suggests that perceived realistic threats to Japan should 
produce an increase in negative public perceptions of the nation viewed as the 
source of the threat. Realistic threats are divided into three groups: economic 
disputes; violations of Japanese sovereignty; and threats to Japan's national 
security. The second argument is that those cases of realistic threat that receive 
higher media coverage should produce changes in public attitudes of greater 
magnitude. This occurs because a threat's salience is likely to increase the 
percentage of respondents who are aware of it. As a result, opinion will change. 
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The unit of analysis in this chapter is the individual case. As throughout this study, 
realistic threats are exogenous variables identified by a content analysis of Sasaki 
et al. (2005) and Kodama (2008). I define a case of realistic threat as any of the 
following three types of issues. First, "economic disputes" are any issue perceived 
as a conflict over economic issues, such as trade or access to natural resources. 
Second, "violations of Japanese sovereignty" are those issues involving illegal 
intrusions into Japanese waters and territory and those long-running conflicts with 
other nations over the sovereignty of Japanese territory. Third, "threats to national 
security" are those issues perceived as military threats, such as a direct military 
attack on Japan or any kind of military activity that sends a threatening signal. 
As discussed in Chapter Three, the dependent variable for the case studies is 
change in public opinion. This is an ordinal variable classified as "no change", 
"minor change" and "major change". The main independent variables are the 
presence of a realistic threat to Japan and media coverage of the threat. Media 
coverage can be classified into "low", "moderate", or "high". For more on how 
these variables were coded, see Chapter Three. 
Hypotheses 
This chapter is concerned with testing the following two hypotheses. First, cases of 
realistic threat should be associated with negative changes in Japanese public 
perceptions of the nation involved. Second, cases of realistic threats that receive 
high media coverage should have a greater effect on public attitudes towards the 
nation involved than those that receive low media coverage. These hypotheses are 
tested with cases involving the three types of realistic threats: economic disputes, 
threats to Japanese sovereignty, and threats to Japanese security. 
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Economic Disputes 
In the following section, I argue that economic disputes between Japan and another 
country will tend to produce negative changes in Japanese public attitudes towards 
the other country. This is derived from Realistic Conflict Theory (RCT), which 
suggests that competition between groups for scarce resources can be a major 
factor in producing hostility. For example, threats to economic wellbeing have 
been shown to have a negative effect on attitudes towards immigrants (Zarate et al. 
2004). Cases of economic disputes should be associated with changes in public 
attitudes towards the nation involved. Furthermore, cases of economic disputes that 
receive higher media coverage should be correlated with changes of greater 
magnitude in public opinion. 
Using interval variables, Figure 5.1 shows a negative, but weak, relationship 
between the number of front page stories in Asahi Shimbun about a threat and 
changes in public opinion. A list of these cases can be found in Appendix 2. 
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Figure 5.1: Front Page Stories of Economic Disputes and Change in Public Attitudes 
toward Nation Involved, 1960-2007 
Q) 
Cl 
~0 
..c 
(.) 
N=28 
0 
"<'""" 
I 
o4 
o6 
012 
o2 
0 
017 
CD2lB 
024 
025 
50 100 
Number of Front Page Stories in Asahi 
Note: Cases are listed in Appendix 2. 
150 
Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008), various Asahi 
Shimbun, and Jiji polls. 
Although the relationship does not appear to be strong, media coverage of 
economic threats is associated with negative changes in public perceptions of the 
country involved. An example of a typical case of an economic dispute was a 
bilateral dispute over steel (Case 1) which received 0 front page stories and was 
associated with a change in opinion of -0.2 percentage points towards the United 
States. Another example of an economic dispute was a trade dispute over beef and 
citrus (case18), which received 26 front page stories but was associated with a 
change in attitudes towards the United States of only -2.1 percentage points in 
April 1984. One case of exceptionally high media coverage was the negotiations 
over fishing rights which received 14 7 front page stories and was associated with a 
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change in attitudes towards the Soviet Union of -11.1 percentage points in April 
1977. Front page media coverage of economic disputes appears to usually be quite 
low and the magnitude of changes in attitudes appears to be quite small. Still the 
effect of such disputes and media coverage does appear to be negative. This 
provides some support for the argument that economic disputes are associated with 
negative changes in public opinion. 
Using ordinal variables, Table 5.1 shows the effect of media coverage on public 
opinion in 28 cases of economic threats. 
Table 5.1: Economic Disputes, Media Coverage and Changes in Japanese Public 
Perceptions of the Nation Involved, 1960-2007 
High Moderate Low Total 
Major Change 2 0 0 2 
(15.38) (0) (0) (7.14) 
Minor Change 2 5 0 7 
(15.38) (50) (0) (25) 
No Change 9 5 5 19 
(69.23) (50) (100) (67 .86) 
Total 13 10 5 28 
(100) 100 100 100 
Note: Percentages in brackets. See Appendix 2 for list of cases. "Major Change" and "Minor Change" 
both refer to cases of negative change in opinion. See Chapter Three text for how the variables were 
generated. 
Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et a!. (2005), Kodama (2008), various Asahi 
Shimbun, and Jiji polls. 
The data show that in quite a few cases of economic threats, public opm10n 
towards the country involved did change. Nine ofthe 19 cases were associated with 
negative changes in public opinion. Given that such events are not likely to be very 
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salient to the mass public, this is an interesting finding. Regarding the effect of 
media coverage, examining the row marked "Major Change", it does appear that 
cases that received higher media coverage were also those associated with high 
media coverage. It appears that occasionally economic threats are associated with 
changes in public opinion and that higher levels of media coverage are associated 
with greater changes in opinion. 
Low Media Coverage 
Even when an important Japanese industry is threatened with disproportionate 
sanctions, if media coverage is low, this is unlikely to result in a change in public 
opinion if media coverage is low. An example of this was a trade dispute between 
Japan and China in 2001 that began when the Japanese Government introduced 
temporary safeguards on imports of leeks, shiitake mushrooms and igusa rushes, 
most of which come from China ("China duties loom as major threat", Daily 
Yomiuri, 20 June 2001, p.22).30 Even though the Japanese sanctions involved only 
agricultural products, China retaliated against high-value Japanese manufactured 
goods, placing 100 per cent punitive tariffs on imports of cars, mobile phones and 
air conditioners ("China and Japan tackle trade row", BBC News, 3 July 2001).31 
Chinese agricultural goods affected by the safeguards were only worth 
approximately $100 million USD while Japanese goods affected by the Chinese 
tariffs were worth $700 million USD ("Japan-China trade row lives on", BBC 
News, 8 November 2001 ).32 This dispute received relatively low media coverage, 
3
° Case 4 in Appendix 2. !gus a rushes are used to make tatami mats. Japanese investigators found that 
China had increased its exports ofleeks to Japan by nine per cent between 1999 and 2000. As a result, 
domestic prices dropped by 12 per cent. 
31 Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1419480.stm [Accessed 4 May 2009]. 
32 Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/164449l.stm [Accessed May 4, 2009] 
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attracting attention only when it began and when it ended. In June 2001, the month 
in which the dispute received the greatest attention, Japanese attitudes towards 
China did not change. This suggests that the public did not see this issue as a 
salient threat. One reason may be that a topic like WTO safeguards is quite distant 
from the world of most Japanese citizens. Without media coverage to tell them that 
it is important, it is unlikely to be given much attention, much less activate 
emotions like anger or fear. 
Another instance in which an economic dispute was limited to a particular industry 
was in March 2002 when the United States placed tariffs on steel products, 
including those from Japan, due to accusations that they were dumping steel on the 
US market at unfair prices. The Japanese government retaliated by raising tariffs 
on steel, benzene, textiles, leather products and other imports from the United 
States. In Japan, the restrictions on steel were believed to be a cynical concession 
by President George W. Bush to protectionist sentiment in the American steel 
lobby. According to the Daily Yomiuri ("U.S. steel decision move in right 
direction", 6 December 2003, p.4), "the Bush administration's latest decision was a 
calculated move linked to his re-election bid." However, this issue seems to have 
barely registered with the Japanese public. Jiji reported no change in attitudes 
towards the United States in March 2002. Although those in the steel industry may 
have been concerned with this issue since it affected their livelihood, without 
media coverage, concern over this issue was not likely to spread to the wider 
Japanese population. 
Various other examples of economic disputes between Japan and the United States 
suggest that such events are not salient to the wider Japanese public. The United 
States accused Japan of dumping steel but in August 1983 and December 1984, 
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two months in which this was a salient issue, attitudes towards the United States 
did not change. Sometimes, the disputes would be over electronic products, such as 
when Washington accused Japan of dumping pagers. However, in June 1983, the 
month in which this issue was salient, attitudes towards the United States did not 
change. Despite the fact that each of these cases involved sectors of the Japanese 
economy facing potential damage, they appear to not have been interpreted as 
threats to Japan. As a result, public opinion towards the United States remained 
stable. 
Moderate Media Coverage 
Even many economic disputes that receive moderate media coverage were not 
associated with changes in public attitudes. While such disputes may generate 
some negative feelings towards the other country involved they are usually 
unlikely to be salient beyond those in the affected industry. Such disputes are 
unlikely to involve the activation of emotions either unless they involve some kind 
of nationalist frame. For example, in February 1980 a dispute erupted between the 
US and Japan over Japanese automobile exports when the representative for the 
United Autoworkers (UA W), Douglas A. Fraser, visited Japan for talks with Prime 
Minister Ohira Masayoshi and Japan's four major car manufacturers to encourage 
greater investment in auto assembly plants in the US ("U.A.W. talks in Japan 
ended", New York Times, 15 February 1980, p.D8)33 . Fraser threatened Japanese 
carmakers that he would go to the American Congress and lobby for the 
introduction of legislation to limit Japanese imports ("Fraser bids Japan build cars 
in U.S.", New York Times, 14 February 1980, p.D1). Although the threat of 
33 This is Case 6 in Appendix 2. 
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limiting imports on cars may have had an impact on Japanese exports, and, 
therefore, the Japanese economy, the Jiji polls did not report any change in 
attitudes towards the United States in February 1980. Since the effect of any limits 
on Japanese cars was unlikely to have a significant effect on citizens beyond those 
in the automobile industry this dispute would not have been viewed as a threat to 
Japan. As a result, public opinion did not change. 
However, some economic disputes that received moderate media coverage were 
associated with negative changes in attitudes towards the nation involved. In 
December 2003, after the United States announced its first suspected case of 
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in Washington State, Japan immediately 
halted all beef imports from the US.34 At the time, these imports accounted for 
approximately 30 per cent of all Japanese domestic beef consumption ("U.S. BSE 
report hits retailers". Daily Yomiuri, 25 December 2003, p.2).35 The day after the 
announcement of the ban, the media reported that Japan was now facing a beef 
shortage. The Japanese restaurant and supermarket industries quickly expressed 
concerned about the economic impact of this on their business. In December 2003, 
the month of the dispute, the data show that public attitudes towards the United 
States experienced a minor negative change of -4.7 percentage points. 
Blame for the "BSE problem" was placed squarely on the United States with the 
Daily Yomiuri ("Stop dangerous imports at the water's edge", December 25, 2003, 
p.4) writing that the source of the problem was "the laxity of the screening system 
in the United States, where only cows suspected of having contracted the disease 
34 Case 8 in Appendix 2. 
35 Two large Japanese restaurant chains, Yoshinoya and Matsuya, used primarily American beef in 
their gyudon (rice topped with seasoned beef). 
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are subject to screening." Feeling that their health was potentially threatened, the 
Japanese public agreed with their Government's decisions to screen imported beef 
from the United States as shown in a Yomiuri Shimbun poll which found that 71.3 
per cent of respondents supported the decision ("Bei-BSE-gyu, zentoukensa 
'hitsuyou' 9 wari I Yomiuri Shinbunsha zenkoku yoronchousa; [Ninety percent 
agree to screening of all beef from US I Yomiuri Shimbun poll]" Yomiuri Shimbun, 
April 24, 2004, p.9). The Japanese public was concerned about this issue and it was 
salient. 
Public attitudes towards the United States were associated with a minor negative 
change in December 2003. Although this was an economic issue-the banning of 
an agricultural import-it was framed by political leaders and the mass media as a 
health issue. Japan has historically been highly sensitive to its food safety with 
domestic stories of tainted food products often eliciting a strong reaction from 
citizens. It was the framing of this dispute as a health concern, rather than an 
economic dispute, that was likely responsible for the minor change in public 
opinion. Without the health aspect of the case, the decision to ban an American 
agricultural product like beef would likely have had little impact on public opinion. 
One implication may be that those domestic interest groups that frame issues such 
that citizens link trade to public health may be at least partly responsible for 
generating negative perceptions of a foreign nation. 
High Media Coverage 
Even though an economic dispute receives high media coverage, it is unlikely to 
have an effect if it remains solely about its effects on a particular industry. In 1968 
and 1969, at a time when tensions were extremely high between Japan and the US 
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over first, the Vietnam War and second, the issue of Okinawan sovereignty, the 
two nations became locked into a dispute over whether limits on Japanese textile 
exports to the United States should be voluntary or mandatory ("U.S. and Japan 
push hunt for a textile agreement", New York Times, 10 November 1970, p.67).36 
This issue was particularly important to some Japanese political and business 
leaders because of a growing fear of rising protectionist sentiment in the American 
Congress. The US wanted Japan to place mandatory restraints on its exports of 
textiles while the Japanese domestic textile lobby wanted to make such restraints 
voluntary. 
Despite the high media coverage of this dispute and the involvement of both Prime 
Minister Sato and President Nixon, however, the Jiji polls did not report any 
change in Japanese attitudes towards the United States. One reason for the lack of 
public opinion activation may have been that this was only one of three major 
issues that Japan was concerned about with regard to the US. If neither the 
Vietnam War nor Okinawa were salient at the time then it is possible that the 
textiles dispute may have resonated with citizens. As suggested by Converse 
(1964 ), citizens can only consider a limited number of items on the national agenda 
at any one time. However, another possibility is that-like many of the economic 
disputes discussed above-the Japanese public just did not find this issue to be a 
serious threat to the nation as a whole. While American limits on textiles would 
certainly have an effect on that industry, and the involvement of top political 
leaders also signalled its importance, Japanese citizens just did not see this issue as 
a threat to their economic wellbeing. The result was opinion stability. 
36 Case 26 and Case 27 in Appendix 2. For a detailed analysis of this dispute see Destler eta!. (1979). 
91 
Even when media coverage is high, disputes with other nations that revolve 
primarily around economic issues are unlikely to affect public attitudes towards the 
other country. Requests for aid packages from foreign nations that were rejected by 
the Japanese Government were not associated with any changes in public opinion. 
For example, in 1983, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro made the first visit to 
South Korea by a Japanese leader since diplomatic relations were established 
between the two nations to discuss the continued negotiations between South 
Korea and Japan over a long-term loan ("Foreign Minister Abe discusses ROK 
loan issue", Kyodo, 5 January 1983) and in March 1993, Japan refused to approve 
an aid package to post-Soviet Russia, resulting in heavy criticism especially from 
French President Francois Mitterand and German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel 
("Rebuts criticism of aid stance", Kyodo, 22 March 1993).37 Despite high media 
coverage, public attitudes towards South Korea did not change in January 1983 and 
attitudes towards Russia did not change in March 1993. Media coverage by itself 
does not appear to be able to generate a sense of threat from economic issues. Most 
cases of requests for Japanese aid in which the Japanese Government refused did 
not tend to elicit an emotional reaction from citizens probably because they were 
simply not interpreted as serious threats. 
Although sometimes it may appear that trade disputes between Japan and the 
United States are tinged with emotions, even with high media coverage, the typical 
trade disputes between the two countries that arose in the 1970s and 1980s did not 
tend to be associated any change in Japanese opinion about its main trading partner. 
For example, a dispute in late 1977 and early 1978 over the Japanese imports and 
37 These are Case 17 and Case 21 in Appendix 2. 
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the US trade deficit intensified but produced no change in opinion. 38 Other 
examples of economic disputes that did not correlate with a change in public 
opinion were a dispute between the US and Japan over beef and citrus fruit exports 
and a 1985 bill to limit Japanese imports into the US.39 Even with high media 
coverage, trade disputes do not appear to be interpreted as threats to the nation and, 
therefore, do not have much of an effect on public evaluations of foreign nations. 
A disagreement over Japanese aid to South Korea in September 1981 was 
associated with a minor change in public opinion of -4.7 percentage points40 • 
Suffering severe economic problems, Seoul requested from Japan a $6 billion USD 
package in economic aid to support a five-year development plan to help its 
recovery ("Tokyo and Seoul again fail to agree on aid", New York Times, 13 
September 1981, p.27). However, based on the grounds that South Korea was 
providing peace and stability on the Korean peninsula that was also of great benefit 
to Japan, South Korea insisted that the 1965 agreement on the normalisation of 
relations between the two nations be renegotiated and that South Korea should 
receive better terms (Roeder, B., 1981. "Japan's rift with South Korea", Newsweek, 
14 September, p.21 ). Although Seoul was emphatic in linking the aid to its 
military policy directed towards North Korea, Japan objected to this. 
The negative change in public opinion was likely a result of Japanese anger over 
the South Korean Government's tone in its demands and the rather unreasonable 
call for the renegotiation of a treaty that both nations had signed more than 15 
years earlier. Although disagreeing with the South Korean position on this issue, 
38 Case 24 and Case 25 in Appendix 2. 
39 Case 18 and case 20 in Appendix 2. 
4
° Case 19 in Appendix 2. 
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Japanese elites attempted to prevent the escalation of the dispute. The deputy 
secretary of the LDP, Minowa Nobaru, rejected South Korea's claims of Japanese 
free-riding and stated that Japan was already contributing to the defence burden in 
East Asia, especially with regard to the protection of sea lanes ("LDP's Minowa 
raps ROK economic aid argument", Kyodo, 19 August 1981). He clearly argued 
that first, it was unconstitutional to lend foreign aid to another nation for its 
defence and second, Japan's current fiscal situation prevented Japan from doing 
more. However, in spite of rejecting South Korean demands that aid be linked to 
defence matters, Japan was still enthusiastic about extending further aid to South 
Korea ("Suzuki-no meeting", Kyodo, 21 August 21 1981). Policymakers 
continually emphasised in their rhetoric that they wanted to give as much support 
to South Korea as possible. Despite the efforts by Japanese elites, however, the 
Japanese public was nonetheless likely unhappy with South Korea. This case 
suggests that even though Japanese political elites may attempt to prevent a dispute 
from escalating it can still activate public opinion. Other nations making economic 
demands in what can be interpreted as an arrogant manner are likely to elicit 
feelings of hostility. 
While disputes that focus on only on trade or economic aid may not be perceived 
as threats to Japan, those that receive high media coverage and are linked to 
nationalist issues can elicit a strong negative reaction from the public. One example 
of this was the disagreement between Japan and the Soviet Union over a 
long-running dispute related to the rich fishing grounds off Hokkaido, Japan's 
northernmost prefecture.41 Local fishermen had complained for years that Soviet 
boats were fishing off the coast of Japan and, since 1968, had been sending large 
41 Case 28 in Appendix 2. 
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trawler fleets into Japanese waters to catch sardine and mackerel ("Sea limit 
extension to cause problems with USSR", Kyodo, 27 January 1977).42 Not only 
would the larger Soviet trawlers sometimes damage Japanese nets and boats but 
they were also believed to be responsible for the decline in fish stocks.43 In 1977, 
the Soviet Union unilaterally announced that it was increasing its Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ), also known as the 200-mile limit, so that it would encroach 
on Japanese waters. Japan responded to the Soviet action by engaging in a series of 
highly acrimonious high-level negotiations over the issue of access to the fishing 
grounds that fell within the EEZ but were also close to the disputed Northern 
Territories.44 Tokyo insisted that the Soviets stop interfering with its fishing boats 
in the area while Moscow demanded that discussions of herring and salmon be 
excluded from the talks ("Suzuki raps USSR's excluding salmon, herring from 
talks", Kyodo, 15 March 1977). 
This dispute, which only directly involved the small number of fishermen in 
Hokkaido whose catches were affected by Soviet actions, was correlated with a 
major negative change in public attitudes towards the USSR of -11.1 percentage 
points in April 1977.45 One reason for that this issue may have had an impact was 
that media coverage of this dispute was extremely high. More importantly, 
42 In 1977, it was reported that the Soviets had approximately 100 fishing boats catching fish in 
Japanese waters. 
43 Although Japan and the Soviets had negotiated a system for damage reparations, it had not yet 
come into effect. By 1977, the Japanese side had mounted 710 claims for damages but the Soviet 
committee responsible for such claims had approved of only two. Further infuriating Japanese 
fishermen was the fact that the Soviets would occasionally seize Japanese vessels, such as on 
February 4, 1977 when patrol boats held the No. 53 Taihei Maru, a 124-ton dragnet fishing boat with 
20 crewmen operating in the Japan Sea ("Soviet patrol boat captures Japanese fishing boat", Kyodo, 4 
February 1977). 
44 One reason for the high level of media coverage was the fact that the dispute was not only 
economic but also involved national sovereignty. However, while public opinion may have been 
influenced by nationalist considerations, the heart of the dispute was over access to economic 
resources. 
45 After the shooting down of Korean Airlines 007 in 1983, this was the second-largest single month 
change in Japanese attitudes towards Russia or the Soviet Union between 1960 and 2007. 
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however, was that while economic issues were involved, the dispute also involved 
the Soviet Union, a nation that the Japanese public had long viewed negatively and 
with a high level of distrust. This may have affected the public's perception of the 
negotiations. Furthermore, since the issue was linked by Japanese policymakers to 
the Northern Territories issue this may also have led citizens to view it in 
nationalistic terms, therefore, eliciting an emotional reaction. In short, various 
factors other than the solely economic aspects of this dispute were also salient at 
the same time. Once these emotions were activated, in what was once a case 
involving Hokkaido fishermen, came to be interpreted as a threat to the interests of 
Japan. 
To summanse, the case studies suggest that those economic disputes linked to 
wider issues, such as health and national pride, are associated with negative 
changes in public attitudes towards the nations involved while those disagreements 
that involve primarily trade or development aid are not. It does appear that many 
economic issues are not interpreted as realistic threats to the nation. In some ways, 
it is surprising that citizens do not respond to issues that may affect their wellbeing. 
For example, trade barriers by the United States could damage Japanese industry 
which could then damage the wider Japanese economy. On the other hand, most of 
the economic disputes that involve Japan and other nations are likely to affect only 
a limited number of individuals. Unlike a missile threat from North Korea, 
safeguards from China on Japanese imports are probably not going to elicit much 
of an emotional response. Those cases that were associated with opinion change, 
such as the BSE dispute or the fishing negotiations with the Soviet Union, involved 
issues other than the economic dispute. For an economic issue to have an impact, it 
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may be necessary for it to be involved in a wider sense of threat beyond its solely 
economic aspects. 
Violations of National Sovereignty 
The following section addresses the question of whether or not violations of 
Japanese sovereignty by foreign actors are associated with changes in Japanese 
public opinion about the nation involved. Citizens should be concerned with the 
territorial integrity of their state because this involves the basic organising principle 
for order in international relations since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. For the 
purpose of this study, violations of national sovereignty can be classified into two 
general groupings. One set of issues involves disputes over territorial claims 
between Japan and other nations. This involves long-running issues such as the 
Senkaku Islands dispute with China, the Takeshima dispute with South Korea, and 
the Northern Territories issue with Russia. The other type of violations of 
sovereignty involve foreign actors entering Japanese territory without permission 
to commit covert or illegal acts, such as the abduction of Japanese citizens by 
North Korea and the abduction ofKim Dae-Jung by the Korean CIA in 1973. Since 
citizens are concerned with the sovereignty of their nation, such cases should be 
associated with negative changes in attitudes towards the nation involved. Higher 
media coverage should be associated with greater changes in opinion. 
Figure 5.2 suggests a negative relationship between media coverage and changes in 
public perceptions of the nation involved in a violation of national sovereignty. A 
list of these cases can be found in Appendix 3. 
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Figure 5.2: Front Page Stories of Violations of National Sovereignty and Change in 
Public Attitudes toward Nation Involved, 1960-2007 
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Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008), various Asahi 
Shimbun, and Jiji polls. 
A relatively large number of cases are found near the fitted line. Higher levels of 
media coverage were correlated with changes in public perceptions of the country 
perceived to be responsible. A typical case of low media coverage was discussions 
between Japan and South Korea over Takeshima in February 1972 (Case 7) which 
received eight front page news stories and was correlated with a change in public 
opinion of -1.7 percentage points. A typical case of high media coverage was a 
dispute between Japan and China that escalated over the Senkaku Islands in May 
1978 (Case 28). This received 64 front page stories and was associated with a 
change in opinion of -5.1 percentage points. The largest outlier was the case in 
which Chinese police entered the Japanese consulate in Shenyang without 
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penmsswn m May 2002 to capture a family of North Korean refugees. This 
suggests that in addition to the media coverage and anger over this dispute, other 
factors were also involved in this large change in opinion. Figure 5.2 suggests that 
higher media coverage of sovereignty disputes is associated with increases in 
negative attitudes towards the other nation. 
Table 5.2 shows the relationship between media coverage and threats to Japanese 
sovereignty using ordinal variables. 
Table 5.2: Violations of National Sovereignty, Media Coverage and Changes in 
Japanese Public Perceptions of the Nation Involved, 1960-2007 
High Moderate Low Total 
Major Change 5 0 6 
(27.78) (0) (20) (18.18) 
Minor Change 10 0 II 
(55.56) (0) (20) (33.33) 
No Change 3 10 3 16 
(16.67) (100) (60) (48.48) 
Total 18 10 5 33 
(100) (100) (100) (100) 
Note: Percentages in brackets. See Appendix 3 for list of cases. "Major Change" and "Minor Change" 
both refer to cases of negative change in opinion. See Chapter Three text for how the variables were 
generated. 
Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008), various Asahi 
Shimbun, and Jiji polls. 
As can be seen examining the column marked "Total", 17 of 33 cases coded here 
as threats to Japanese sovereignty were associated with minor or major changes in 
public attitudes. This is a relatively high number. Furthermore, as can be seen in 
the row labelled "Major Change", five cases of major changes in opinion was 
associated with high media coverage while only one case of low media coverage 
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was associated with a major change in public opinion. This supports the argument 
that higher media coverage of threats to national sovereignty produces larger 
changes in collective opinion. Below I examine in some more detail selected cases 
in which media coverage was low, moderate and high. 
Low Media Coverage 
Cases of sovereignty disputes with low media coverage do not usually produce 
changes in public opinion. One example of a sovereignty dispute that was not 
correlated with any change in public opinion in June 2005 was a stand-off between 
the Japanese and South Korean coastguards over a South Korean eel-fishing boat's 
entry into Japan's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) near Tsushima, an island close 
to Nagasaki that is often the source of disputes between Japan and South Korea.46 
With two Japanese coast guard officers conducting an inspection on board, the 
Korean ship suddenly fled into the South Korean EEZ. This resulted in a standoff 
between the Japanese and South Korean coastguards, both of which claimed 
jurisdiction over the ship ("Japan, ROK coast guards end 2-day standoff', Daily 
Yomiuri, 3 June 2005, p.l). After two days, the issue was resolved peacefully. 
One of the probable reasons for the lack of opinion activation was the fact that 
political elites on both sides had incentives to downplay the dispute, resulting in 
low levels of media coverage. According to the Daily Yomiuri ("Govt treads gently 
to avoidS. Korean Toes", 4 June 2005, p.3), both the Japanese and South Korean 
Governments were preparing for a summit between the two nations and so both 
had an interest to resolve the dispute peacefully. The quickness with which the 
46 Case 5 in Appendix 3. Tsushima is not to be confused with Takeshima, the island over which Japan 
and South Korea have their most serious sovereignty dispute. 
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incident was resolved and the lack of government rhetoric framing the issue as a 
serious threat meant that the media did not have much reason to continue their 
reporting. Although somewhat dramatic, a minor dispute such as this in which elite 
frames downplayed the incident and which media coverage was low meant that it 
was unlikely to be perceived as a serious threat to Japan. 
Minor infringements of Japanese territory do not tend to activate nationalist 
feelings or anger among the general public. One sovereignty issue that appears on 
the national agenda from time to time is that of the Senkaku Islands, a small group 
of islands south of Okinawa that have long been the source of a dispute between 
Japan, China and Taiwan. As stated by Japanese Foreign Minister at the time, Aso 
Taro, "the Senkaku Islands are Japanese territory both historically and in the eyes 
of international law" ("Senkaku area not in China gas proposal/Japan seeks 
compromise", Daily Yomiuri, ll March 2006, p.l). In March 2004, seven Chinese 
activists landed on Uotsurijima, one of the Senkaku Islands, to reinforce China's 
territorial claims.47 The activists were quickly arrested by Japanese authorities, 
taken to Okinawa, and then deported. These moves angered Chinese nationalists in 
Beijing who staged small protests in front ofthe Japanese embassy demanding the 
return of the activists and Japan's removal from the Senkaku Islands 
("Anti-Japanese protests push Beijing to take hard line", Daily Yomiuri, 28 March 
2004, p.3). The Chinese embassy in Tokyo accused Japan of "abducting" the 
activists when they were placed under arrest. 
However, despite the fact that the Chinese activists appeared to have had some 
support from their Government, Jiji did not report any change in public attitudes 
47 Case 6 in Appendix 3. 
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towards China in March 2004. The main reason for this was probably the restrained 
reaction by the Japanese Government and the lack of media coverage that followed. 
Despite the potential for chest-thumping nationalist rhetoric, Japanese leaders 
framed this issue as purely a legal matter. Japan treated this crisis as mainly a 
matter of international law-beginning with the assumption that the islands were 
part of Japan-and made strong efforts not to escalate it. Most statements by 
Japanese officials repeated the assertion that the islands were an inherent part of 
Japanese territory but, other than that, made no moral judgments. Koizumi's order 
to the Cabinet Secretary in charge of crisis management was "deal with it 
according to the law, and make sure there are no accidents" ("12 hours behind the 
scenes", Asahi Shimbun/Asahi Evening News, 27 March 2004). This calm approach 
by both China and Japan meant that media coverage quickly evaporated once the 
activists were deported. Had Japan taken more aggressive action against the men or 
had China increased its rhetoric, then the media may have had greater opportunity 
to increase their coverage and to frame the issue in more nationalistic tones. 
Without inflammatory statements by political leaders, however, media coverage 
soon subsided. The framing of the event by Japan as a minor legal dispute and the 
low media coverage that it received were likely the main reasons for the lack of 
salience and, therefore, lack of attitude change. The Japanese public appears to 
react rather reasonably to minor infractions by private individuals over peripheral 
territory. 
Minor infringements of Japanese sovereignty that receive low media coverage are 
unlikely to produce any change in public opinion about the nation involved. For 
example, in April 1999, two unidentified ships believed to be of North Korean 
origin were spotted in Japanese waters and ordered to stop by the Maritime 
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Self-Defense Force (MSDF).48 The Japanese Government suspected them ofbeing 
part of a North Korean operation to transport spies, picking up North Korean 
agents in Japan, or gathering intelligence ("Were ships on N. Korean spy mission?", 
Daily Yorniuri, 25 March 1999, p.2). This infringement on Japanese territorial 
waters was taken seriously by Tokyo, which sent a letter to the North Korean 
mission at the United Nations in protest ("Govt to protest over boat incident", 
Daily Yorniuri, 31 March 1999, p.1).49 Japanese elites were certainly concerned 
about this issue. 
However, despite the elite rhetoric and the fears elicited by the image of mysterious 
ships lurking along the Japanese coast, public attitudes towards North Korea did 
not change in April 1999. Although the Japanese public may have been concerned 
about North Korean actions, the minor nature of this infringement and the lack of 
media coverage meant that it was insufficient to activate public opinion. In spite of 
public comments and rhetoric by political elites, all things considered, the public 
responded quite reasonably to an incursion in which no one was injured and no 
property was damaged. 
High Media Coverage 
Various cases of sovereignty disputes that received high media coverage were 
associated with minor changes in public attitudes. For example, one issue that has 
consistently produced minor changes in negative public opinion towards Russia/the 
Soviet Union when it became salient is the Northern Territories issue. This dispute 
concerns the sovereignty of a group of islands taken by the Soviets in the closing 
48 Case 3 in Appendix 3. I treat this as a violation of Japanese sovereignty rather than a threat to 
national security because the emphasis by the Government and the media was on the legality of the 
ships being in Japanese waters rather than whether they posed a direct threat to Japan. 
49 This letter was returned to Japan unopened. 
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days of World War II. Both nations have engaged in numerous discussions with 
one another over this issue but are no closer to resolving it. Yet the numerous 
official meetings that attracted high media coverage such as in October 1973, July 
1992, and April 1993, only resulted in minor changes in public opinion of -3.7 
percentage points, -5 percentage points, and -4.8 percentage points. 50 Various 
other territorial disputes between Japan and China and Japan and South Korea have 
also received high media coverage but only produced minor changes in public 
opinion. For example, a dispute over the Senkaku Islands attracted high media 
coverage but was associated only with a minor change in attitudes towards China 
of -5.1 percentage points in May 1978. A dispute with South Korea just prior to the 
normalisation of relations in October 1965 was correlated with a change in 
. d f 6 . 51 attltu es o - percentage pomts. 
Cases of violations of Japanese sovereignty that receive high media coverage are 
often associated with major changes in public opinion. Much has been written 
elsewhere about the relationship between media coverage, public opinion, and the 
North Korean abductions issue so it will only be briefly mentioned here. 52 On 
September 17, 2002, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro made a historic visit to 
Pyongyang in an attempt to engage in talks that could lead to the establishment of 
diplomatic relations with North Korea. A stumbling block for relations between the 
two nations had long been the issue of the abductions of Japanese citizens from 
Japan by North Korea in the 1970s and 1980s. As the Daily Yomiuri ("No rush to 
normalize ties", 10 October 2002, p.15) put it in an editorial, "the abductions were 
50 These are cases I 6, I 8 and 23 in Appendix 3. 
51 These are cases 28 and 3 I in Appendix 3. 
52 Case 30 in Appendix 3. There are many ways to view the abductions issue but, for the purpose of 
this dissertation, I treat them as a violation of Japanese sovereignty. Many Japanese also saw them as 
a violation of basic human rights norms but I treat them as most importantly a violation of Japanese 
sovereignty and a realistic threat to Japanese citizens. 
104 
a blatant infringement of Japan's sovereignty". At the summit, although Kim 
Jong-Il admitted to the abductions, Japan was strongly dissatisfied by the fact that 
North Korea did not give this issue a high priority and then told Koizumi that eight 
ofthe abductees had died. In October 2002, the month after the Pyongyang summit 
and the month in which five of the abductees returned to Japan, attitudes towards 
North Korea changed by -7.5 percentage points. 
This brazen violation of Japanese territory and mistreatment of its citizens as a part 
of North Korean policy elicited strong negative emotions from Japanese citizens. 
The elite rhetoric attacking North Korea and the constant media coverage meant 
that it was highly salient. The dominant frame included a narrative of random 
Japanese citizens being plucked from their families and taken away to North Korea 
where they were forced to train spies. It was simple and so easily understood by 
even those citizens unlikely to be attentive to foreign policy. The anger of the 
families over the abductions of their relatives was also something most Japanese 
could relate to. The negative emotions over this issue quickly turned into hostility 
towards the source of this threat, North Korea. In October 2002, one month after 
Koizumi returned to Japan from Pyongyang, public opinion towards North Korea 
experienced a major negative change. 
The abduction of even a single person from Japanese territory may be sufficient to 
produce negative attitudes towards an entire country, especially if media coverage 
is high. On August 8, 1973, Kim Dae-Jung, the leader of the South Korean 
opposition Democratic Party and opponent of the authoritarian President Park 
Chung-Hee, was abducted by a group of five Korean agents from his Tokyo hotel 
room ("Korean Reported Abducted in Tokyo; Friend says 5 seized foe of President 
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Park", New York Times, 9 August 1973, p.8).53 After drugging him, the abductors 
loaded Kim on to a boat and took him back to South Korea. After strong protests 
from Japan and the United States, Kim reappeared unharmed five days later at this 
family home in Busan. The Japanese Government was furious and explicitly 
claimed jurisdiction over the case because Japanese laws concerning kidnapping 
were broken and South Korean government agents had violated national 
sovereignty (Halloran, R., 1973, "Report by Seoul on kidnapping worsens breach 
with Tokyo; Kim's return asked", New York Times, 30 August, p.10). Despite 
denials by the South Korean government of any involvement, and even a request 
by Seoul that Japan investigate the disappearance, police soon found evidence that 
the first secretary of the South Korean embassy in Tokyo was actually present at 
the kidnapping (Halloran, R., 1973, "Seoul receptive to a U.N. debate to face the 
North, Foreign Minister says talks with North cited a compromise is hinted", New 
York Times, 6 September, p.11). The dispute, and therefore, media coverage, 
escalated further when Seoul refused to accept Japanese demands that it take 
responsibility for the incident (Halloran, R., 1973, "Tokyo rejects Seoul offer in 
kidnapping", New York Times, 3 September, p.36). 
In September 1973, the month after the abduction, Jiji reported a change in 
attitudes towards South Korea of -5.9 percentage points. This was an event in 
which the original frame of the abduction was likely to anger Japanese citizens and 
elite rhetoric by both Japanese and South Korean leaders were also bound to 
increase negative feelings. Japanese policymakers and the media establishment 
expressed moral outrage over the fact that the South Korean spies had posed as 
53 Case 32 in Appendix 3. These agents were later found to be members ofthe South Korean Central 
Intelligence Agency (KCIA). 
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diplomats and that a neighbouring country would conduct so brazen an act as 
abducting a well-respected democratic leader. The escalation in tensions because of 
the Japanese Government's reaction to the abduction, which included several 
statements by high-ranking figures including the Minister of Justice, coupled with 
the South Korean Government's belligerent and clumsy reaction, ensured high 
levels of media coverage for almost two months. The dominant frame was clearly 
one in which this issue was interpreted by the Japanese public as a threat to 
Japanese sovereignty. The major change in public opinion in the two months 
following this event, and the lack of other salient issues at the time, strongly 
suggest it was the primary cause of this change. 
Another case of a violation of Japanese sovereignty associated with a major change 
in opinion occurred on May 8, 2002 when a group of five North Korean asylum 
seekers in the northeast Chinese city of Shenyang suddenly rushed into the 
Japanese consulate. 54 Without first seeking the permission of consular officials, 
the Chinese police officers pursued the asylum seekers, entering the consulate and 
physically dragging them out. Video from security cameras showed startled 
Japanese diplomats failing to block the Chinese police as they removed the North 
Koreans, with one consular employee even going so far as to pick up one police 
officer's hat off of the floor and handing it back to him. 
In May 2002, Jiji reported a major change in attitudes towards China of -12.8 
percentage points. The Japanese public was already unhappy with China due to the 
high tension between the two nations over the visits by Koizumi to Y asukuni 
Shrine. The Japanese Government's angry response to the incident in Shenyang 
54 Case 24 in Appendix 3. 
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attracted high levels of attention from the mass media. 55 The incident was framed 
as a violation of the Vienna Convention's granting of extraterritorial status to 
diplomatic missions.56 This included visual images of the event which showed 
the Chinese police entering the grounds of the consulate and physically pulling the 
asylum seekers out. Media coverage continued for a month after the actual events 
due to the diplomatic standoff between Japanese policymakers demanding an 
apology for the incident and China's refusal to give it. Along with the high media 
coverage, the already antagonistic feelings towards China and the anger over what 
many saw as weak Japanese diplomats giving in to stronger Chinese police were all 
factors that contributed to the increase in negative opinion towards China. This 
threat produced a major change in public perceptions of China. 
Issues that involve territory considered to be an integral part of Japan are likely to 
elicit strong negative emotions towards any nation perceived as a threat to this. 
Such a case involved negotiations in the late 1960s between Japan and the United 
States over the reversion of Okinawa back to Japanese sovereignty. 57 In the 1952 
San Francisco Peace Treaty, the US did not agree to return Okinawa back to 
Japanese sovereignty. In November 1969, Prime Minister Sato Eisaku and 
President Richard Nixon met for a summit, with Sato stating that he was staking 
his political life on the reversion of Okinawa to Japan (Oka, T., 1969, "Sato stakes 
career on return of Okinawa to Japan", New York Times, 8 November, p.2). Just 
55 Prime Minister Koizumi stated that he wanted "China to respond in all sincerity" and that the 
actions were a violation of the Vienna Convention ("Koizumi insists China hand over 5", Daily 
Yomiuri, 10 May 2002, p.l). He also demanded that China hand over the five asylum seekers to 
Japanese custody, which they eventually did. 
56 According to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963: "The authorities 
of the receiving State shall not enter that part of the consular premises which is used exclusively for 
the purpose of the work of the consular post except with the consent of the head of the consular post or 
ofhis designee or of the head of the diplomatic mission of the sending State." 
57 Case 33 in Appendix 3. 
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prior to going to Japan, the American Senate passed a resolution that the President 
would require the Senate's "advice and consent" before allowing for the return of 
Okinawa. In order to achieve Okinawan reversion, Sato was forced to make 
numerous concessions on its sovereignty to the United States. Basically, he wanted 
the bases in Okinawa to fall under the same rules as other bases in Japan especially 
with regard to the need for Japanese permission whenever they were to be used in a 
conflict. On the other side, the United States was deeply concerned about what 
effect this would have on the Vietnam War if, as expected, it was still being waged 
at the time of the proposed reversion in 1972. 
The meetings between Sato and Nixon over Okinawa in November 1969 were 
associated with a major negative change in public attitudes towards the United 
States of -6.8 percentage points while another high level meeting in May 1969 was 
associated with a major change in attitudes of -9.2 percentage points. The main 
reasons for the opinion change were the massive amounts of media coverage that 
this issue received and its emotional effects. The negotiations between Sato and 
Nixon were deemed to be so important to Japan's national interest that they. even 
received higher media coverage in November 1969 than the dominant issue of the 
day, the Vietnam War. Both the Japanese Government and people saw Okinawa, 
and its people, as an inherent part ofthe Japanese nation-state and were angered by 
the fact that the US was using its bases in Okinawa to launch bombing raids against 
Hanoi. Furthermore, the public was unhappy with the deal brokered by Japan's 
leaders. The joint Nixon-Sato communique which emerged from the negations, and 
which outlined the conditions of Okinawan reversion to Japan, left many in Japan 
feeling highly dissatisfied. It was highly ambiguous as to the presence of nuclear 
weapons in Okinawa and whether or not B-52s would require prior permission 
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from the Japanese government before they were launched. Both Japan and the US 
also agreed to keep American bases at their current levels. The chief executive of 
the Ryukus, the highest ranking government official for the people of Okinawa, 
expressed the feelings of many when he said that "a real reversion means 
restoration of all constitutional rights to the Okinawan people" ("Accord on 
reversion to Japan leaves Okinawans dissatisfied", New York Times, 22 November 
1969, p.14). The anger and frustration over the Okinawa issue, along with its 
salience, produced major negative changes in public opinion towards the United 
States. 
In conclusion, it appears that sovereignty disputes can produce negative changes in 
public opinion towards the nation involved. This is especially likely when media 
coverage is high. Although citizens do not appear to respond to minor 
infringements of sovereignty, especially those involving non-governmental actors, 
they will respond to major infringements by government officials. Illegal actions 
within Japanese territory by foreign governments are especially likely to elicit a 
negative response. The public is much more sensitive to threats to integral Japanese 
territory, such as Okinawa, than it is to those associated with those peripheral 
islands like Takeshima and the Senkakus. Arguably, this is reasonable. The 
findings suggest that Japanese citizens want their nation's territorial boundaries to 
be respected and react with hostility towards those nations that violate this 
principle. Such perceived threats, especially how they are framed by the media and 
political elites, can be a cause of negative changes in public perceptions of the 
nation involved in the violation. 
110 
Threats to National Security 
In the final section of this chapter, I address the question of whether or not threats 
to national security have an impact on Japanese public opinion about the nation 
involved. I argue that events that the Japanese public as a threat to Japanese 
national security will tend to produce an increase in negative public perceptions of 
the country that is the source of the threat. Empirically, the presence of a threat to 
national security should be correlated with negative changes in public opinion 
about that nation. Furthermore, as the media affect issue salience, higher media 
coverage of such threats should be associated with greater changes in public 
perceptions than lower levels of media coverage. 
Figure 5.3 suggests a negative relationship between the number of front-page 
stories in Asahi Shimbun and public attitudes towards the nation involved in the 
dispute. A list of these cases can be found in Appendix 4. 
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Figure 5.3: Front Page Stories of Threats to National Security and Change in Public 
Attitudes toward Nation Involved, 1960-2007 
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Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et a!. (2005), Kodama (2008), various Asahi 
Shimbun, and Jiji polls. 
Although there are only six cases, the relationship between media coverage and 
changes in public opinion appears to be negative. As media coverage increases, so 
too do changes in public perceptions of the country involved. A typical case of low 
media coverage was the test of a long range-ballistic missile by China in August 
1999 (Case 1). This received two front page news stories and was associated with a 
change in public opinion towards China of -2.5 percentage points. A typical case of 
higher media coverage was the sinking of a North Korean ship by Japan in 
December 2001 (Case 4 ). This event received 18 front page stories and was 
correlated with a change in public perceptions of North Korea of -7.1 percentage 
points. 
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Two outliers involved North Korea. One was the Taepodong missile test by North 
Korea over Japan in August 1998 (Case 5) which received 31 front page stories and 
was associated with a change in public attitudes towards North Korea of -13.1 
percentage points. As to be expected by an event that attracts large amounts of 
rhetoric from political elites and commentary in the mass media, factors other than 
media coverage appear to have been highly influential on public opinion. The other 
was the North Korean missile tests in the Sea of Japan in July 2006 which despite 
40 front page stories in Asahi Shimbun, were correlated with a smaller change in 
public opinion of -7.1 percentage points. Public perceptions of North Korea were 
already very low at this point so any change in public opinion may not have been 
detected in the polls. It is also possible that unlike the case ofthe Taepodong test in 
1998, citizens were less surprised by North Korea's actions in 2006. 
In all six cases of threats to Japanese security, public opinion turned negative and 
in three of them, the change was greater than -5 percentage points. Greater change 
also appears to be associated with higher media coverage. Taking into account the 
small number of cases from which to draw any conclusions, media coverage does 
appear to explain some part of the changes in Japanese public opinion following 
threats to national security. 
Table 5.3 shows the relationship between media coverage and changes in public 
opinion following threats to Japanese security. 
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Table 5.3: Threats to National Security, Media Coverage and Changes in Japanese 
Public Perceptions of the Nation Involved, 1960-2007 
High Moderate Low Total 
Major Change 3 0 0 3 
(100) (0) (0) (50) 
Minor Change 0 0 
(0) (100) (0) (16.67) 
No Change 0 0 2 2 
(0) 0 (100) (33.33) 
Total 3 2 6 
(100) (100) (100) (100) 
Note: Percentages in brackets. See Appendix 4 for list of cases. "Major Change" and "Minor Change" 
both refer to cases of negative change in opinion. See Chapter Three text for how the variables were 
generated. 
Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et a!. (2005), Kodama (2008), various Asahi 
Shimbun, and Jiji polls. 
Although the sample is small, the majority of cases of threats to Japanese security 
were associated with changes in public attitudes towards the nation involved. Of 
the six cases, three were associated with a major change in public attitudes and one 
was involved in a minor change in public attitudes. Cases that received higher 
media coverage were also associated with changes in opinion of greater magnitude. 
The row marked "Major Change" shows that three cases of major change in public 
opinion were related to high media coverage and none with low media coverage. 
Though not conclusive, these findings do suggest that first, a number of cases of 
threats to Japanese security were associated with major changes in public attitudes 
and second, higher media coverage was associated with changes of greater 
magnitude. Representative cases are examined in greater detail below. 
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Low Media Coverage 
The Japanese public does not respond strongly to minor threats to national security 
which receive low levels of media coverage. As in violations of national 
sovereignty, even though elite rhetoric may be high, citizens are unlikely to 
respond to those events that are not intended to be threatening signals. One such 
case was the August 1999 test by China of a long-range ground-to-ground missile 
on which some in the Japanese security community expressed concern about.58 
This test was viewed with concern because it was conducted amid high levels of 
rhetoric in China over claims about a campaign by Taiwan to declare formal 
independence. Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo stated that he was "paying close 
attention to the incident" and Foreign Minister Komura Masahiko said that the 
incident was "not favourable" given the desire to reduce weapons of mass 
destruction ("Komura concerned", Daily Yomiuri, 4 August 1999, p.l). For some in 
the defence community, the missile test was a signal of China's growing military 
capabilities and, therefore, an act that could have consequences for Japanese 
security in the future. Despite the fact that such a test could have been perceived as 
a threat to Japan and a signal of China's military power, public attitudes towards 
China that month did not change. The low volume of media coverage was likely a 
major factor. Furthermore, unlike the North Korean missile tests, the Chinese test 
was not interpreted as an intentional signal directed at Japan. According to one 
Japanese official, "It was conducted in China, not like the North Korean (missile) 
that flew over the Sea of Japan" ("Japan plans to convey concern over China's 
missile test", Japan Economic Newswire, 3 August 1999). Despite the potential for 
58 Case 1 in Appendix 4. 
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it to be perceived as a threat, the missile test was not related to any change in 
public perceptions of China in August 1999. 
Another case of a threat to Japan that was not associated with any change in 
Japanese public opinion was the discovery that the Soviet Union had built bases 
near Hokkaido. In September 1979, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
reported that the Soviet Union was building a new facility on the island of Shikotan, 
one of four islands retained by the Soviet Union at the end of World War II. The 
US reported a division-size force of 1 0 000 to 12 000 troops on four islands 
claimed by Japan 64 kilometres off the northern Japanese coast ("Defence Agency 
on USSR troops on northern islands", Kyodo, 26 September 1979). Japan lodged a 
diplomatic protest over this issue but the Soviet Union responded to Japanese 
concerns by stating that it was free to construct military bases anywhere on its 
territory ("Soviet troops on islands off Japan", BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 
29 September 1979). 
Despite the fact that the base was built so close to Japan, on a disputed territory, 
and during the Cold War, this was not associated with any change in Japanese 
public opinion. The main reason for this lack of opinion activation was probably 
the issue's low level of salience. The Japanese Government reacted to the news of 
the Soviet actions calmly and made no efforts to escalate the issue. Media coverage 
was also low. Although the Soviet forces may have posed an objective threat to 
Japan, in 1979, it was unlikely that many people though that the plan was invasion. 
Without any cues from political elites or the media, the public may have just not 
paid great attention to the Soviet bases or seen them as particularly threatening. 
The lack of change in opinion in the cases of the Chinese missile test and the 
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Soviet bases suggests that the Japanese public is not apt to panic when other 
nations engage in behaviour that could be interpreted as somewhat provocative. 
Moderate Media Coverage 
A minor negative change in Japanese attitudes towards China of -3.7 percentage 
points in November 2004 was associated with a report that a Chinese submarine 
had been detected in Japanese waters near Okinawa. 59 After confirming the 
submarine was of Chinese origin, the government formally protested to Beijing and 
demanded an apology ("Govt demands apology from China over sub", Daily 
Yomiuri, 13 November 2004, p.1). One senior officer of the Japanese Maritime 
Self-Defense Force (MSDF) described the intrusion of the Chinese Navy nuclear 
submarine as a possible attempt to flex China's naval muscles ("China may have 
been flaunting its power", Daily Yomiuri", 12 November 2004, p.3). According to 
an editorial in the Daily Yomiuri ("Beef up MSDF's ability to patrol nation's 
waters", 11 November 2004, p.4), "if the latest intrusion was indeed made by a 
Chinese submarine, it will clearly demonstrate that China is becoming a real threat 
to Japan in areas surrounding Japan ... China is expanding the activities of its 
marine research vessels under its state strategy of becoming a naval power". One 
reason for the opinion change was likely the moderate media coverage that it 
received. However, part of the reason for the change may have been due to the fact 
that tensions between China and Japan were relatively high during the years of the 
Koizumi Cabinet. The elite rhetoric, media coverage, tense relations between the 
two nations, and the fears of military vessels in Japanese waters were likely all 
factors in generating antagonism towards China. 
59 Case 3 in Appendix 4. 
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High Media Coverage 
Three cases of security threats to Japan, all involving North Korea, were associated 
with major changes in public opinion. Japanese attitudes towards North Korea 
experienced a major change in the month following a naval battle between the 
Japanese coast guard and a North Korean "spy ship". As discussed earlier, for 
many years, the Japanese public had been concerned about North Korean ships 
operating in Japanese waters for the purposes of intelligence gathering and drug 
smuggling. In December 2001, the Japanese coast guard chased a North Korean 
spy vessel operating in Japanese waters and after a dramatic gun fight, the North 
Korean ship sank with all aboard killed. 
Jiji reported a major change in public attitudes towards North Korea in January 
2002 of -7.1 percentage points. High media coverage likely played an important 
role in whipping up public sentiment against North Korea. The fact that this 
involved North Korea, a nation that is generally disliked in Japan anyway, was also 
likely a factor. Past concerns about "spy ships" probably also primed the public to 
react negatively. More nationalistic elements of the Japanese media used this event 
to slam the Government's capability to protect Japan and deal with military crises. 
The Daily Yomiuri ("Coordination, hard laws vital to nation's security", 25 
December 2001, p.3) stated: "The case of the suspected North Korean spy vessel 
detected in the East China Sea off the coast of Amami-Oshima island poses 
questions concerning the government's ability to patrol territorial waters and deal 
with security emergencies". Japanese policymakers who had long been concerned 
about the issue of North Korea were also intent on making a public statement about 
this issue. The ship was raised and placed on display in Tokyo at the Museum of 
Maritime Science ("North Korean spy ship goes on public display", Daily Yomiuri, 
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25 May 2003, p.3). The dramatic nature of the "shoot out on the high seas" and the 
rhetoric by elites and members of the media advocating more hawkish foreign 
policy towards North Korea framed the issue in a way that it resonated with 
Japanese citizens. As a result, negative public emotions were activated and 
attitudes towards North Korea turned negative. 
Another case of a threat to Japanese security which received high media coverage 
and which was associated with a major negative change in public attitudes towards 
North Korea of -7.1 percentage points occurred in 2006, the same month that it 
provocatively launched six missiles into the Sea of Japan. 60 These included 
short-range Scud-C missiles, intermediate-range Rodong missiles, and one 
intercontinental missile believed to be capable of reaching the United States. The 
Japanese media reported that various ferries and fishing boats were operating in the 
Sea of Japan at the time of the tests and that citizens on the coast of the Sea of 
Japan were concerned that missiles could target nuclear power plants ("Nation 
reacts to launch of missiles/North Korean move triggers annoyance, bewilderment 
across Japan", Daily Yomiuri, 6 July 2006, p.2). The Japanese Government 
responded strongly to this provocation, launching an official protest and halting 
remittance payments from North Koreans in Japan to their home country ("Govt 
planning 'stem action,' sanctions", Daily Yomiuri, 6 July 2006, p.3). The UN 
Security Council was also asked to adopt a resolution condemning North Korea. 
The linkage in the minds of the Japanese public to the Taepodong launch eight 
years earlier was also certainly a factor. This combination of the nature ofthe event 
itself, the high media coverage and the framing of the issue as a threat by the 
Government and the mass media produced feelings of hostility towards North 
6
° Case 6 in Appendix 4. 
119 
Korea. These missile tests and the reaction of Japanese elites and media were likely 
responsible for the negative change in public opinion towards North Korea in July 
2006. 
The final case of a military threat to Japan which received high media coverage 
was the launch of a Taepodong missile by North Korea into the seas between 
Russia and Japan. This was associated with major attitude change towards North 
Korea of -13.1 percentage points in August 1998. Rhetoric by Japanese elites 
played an important role in generating feelings of fear among the public. The 
Japanese Government was surprised by the North Korean action and concerned 
that it did not possess an independent monitoring system to warn of hostile missile 
launchings, instead relying on Washington for such information. Prime Minister 
Obuchi Keizo said that "Japan's people are extremely anxious and I am deeply 
worried" while Foreign Minister Komura Masahiko stated, "our relations with 
North Korea are going to be more severe than they have ever been" (Kageyama, Y., 
1998, "Missile raises fears about Asian security, military ships sent", Associated 
Press, 1 September). In the days following the missile test, Chief Cabinet Secretary 
Hiromu Nonaka expressed concern about the re-election of Kim Jong-Il as 
Chairman of the National Defense Commission, telling a news conference that he 
was "worried that military power will take a greater position in North Korea" 
("Japan frets over N. Korea's 'militaristic aspect"', Japan Economic Newswire, 7 
September 1998). A Daily Yomiuri editorial on 3 September 1998 ("N. Korea act 
calls for firm response", p.6) called the act "outrageous" and demanded an 
explanation and apology from North Korea. The hostility directed towards North 
Korea was likely a product of fear that it could strike Japan anytime it wanted and 
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anger that it could act so brazenly. Elite rhetoric and media coverage meant that 
this issue was going to be salient and, thus, public opinion was activated. 
To conclude this section, the evidence that many threats to Japanese security do 
tend to be followed by a change in public opinion towards the nation involved 
suggests that such threats can produce changes in public perceptions towards the 
nation involved. The findings also support the hypothesis that when media 
coverage is high, it will be associated with greater changes in public attitudes 
towards a foreign nation. This makes sense since these issues involve life and death. 
The public of any nation would be concerned with external threats to its security. 
But given Japan's geographic position and its non-democratic neighbours, it is 
hardly surprising that a sense of vulnerability is activated when a foreign nation 
engages in threatening behaviour. That being said, citizens do appear to respond 
rationally when threats involve only minor issues or events and media coverage is 
low, such as the cases of the Chinese ballistic missile test and the construction of 
the Soviet bases. Despite possible threats to their nation, and the attempts by some 
political elites to gamer support for more hawkish policies, the Japanese public 
does seem to be rather rational. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have shown through a series of case studies and the use of the Jiji 
poll data that realistic threats to Japan are often associated with negative changes in 
public attitudes towards the nation involved. Of course, not every realistic threat is 
going to be associated with changes in public attitudes about a foreign nation. 
Collective opinion about a country is a product of complex factors, not only salient 
issues. Furthermore, the data used in this analysis are not always going to be able 
to detect changes in public opinion because it is an aggregate measure. For 
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example, if a nation is already viewed negatively then it may be difficult to detect 
the public's response to a particular event. 
However, the findings do suggest that Japanese citizens often, if not always, 
respond to realistic threats with the result that public attitudes change negatively 
towards the nation involved. This is especially likely to be the case when events are 
inherently salient, such as a North Korean missile test over Japan or negotiations 
over Okinawa, and when political elites and the mass media frame events in such a 
way that they generate an emotional response from citizens. When it comes to 
short-term opinion change, it seems that issues interpreted as threats are essential in 
giving elites the opportunity to push their policy preferences on to the national 
agenda. It was also interesting to find that Japanese citizens do not seem to panic in 
their responses to realistic threats. In only a few cases were the magnitude of 
change in public attitudes exceptionally large. In sum the findings in this chapter 
support the propositions guiding this study-realistic threats can produce negative 
changes in public attitudes towards foreign nations and media coverage moderates 
this effect. The next chapter examines whether symbolic threats also are associated 
with negative changes in public attitudes towards the nation involved. 
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6. Symbolic Threats to Japan and Public Perceptions of 
Foreign Nations 
Introduction 
In the following chapter, I argue that issues or events interpreted as symbolic 
threats to Japan produce negative changes in public perceptions of the nation 
involved. As discussed in Chapter Two, the notion of symbolic threat begins with 
the premise that feelings of difference between groups can arise from perceived 
distinctions between the in-group and the out-group over morals, values, standards, 
beliefs and attitudes (Tajfel and Turner 2004). People value those beliefs that are 
part of their group identity because they want to feel as if this links them to the 
worldview of their group. To make the distinction between symbolic and realistic 
threats, realistic threats are about the desire to achieve group outcomes while 
symbolic threats are associated with conflict related to one group believing that 
they are better than the other. Scholars of symbolic racism theory, for example, 
have proposed that negative attitudes towards an out-group are not the product of 
competition or conflicting goals but rather conflicting values and beliefs (Feldman 
and Huddy 2005). Any issue that is perceived to violate this worldview should be 
perceived as a threat and, therefore, generate hostility towards the source of the 
threat. 
As applied to this study, the proposition that threats to the in-group produce 
antagonism towards the out-group suggests that those issues that the Japanese 
public perceives as symbolic threats should produce an increase in public hostility 
towards the nation involved. In response to a violation of Japanese norms, citizens 
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will attempt to differentiate themselves from the other nation, leading to derogation. 
This derogation will produce negative feelings towards the nation viewed as the 
source of the threat. The magnitude of the effect of these feelings will be 
moderated by media coverage, with higher media coverage making a symbolic 
threat more salient and causing a greater change in collective opinion. 
Public hostility towards a foreign nation is a result of the belief that a foreign 
nation violates, and therefore threatens, those values important to the mass public. 
For the purpose of this chapter, I assume that events will be interpreted as symbolic 
threats if they are seen to violate the Japanese norms of anti-militarism and 
anti-nuclearism.61 Although I do not make the claim that Japanese citizens are all 
pacifists, I do assume that they will react negatively to the use of military force by 
another country or it's testing of nuclear weapons. These beliefs, which I assume to 
be common to most members of the public, are rooted in memories of the defeat of 
World War II and the experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
Public opmwn polls support the claim that for most Japanese, "peace" is an 
important priority in their country's international relations. According to Figure 6.1, 
the results of a public opinion poll conducted by Yomiuri Shimbun in 2001, 
respondents stated that the third most important goal for Japan was that it 
"promotes the importance of peace in the world". This was a more common 
response than econom1c affluence, exercising political power in international 
relations and security. 
61 For more on my theoretical framework, see Chapter Two. 
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Figure 6.1: Public Opinion about What Type of Country Japan Should Be in the 21st 
Century, 2001 
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Source: Yomiuri Shimbun, 2001. "21 seiki no nihon, kankyo/hukushi wo jyushisuru kuni ni I Yomiuri 
shimbunsya zenkoku yoron chosa [Yomiuri Shimbun Poll: People willing to make sacrifices for 
environment]", January 10, p.32. 
In addition to a general anti-militarism, Japanese citizens remain firmly opposed to 
anything associated with nuclear weapons. Any discussion of such issues among 
policymakers has long been a taboo in Japanese politics. This principle of 
anti-nuclearism was articulated by Prime Minister Sato Eisuke who said that Japan 
would not possess, produce or permit the introduction of nuclear weapons into 
Japan. On November 21, 2006, when the Yomiuri Shimbun asked citizens whether 
they still supported Japan's three non-nuclear principles, 66.6 per cent of 
respondents said that they fully supported them and 13.3 per cent said that they 
somewhat supported them ("Hikaku sangensoku 'mamorubeki' hachi-wari, 'kaku 
hoyuu giron' wa sanpi ryoron [80% support three non-nuclear principles while 
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divided on nuclear power/Yomiuri Shimbun poll]", Yomiuri Shimbun, 21 
November 2006, p.2). For the purpose of this chapter, I assume that the Japanese 
public's worldview is challenged whenever a foreign nation uses, or threatens to 
use, military force against civilians or another nation and whenever a foreign 
nation seeks to develop or test nuclear weapons. 
To examine the effects of symbolic threats and media coverage on public opinion, 
this chapter presents a series of brief case studies on issues that could all be 
interpreted as symbolic threats. The Japanese public interprets an issue as a 
symbolic threat if it involves the behaviour of a foreign nation that is interpreted to 
violate and threaten values considered to be important in Japan. I operationalise 
symbolic threats as any of the following three types of issues: the testing of a 
nuclear device; the use of military force against another country; and the killing of 
civilians. Nuclear tests are those issues in which a foreign nation tests a nuclear 
device. The use of force refers to both wars and international crises that involve 
two different states, as well as the mobilisation of military forces which should also 
be interpreted as the willingness of a state to use force to achieve its political 
objectives. The killing of civilians is any issue framed as the wilful killing of 
non-combatants, such as a massacre or the destruction of a passenger aircraft. 
Hypotheses 
This chapter is concerned with testing the following two hypotheses. First, cases of 
symbolic threat should be associated with negative changes in Japanese public 
perceptions of the nation involved. Second, cases of symbolic threats that receive 
high media coverage should have a greater effect on public attitudes towards the 
nation involved than those that receive low media coverage. These hypotheses are 
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tested with cases involving the three types of symbolic threats: nuclear tests, the 
use of military force, and the killing of civilians. 
Nuclear Testing 
In this section, I argue that a nuclear test will produce a negative change in 
Japanese attitudes towards that nation. Any nuclear test is likely to be interpreted as 
a threat to the Japanese public because it activates cognitive schema among citizens 
associated with the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. To build up their 
sense of self-worth, citizens will differentiate themselves psychologically from the 
nation that conducts the test. When this happens, public feelings of hostility 
towards that country will increase and public opinion will tum negative. Higher 
levels of media coverage will make such tests more salient and, therefore, increase 
the magnitude of their effect. Although hundreds of nuclear tests were carried out 
by the nations included in this study, I have only included those taken from the 
content analysis of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008). 
Figure 6.2 shows a negative and relatively strong relationship between media 
coverage of the nuclear tests included in this study and changes in public 
perceptions of the nation conducting the test. The list of cases can be found in 
Appendix 5. 
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Figure 6.2: Front Page Stories of Nuclear Tests and Change in Public Attitudes toward 
Nation Involved, 1960-2007 
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Higher media coverage is correlated with greater magnitude negative changes in 
public opinion. The relationship also appears to be relatively strong. A typical case 
of a nuclear test that received low media coverage was an underground nuclear test 
conducted by France in June 1975 (Case 6). This received 3 front page stories and 
was associated with a change in attitudes towards France of -1.8 percentage points. 
A case of high media coverage was the Indian nuclear test in May 1998 (Case 35) 
which received 59 front page stories and was correlated with a change in public 
opinion of -11.4 percentage points. Two notable outliers are the French nuclear 
tests in the South Pacific in July 1995 (Case 28) and September 1995 (Case 36). 
Both of those cases were associated with extreme changes in public opinion 
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towards France. This suggests that in addition to the nuclear tests and the media 
coverage that they received, the Japanese public may also have responded 
negatively to other factors such as elite rhetoric and how the events were framed. 
Using ordinal variables, Table 6.1 shows the relationship between media coverage 
and changes in public opinion. 
Table 6.1: Nuclear Tests, Media Coverage and Changes in Japanese Public 
Perceptions of the Nation Involved, 1960-2007 
High Moderate Low Total 
Major Change 6 0 7 
(37.5) (10) (0) (18.92) 
Minor Change 6 3 5 14 
(37.5) (30) (45.45) (37.84) 
No Change 4 6 6 16 
(25) (60) (54.55) (43.24) 
Total 16 10 11 37 
(100) (100) (100) (100) 
Note: Percentages in brackets. See Appendix 5 for list of cases. "Major Change" and "Minor Change" 
both refer to cases of negative change in opinion. See Chapter Three text for how the variables were 
generated. 
Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008), various Asahi 
Shimbun, and Jiji polls. 
The data show that a substantial number of nuclear tests were associated with a 
negative change in public attitudes towards the nation conducting the test. In the 
cases listed here, 21 of 37 were correlated with changes in public opinion. 
Furthermore, nuclear tests that received higher media coverage were associated 
with greater changes in public opinion than those that received lower media 
coverage. Examining the row marked "Major Change", no cases of low media 
coverage were related to major changes in public opinion while six cases that were 
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received high media coverage. Both of these results suggest that nuclear tests may 
be a causal factor in changes in public attitudes towards a foreign nation and higher 
media coverage of such tests may produce changes in opinion of greater magnitude. 
Below is a closer examination of the relationship between nuclear tests and public 
opinion change. 
Low Media Coverage 
Nuclear tests that receive low media coverage do not tend to be associated with 
changes in public attitudes towards the nation involved. Especially during the Cold 
War, most of such tests were unlikely to be salient. While the public may not have 
approved of such testing, it may have been such a common occurrence that it was 
unlikely to attract public attention. To take an example, in August 1971, France's 
nuclear test in the Tuamotu Archipelago received low media coverage and was not 
associated with any change in public opinion.62 In July 1967 and March 1972, 
China tested nuclear devices but neither of these were correlated with any change 
in Japanese public opinion about China.63 In September 1966, France tested a 
nuclear device but there was no change in Japanese attitudes.64 The lack of 
change to such tests suggests that they were not salient to the public and, therefore, 
not interpreted as important threats. 
High Media Coverage 
Although nuclear testing was common throughout the Cold War period, one test 
stood out and it was associated with a major negative change in public opinion 
towards the Soviet Union. On Novaya Zemlya Island in the northern Arctic on 30 
62 Case 8 in Appendix 5. 
63 Case 7 and Case 3 in Appendix 5. 
64 Case 10 in Appendix 5. 
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October 1961, the largest and most powerful nuclear weapon, called "Tsar Bomba", 
was detonated. 65 The sheer size of this device, 27 tonnes, was likely to attract the 
attention of the public. In what was already a salient action, the high media 
coverage likely increased the magnitude of the effect of this test on the Japanese 
consciousness. The sheer magnitude of the bomb and the decision by the Soviets to 
test such a device were a violation of Japanese anti-nuclearism. Feelings of 
hostility towards the Soviet Union would have been generated following the test 
and likely influenced by fears of a realistic threat. Attitudes towards the Soviet 
Union in November 1961 turned negative by -7.6 percentage points. 
North Korea's first nuclear test was associated with a major negative change in 
Japanese public opinion. On October 6, 2006, just as newly appointed Japanese 
Prime Minister Abe Shinzo was making his first trip abroad to South Korea and 
China, North Korea conducted its first ever nuclear test.66 The act itself was highly 
provocative and its timing, whether intentional or not, made it salient to a Japanese 
public that had been looking forward to improving relations with its Asian 
neighbours in the post-Koizumi era. Pyongyang's announcement to the world that 
it was a nuclear power likely elicited a negative reaction from the Japanese public 
who do not like nuclear tests in general but also have a strong dislike of North 
Korea. Furthermore, the fact that this was its first nuclear test meant that the North 
had violated the norm of non-proliferation. Finally, given the geographical 
proximity of the two nations. and the lack of diplomatic relations, this was 
interpreted as not only a symbolic threat but also a realistic threat. The Jiji data 
65 Case 30 in Appendix 5. 
66 Case 37 in Appendix 5. 
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show a change in attitudes towards North Korea in October 2006 of -5.6 percentage 
points. 
Adding to the perception of threat was the rhetoric of Japanese elites which framed 
North Korea's actions as a threat. Following the test, Prime Minister Abe said, 
"North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons drastically changes the security 
circumstances in Northeast Asia" and that "we're going to enter a new, more 
dangerous nuclear era" ("Japan's diplomacy tested by North Korea", Daily Yomiuri, 
October 12, 2006, p.2). In an editorial, the Yomiuri wrote that North Korea's 
actions "constitute a grave challenge by a rogue nation to the security of the 
international community" ("Safeguarding Japan in a 'dangerous new era"', Daily 
Yomiuri, October 11, 2006, p.4). Media coverage of this event was also high, 
adding to the salience of this event. The association of the major change in public 
opinion towards North Korea in October 2006 in the same month as its nuclear test 
supports the assertion that the Japanese public responds negatively to nuclear tests. 
One of the largest single-month changes in public opinion in Japan towards a 
foreign nation throughout the period of this study came following its resumption of 
nuclear testing in the South Pacific in 1995 and 1996.67 Attitudes towards France 
changed by -8.5 percentage points in December 1995, -10 percentage points in 
August 1995, and -29.7 percentage points in September 1995. One reason for the 
change in opinion was the high media coverage that they received. Nuclear issues 
were salient in 1995 because China had been conducting its own tests. The actions 
of China and France, both of which were attempting to collect as much data as 
possible before the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) came into effect, were 
67 Case 36, Case 31, Case 28, and Case 21 in Appendix 5. 
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viewed as unnecessary and harmful to the NPT regime. Furthermore, anger was 
further generated because the timing of the tests coincided with the fiftieth 
anniversary of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. A large conference in 
Hiroshima at the time of the tests led numerous participants to protest France's 
actions ("French rapped as A-bomb meet opens in Hiroshima", Daily Yomiuri, 5 
August 1995, p.2). The mayor of Hiroshima called the French tests "unforgivably 
reckless actions" and a reflection of "anachronistic great powers policy that still 
believes in a nuclear deterrent even after the end of the Cold War" ("Japanese 
angered, distressed over nuclear test", Daily Yomiuri, 7 September 1995, p.3). 
Japanese media organisations were also highly critical, framing the tests as a 
violation of internationally accepted norms. The Daily Yomiuri ("France must end 
its nuclear tests", 29 January 1996) argued that France's actions harmed global 
efforts to promote disarmament and ban nuclear tests: 
France's resumption of testing just contrary to this pledge has ended up 
tarnishing the country's international trustworthiness and its moral 
reputation ... the tests have only served to show, blatantly, the arrogance of a 
nuclear power, thus rekindling the nonnuclear countries' dissatisfaction with 
the existing NPT regime (p.8). 
The dominant frame saw the French as arrogant and as breaking international 
norms. In the post-Cold War period, the Japanese public appears to be much less 
tolerant of nuclear tests than it had been before. Finally, the fact that France 
conducted the tests in the South Pacific, a part of the world that had long been used 
by nuclear powers as a testing ground, also elicited anger among the Japanese 
public. The temporal proximity of the major change in public opinion towards 
France and the nuclear tests, along with the high media coverage they received, 
suggest that they were the cause. 
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The underground nuclear tests in Pokharan were associated with a major change in 
Japanese public opinion towards India of -11.4 percentage points in May 199868. 
Like with the French tests, both Japanese elites and media responded to India's 
action with outrage. Japanese leaders expressed disappointment in India and stated 
their concern that this could lead to an arms race with Pakistan since both nations 
were outside the agreed upon framework ofthe NPT regime. Japanese aid to India 
was suspended ("Japan to freeze grants to India", BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 13 
May 1998). The Japanese media also showed anger and expressed moral outrage, 
with the Daily Yomiuri ("India blasts away international trust", 13 May 1998, p.6) 
stating that "the decision to conduct the tests was dishonourable in that it showed 
utter disregard for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) adopted by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations in the autumn of 1996". The high media 
coverage of the tests also likely increased their salience and the anger generated by 
them turned in to hostility towards India. 
In sum, the close association with many nuclear tests and changes in public 
attitudes towards the nations involved suggest that salient nuclear tests may 
produce increases in negative public attitudes towards foreign countries. This 
supports the theoretical proposition that symbolic threats are one cause of negative 
changes in public perceptions of foreign nations. Although the number of cases to 
draw inferences from is small, it does appear that the Japanese public is even more 
sensitive to nuclear tests conducted in the post-Cold War period. Part of the reason 
is the high volume of media coverage since the novelty of nuclear tests today 
means that they are newsworthy. In addition, political elites can use such nuclear 
tests as "valence issues" to gamer public support since no members of the Japanese 
68 Case 35 in Appendix 5. 
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public are going to come out in support of a North Korean or Chinese nuclear test. 
Since nuclear tests are primarily symbolic issues, low cost political rhetoric from 
Japanese elites targeting those countries that conduct such tests is likely to be 
strong. These same elites, of course, do not make any mention of the fact that even 
though the United States no longer conducts such tests it remains the country with 
the world's largest nuclear arsenal. The Japanese public may also be more sensitive 
to nuclear testing today than during the Cold War because such tests are no longer 
deemed as necessary and the international norm against such testing may have been 
strengthened following the adoption of the CTBT by the United Nations in 1996 
(though it has not entered into force). To conclude, the data do suggest that nuclear 
tests are likely to be associated with negative attitudes towards the nation 
conducting the test. 
Use of Military Force 
The threat to use force, or the actual use of force, can be considered to be a 
symbolic threat because it violates the Japanese value of anti-militarism. In this 
section, I test two hypotheses. First, the use of military force by a foreign nation 
should be associated with a change in public opinion towards the nation perceived 
as responsible for the dispute. Second, cases in which media coverage of a 
country's use of force is high should be correlated with greater magnitude change 
than in cases in which media coverage is low. 
Figure 6.3 shows a negative but weak relation between media coverage of the use 
of military force and changes in Japanese collective opinion towards those nations 
involved. A list of cases can be found in Appendix 6. 
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Figure 6.3: Front Page Stories of Use of Military Force and Change in Public Attitudes 
toward Nation Involved, 1960-2007 
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Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008), various Asahi 
Shimbun, and Jiji polls. 
Higher media coverage of a use of force is associated with greater negative 
changes in public perceptions of the nation involved. A typical case of low media 
coverage was the border dispute between India and China (Case 18). This attracted 
eight front page stories and was associated with a change in attitudes towards India 
of -2.3 percentage points in December 1962. A typical case of high media coverage 
came when the United States announced that it was sending more combat troops to 
Vietnam (Case 60). This was related to a change in attitudes towards the United 
States of -6.6 percentage points in April 1965. Another example of high media 
coverage associated with a major change in opinion was the Falklands War, which 
received 203 front page stories in Asahi and was associated with a change in public 
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attitudes towards the United Kingdom of -5.9 percentage points. Higher media 
coverage of the use of military force does appear to be correlated with greater 
negative changes in public opinion. 
However, the large number of outliers does suggest that factors other than media 
coverage are also important influences on public opinion. Understandably, 
invasions of smaller nations by larger nations tend to be associated with extremely 
large changes in public attitudes towards the invading nation. For example, the 
invasion of Czechoslovakia received 157 front page stories and was associated 
with a change in public attitudes towards the Soviet Union of -12.2 percentage 
points in September 1968 (Case 61 ). The invasion of Cambodia by the United 
States in June 1970 received 104 front page stories and was associated with an 
extremely large change in June 1970 of attitudes of -11.3 percentage points (Case 
56). Japanese citizens do not seem to like it when large countries use military force 
against weaker opponents. This is not only a violation of the norm of 
anti-militarism but it could also be viewed as extremely unfair. 
Table 6.2 shows a relationship between the use of force by a foreign nation and 
changes in public opinion. Many cases of the use of military force by a foreign 
nation were associated with changes in public attitudes towards that country. The 
column marked "Total" shows that in 34 of 64 cases of the use of military force, 
Japanese attitudes towards the nation involved changed. This supports the 
proposition that symbolic threats can have a negative effect on public perceptions 
of a foreign nation. 
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Table 6.2: The Use of Military Force, Media Coverage and Negative Change in 
Japanese Public Attitudes toward Country Involved, 1960-2007 
High Moderate Low Total 
Major Change 12 5 2 19 
(30.77) (33.33) (20) (29.69) 
Minor Change 12 2 15 
(30.77) (6.67) (20) (23.44) 
No Change 15 9 6 30 
(38.46) (60) (60) (46.88) 
Total 39 15 10 64 
(100) (100) (100) (100) 
Note: Percentages in brackets. See Appendix 6 for list of cases. "Major Change" and "Minor Change" 
both refer to cases of negative change in opinion. See Chapter Three text for how the variables were 
generated. 
Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008), various Asahi 
Shimbun, and Jiji polls. 
Furthermore, cases of the military use of force were related to changes in public 
opinion of greater magnitude when media coverage was high. The row labelled 
"Major Change" shows that two cases of low media coverage and 12 cases of high 
media coverage were associated with a major change in public opinion. Thes~ 
results suggest that when media coverage of international conflict is high, the 
magnitude of public opinion change is likely to be greater than when it is low. This 
supports the proposition that media coverage moderates the effect of threats on 
public attitudes. 
Low Media Coverage 
Given that many international disputes occur in places that are unfamiliar to most 
citizens and involve conflicts that they have no knowledge of, it is unsurprising to 
find that those cases of the use of military force that received low levels of media 
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coverage were not associated with changes in public opinion. Minor border 
disputes that occasionally arise between nations, especially those geographically 
distant from Japan, do not appear to have a significant effect on public opinion. For 
example, the Kargil War between India and Pakistan in 1999 over Kashmir did not 
result in any change in public opinion.69 
Various issues associated with the Vietnam War that received low media coverage 
also were not associated with changes in public opinion towards the United States. 
As the war continued, such events were seen as more and more common and thus 
unlikely to be salient to most Japanese citizens. For example, in February, April 
and December 1967, American bombing of North Vietnam received low media 
coverage and did not result in any reported changes in attitudes in the Jiji polls.70 
As other countries joined the American war effort, this did not also appear to result 
in a reaction from the Japanese public. Neither South Korea nor France's decisions 
to send soldiers to Vietnam to support the United States were associated with any 
change in opinion in February 1966.71 The low level of media coverage and the 
constant salience of an international conflict, such as the Vietnam War, may tend to 
breed indifference among the public as information about violence just becomes a 
normal part of the news cycle. 
Moderate Media Coverage 
Since many cases of the minor use of military force are not salient they do not tend 
to produce negative changes in public attitudes. Various examples exist of such 
cases that were not associated with any changes in public attitudes towards the 
69 Case 3 in Appendix 6. 
7
° Case I, Case 2, and 4 in Appendix 6. 
71 Case 5 and Case I 0 in Appendix 6. 
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nation involved include the US shooting down of two Libyan jets in August 1981; 
the India-China border dispute in December 1962; and the bombing of the Chinese 
embassy in Belgrade in 1999 during the war with Serbia. 72 Although each of these 
events involved a use of military force and received moderate media coverage, they 
were not associated with any changes in public attitudes. 
In some cases, even geographically distant conflicts can impact on public opinion, 
especially when they involve a major use of force. For example, the Algeria-France 
War was associated with a major negative change in public attitudes towards 
France in July 1961 of -9.3 percentage points and the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba 
by the US was associated with a major change in public perceptions of the United 
States in May 1961 of -8.2 percentage points. 73 Both of these cases suggest that 
even when a nation that is generally liked by the Japanese public is involved in a 
conflict, this can still produce a major change in public opinion. 
The launch of missile attacks on Sudan and Afghanistan by the United States on 
Sudan and Afghanistan were associated with no change in public attitudes towards 
the United States in August 1998.74 Despite the fact that this use of force was 
against two sovereign states, the Japanese public may have seen the American 
actions as justified. Some in the Japanese media pushed the frame that this was a 
reasonable response to the bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. 
According to the Daily Yomiuri ("Fight terrorism together", 22 August 1998): 
Naturally the Sudanese government and the Taliban militia of Muslim 
fundamentalists, which in effect controls Afghanistan, bitterly criticised the 
United States for the attacks ... however, if what Washington says is true, 
72 Case 13, Case 18, Case 25 in Appendix 6. 
73 Case 20 and Case 12 in Appendix 6. 
74 Case 14 in Appendix 6. 
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the U.S. assertion that it has only exercised its right to self defence in 
attacking the facilities has some legitimacy, although the targets were 
located in the territories of other countries (p.6). 
Without much knowledge or familiarity with the two nations that were the target of 
the attacks, the more hawkish elements of the Japanese media may have been able 
to dominate the framing of the issue. Since the public may have seen these actions 
as a rational response to a terrorist act, and since the event only received moderate 
media coverage, it may not have been interpreted as a threat to Japanese values but 
rather a reasonable response to international terrorism. 
Another example of a case of a use of military force that did not result in a change 
in public attitudes towards the nation involved was the invasion of Panama by the 
United States. 75 In December 1989, the month of the invasion, Japanese attitudes 
towards the United States remained stable. Despite the fact that approximately 
1,000 people were killed, the invasion did not appear to have a strong effect on the 
Japanese public. One reason was certainly Panama's geographical distance and the 
unfamiliarity of the country for most citizens. However, perhaps the most 
important reason for the lack of public opinion activation was how it was framed. 
According to the Diplomatic Bluebook (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan 1989), 
"the Panamanian National Assembly of Representatives declared a state of war 
with the United States" and so "the United States resorted to use of force in 
Panama to protect U.S. citizens". Although the Japanese media framed the actions 
of the United States in Panama as "regrettable", the Daily Yomiuri ("U.S. 
Intervention of Panama", 22 December 1989, p.6) did argue that American anger 
over the issue was justified due to concerns about access to the Panama Canal. The 
75 Case 23 in Appendix 6. 
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lack of media coverage may have moderated the salience of the invasion and the 
framing of the invasion as one of "self-defence" likely limited the perception of 
America as the source of the threat. This suggests that when the Japanese public 
have little knowledge of an international conflict, they may be more susceptible to 
framing. 
In another case, military exercises near Taiwan were associated with an increase in 
negative feelings among the Japanese public towards China.76 Jiji reported that 
attitudes towards China experienced a major negative change of -7 percentage 
points in March 1996, the same month as the crisis. Just prior to the Taiwanese 
elections, China threatened Taiwan with a series of provocative missile launches in 
the Taiwan Straits. These events elicited a large amount of concern by Japanese 
leaders and the Japanese press. According to the Daily Yomiuri ("Threats won't 
break Taiwan deadlock", 6 March 1996, p.6), "the planned missile launches run the 
risk of causing an 'unforeseeable incident' and thus we think China's decision is 
extremely regrettable ... the upcoming exercises will only fan the flames of tension". 
These events were not only of concern as a symbolic issue but also had 
implications for Japan's own security. 
High Media Coverage 
Even when media coverage is high, those conflicts about which the Japanese public 
has little knowledge of are unlikely to activate public opinion. For example, even 
though media coverage of the Indo-Pakistani War was high, Japanese public 
attitudes towards India in December 1971 did not change.77 The NATO attacks on 
76 Case 16 in Appendix 6. 
77 Case 57 in Appendix 6. 
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Serbia were not associated with any change in public attitudes towards the United 
States or the United Kingdom in April 1999.78 Both the border dispute between 
the Soviet Union and China in March 1969 and the France-Tunisia war in July 
1961 were associated with public opinion stability towards the nations involved.79 
Even when media coverage of the use of military force is high, this may not be 
sufficient to make conflicts in geographically distant areas salient. 
The invasion of Afghanistan produced a minor change in negative public attitudes 
towards the Soviet Union. In January 1980, the month of the invasion, public 
attitudes towards the Soviet Union experienced a minor change of -4.9 percentage 
points. This change in public opinion came even though the Japanese Government 
was doing its best not to anger the Soviets. Tokyo did not want to antagonise 
Moscow because the two nations were deepening trade relations, including 
collaboration in developing Siberian natural resources and reaching an agreement 
over Japanese fishing operations in the Soviet controlled areas near northern Japan. 
Unlike the reaction from the United States and Western European nations, the only 
action that Japan took following the invasion was to cancel person-to-person ties 
between the two nations ("Government turning cautious", Kyodo, 13 January 
1980). However, despite the lack of framing of this dispute as a threat by Japanese 
leaders, public opinion does appear to have been sufficiently activated so that 
attitudes towards the Soviet Union turned negative. This case suggests that even 
though political elites may wish to reduce the sense that a particular issue or event 
is a symbolic threat, sufficient media coverage of an event can help the public to 
resist these frames. 
78 Case 26 in Appendix 6. 
79 Case 29 and Case 51 in Appendix 6. 
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Another case of a use of military force that produced a change in Japanese public 
attitudes towards the nation involved was the 2003 Iraq War. 80 In March 2003, Jiji 
reported that Japanese public attitudes towards the United States experienced a 
minor negative change of -3.4 percentage points. This change can probably be 
attributed to the launching of what many in Japan considered to be an unnecessary 
war. What is interesting about this case is that it appears that the Japanese public 
resisted their Government's framing of the issue and perceived it as a symbolic 
threat. The Koizumi Cabinet publicly supported the efforts of the United States, 
using UN Security Council Resolution 1441 as the main rationale behind the war. 
Following the line taken by its ally, Japan also attempted to conflate the threat of 
terrorism in the minds of the Japanese public with the Iraq issue. The Diplomatic 
Bluebook (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan 2004) states: 
... the terrorist attacks in the United States (US) on September 11, 2001 
made the international community clearly understand the threat by the 
possession and use of WMD and missiles by so-called states of concern 
(p.1 0). 
Japan accused Iraq of insufficient cooperation in the work with nuclear inspectors 
and argued that the American and British military action was a last resort due to 
Iraq being in material breach of its obligations under the ceasefire agreement at the 
end of the Gulf War. The frame used by the more hawkish members of the 
Japanese media was almost word for word that of the American Government. In an 
editorial, the Daily Yomiuri ("Continue backing U.S. on Iraq", 14 March 2003) 
wrote: 
We must not forget, Iraq is to blame. The regime of Iraqi President Saddam 
Hussein insists that it has disposed of its weapons of mass destruction, but 
8
° Case 39 in Appendix 6. 
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this claim has not yet been proved. Baghdad has also failed to comply with 
a series of U.N. resolutions. Even though the regime pledged to cooperate 
fully and unconditionally with U.N. weapons inspectors, it merely did so in 
dribs and drabs to gain time (p.8). 
Following the invasion, the Daily Yomiuri ("U.S., U.K. need free rein in Iraq", 11 
April 2003, p.9) also stated that "the jubilation expressed by Iraqis at their freedom 
from Saddam's oppressive rule has demonstrated that the United States and Britain 
were correct in their decision to launch a war to topple the dictator". However, the 
minor change in public attitudes towards the United States in the same month that 
the war was launched suggests that the public may not have accepted this frame. 
The high media coverage of the invasion, plus certain less hawkish parts of 
Japanese society, may have led citizens to interpret the Iraq War as a symbolic 
threat and, like publics in other nations, see the unilateral actions of the United 
States as a threat to international order. 
The invasion of Cambodia was associated with a major change in public attitudes 
towards the United States in June 1970 of -11.3 percentage points. 81 In April1970, 
President Richard Nixon announced the United States and South Vietnam. were 
engaged in a campaign in Cambodia to eliminate the Viet Cong from their 
sanctuaries in that country. By this time, the Japanese public had already turned 
against the Vietnam War and feelings of anti-Americanism were also on the rise 
due to the Okinawa reversion issue. In the middle of a war that the majority of 
Japanese citizens opposed, the invasion of another small and poor Asian nation by 
the United States was simply deemed to be unacceptable. When the US invaded 
Cambodia, this was perceived as a symbolic threat not only because it was a use of 
military force but it was also the invasion of a neutral nation. The high media 
81 Case 56 in Appendix 6. 
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coverage meant that even in the middle of another war, this action by the United 
States was nonetheless salient. 
In another example, the invasion of Vietnam by China was related to a maJor 
change in public attitudes towards China of -8.6 percentage points in March 
1979.82 On 15 February 1979, Deng Xiaoping announced that China was going to 
launch a limited attack on Vietnam to remove it from its occupation of Cambodia, 
an ally of China. Chinese forces invaded the northern part of Vietnam and 
withdrew one month later. Approximately 30 000 people were killed in the 
violence. The invasion of a smaller nation by a large nation like China, even 
though the Japanese public had mainly positive feelings towards China at the time, 
was likely to be interpreted as a symbolic threat, especially given the high volume 
of media coverage that it received. 
The Falklands War was associated with a maJor change in Japanese attitudes 
towards the United Kingdom in April 1982 of -5.9 percentage points.83 In April 
1982, following Argentina's occupation of the Falklands Islands and the month that 
the war began, public attitudes towards the United Kingdom experienced a major 
negative change. Approximately 800 people were killed. The Japanese 
Government took the "basic position that the settlement of international disputes by 
peaceful means is the solemn responsibility assumed by all member states under 
the Charter of the United Nations and that, therefore, the Falkland Islands 
(Malvinas) dispute should also be settled by peaceful and diplomatic means in line 
with the principles and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations" ("Foreign 
Ministry issues statement on Falklands", Kyodo, 26 April 1982). In other words, 
82 Case 40 in Appendix 6. 
83 Case 64 in Appendix 6. 
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they did not really have much to say on the matter. Even though the conflict was 
distant and involved a nation that the Japanese public generally liked, the fact that 
United Kingdom was engaged in a conflict with a smaller nation in a distant part of 
the world was not seen positively in Japan. Even without cues from political elites, 
the Japanese public still saw the Falklands conflict as a violation of the norm of 
anti-militarism and so, public opinion towards the United Kingdom turned 
negative. 
The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was associated with a major change in 
public attitudes towards the Soviet Union in August 1968 of -12.2 percentage 
points.84 This was an event that received massive amounts of media coverage 
worldwide. In the summer of 1968, Czechoslovakia was enjoying what was known 
as the "Prague Spring", a period in which its citizens experienced some political 
liberalisation such as a loosening of restrictions on the media, free speech and 
travel. However, the Soviet Union decided that it was necessary to halt Prague's 
increasingly liberal reforms and so, along with its Warsaw Pact allies, invaded 
Czechoslovakia. Approximately 500 Czechs were injured and 100 were killed. This 
invasion immediately halted the liberalisation in Czechoslovakia and led to a 
strengthening of the Czech communist party. Like the cases of China invading 
Vietnam and the British fighting with the Argentineans, this involved a much 
larger nation invading a smaller one. The images of the Soviet tanks moving down 
the streets of Prague and Czech protesters standing defiantly against them 
enhanced the salience of this event and produce a major negative change in public 
attitudes towards the Soviet Union. 
84 Case 61 in Appendix 6. 
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In conclusion, a large number of factors surrounding international conflicts make 
predicting the magnitude of opinion change difficult. Factors seeming to influence 
the salience of a particular conflict include its geographical proximity to Japan, the 
nations involved, the reaction by Japanese elites, and the volume of media 
coverage. The Japanese public appears to react especially strongly to attacks on 
smaller nations by larger nations. These cases may be perceived to not only violate 
the norm of anti-militarism but also norms related to fairness. Even in international 
affairs, people do not appear to like a bully. In sum, this section has found 
empirical support for the proposition that events interpreted as symbolic threats 
tend to produce negative changes in public attitudes towards the nation involved 
and media coverage moderates this effect. 
Killing of Civilians 
The killing of civilians by a foreign government is an action that violates the 
worldview of most citizens ofthe world, not only in Japan. As a result, nations that 
engage in such behaviour should be the target of feelings ofhostility from Japanese 
citizens. In the following section, I argue that the killing of civilians by a foreign 
nation will produce an increase in negative Japanese public attitudes towards that 
nation responsible and that media coverage of such events leads to changes of 
greater magnitude. Although the number of cases is small, the empirical finding 
that changes in opinion are associated with such events lends support to both of 
these claims. 
As Figure 6.4 shows, the relationship between the volume of front page stories in 
Asahi and the changes in public perceptions of a state viewed as responsible for the 
killing of civilians is negative. The list of cases can be found in Appendix 7. 
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Figure 6.4: Front Page Stories of the Killing of Civilians and Change in Public 
Attitudes toward Nation Involved, 1960-2007 
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Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et a!. (2005), Kodama (2008), various Asahi 
Shimbun, and Jiji polls. 
Higher media coverage does appear to produce a greater increase in negative public 
attitudes towards those nations involved in the killing of civilians. A typical case of 
relatively low media coverage was that of the Rangoon bombing in which North 
Korean agents attempted to kill the South Korean President in Burma but ended up 
killing 21 people and wounding 46 (Case 2). Media coverage of the incident was 
27 front page stories and this was associated with a change in attitudes towards 
North Korea in November 1983 of -6.5 percentage points. A case of high media 
coverage 0f the killing of civilians was the Russian missile attack on Korean 
Airlines Flight 007 in which 269 people were killed (Case 1 0). Media coverage of 
this incident was 126 front page stories in Asahi and a change in public perceptions 
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of the Soviet Union in September 1983 of -20 percentage points. Higher media 
coverage was correlated with greater changes in public opinion. 
Two major outliers exist. The first outlier was the shooting down of Iranian Air 
Flight 655 by the USS Vincennes, which was not associated with a significant 
change in public opinion towards the United States (Case 1 ). One reason for this 
may have been the relatively lower volume of prominent media coverage that it 
received. Another reason may have been its framing as an accidental rather than 
intentional action. Since the actions of the United States were not seen as intention, 
Japanese citizens probably did not see it as a symbolic threat. The second outlier. 
was the Tiananmen Square incident (Case 6). This received 40 front page stories 
and public attitudes towards China in June 1989 changed by -34.1 percentage 
points, the largest single month change in public opinion towards a country in a 
single month throughout this entire study. Other than the volume of media 
coverage, other factors in this case were also important, especially the framing of 
this incident by the mass media. Although the change in public opinion was much 
greater than expected, this still supports the argument that the killing of civilians 
results in negative changes in public opinion towards the nation involved. 
Table 6.3 shows that the majority of cases coded here as the killing of civilians 
were associated with negative changes in public perceptions of the nation involved. 
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Table 6.3: Killing of Civilians, Media Coverage and Negative Change in Japanese 
Public Perceptions of the Nation Involved, 1960-2007 
High Media Moderate Media Low Media Total 
Major Change 5 0 0 5 
(55.56) (0) (0) (50) 
Minor Change 4 0 0 4 
(44.44) (0) (0) (40) 
No Change 0 0 
(O) (I 00) (0) (10) 
Total 9 0 10 
( 100) (100) (0) (100) 
Note: Percentages in brackets. See Appendix 7 for list of cases. "Major Change" and "Minor Change" 
both refer to cases of negative change in opinion. See Chapter Three text for how the variables were 
generated. 
Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et a!. (2005), Kodama (2008), various Asahi 
Shimbun, and Jiji polls. 
Numerous cases exist in which the use of violence against civilians was related to 
changes in public attitudes towards the nation involved. In nine of the ten cases 
cited here, collective opinion changed. Furthermore, media coverage also appears 
to moderate the effect of such events. Examining the row labelled "Major Change", 
five cases were associated with high media coverage and no cases were associated 
with low media coverage. Although the number of cases is small, both of these 
finding support the propositions that symbolic threats have a negative effect on 
public perceptions of foreign nations and media coverage moderates the magnitude 
of that effect. The cases are examined briefly below. 
151 
Moderate Media Coverage 
The shooting down of Iranian Air Flight 655 by the USS Vincennes was not 
associated with any change in Japanese public attitudes towards the United States 
in July 1988.85 In a period when tensions in the Persian Gulf were high and the 
Iran-Iraq War was ongoing, the USS Vincennes, thinking it was an Fl4 jet fighter, 
shot down an Iranian passenger airliner with two surface-to-air missiles. According 
to Iran, 290 crew and passengers were killed. Despite the number of people killed 
and the similarities to the KAL Flight 007 incidence, the month of the event, July 
1988, public attitudes towards the United States remained stable. 
Two reasons are probably behind the fact that public attitudes did not change. First, 
media coverage was moderate. While the Soviet shooting down of KAL Flight 007 
received 126 front page stories in Asahi, the Iranian Air Flight 655 story received 
only 13. This lack of salience meant that Japanese public opinion was unlikely to 
be activated. The second reason for the lack of changes was that this incident was 
likely not perceived to be a violation of Japanese values because, as Entman (2004) 
reports in great detail, the dominant frame put forth by the United States 
Government and American media was that it was accidental rather than intentional. 
According to the Diplomatic Bluebook of 1988 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan 
1988), "a U.S. warship, which had been exchanging fire with Iran, mistook an 
Iranian passenger plane for a fighter plane and shot it down with a missile". 
Without the assigning of responsibility or intention to the United States, this was 
unlikely to result in feelings of hostility. The result was no change in public 
opm10n. 
85 Case 1 in Appendix 7. 
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High Media Coverage 
Even when the killing of civilians involves distant nations and conflicts the 
Japanese public knows little about, if media coverage is high, this can still activate 
public opinion. The Soviet repression of Lithuanians in 1991 during what was 
known as the "January events" was related to a minor change in public attitudes.86 
In 1990, following the Republic of Lithuania's declared independence from the 
Soviet Union, the economic situation there worsened and there were riots in front 
of the parliament building over rising prices and food rationing in January 1991. 
Under the orders of Gorbachev, Soviet troops were flown in to Lithuania to quell 
the disturbances. According to the New York Times ("Soviet loyalists in charge 
after attack in Lithuania; 13 dead; curfew is imposed", 14 January 1991, p.A 1 ), at 
least 14 people were killed in the events and 600 injured. According to the Daily 
Yomiuri ("Lithuania- Graveyard of reform?", 13 January 1991, p.6), "television 
images of Soviet paratroopers firing warning shots over the heads of Lithuanians 
rallying in Vilnius cannot help but remind us of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact 
intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968". Public attitudes towards the Soviet Union 
in January 1990, the same month as these events, showed a minor negative change 
of -4.1 percentage points. The high media coverage, the salient images, and its 
linkage to events in Prague in 1968 appear to have been sufficient to activate 
negative emotions among Japanese citizens. 
The Kwangju massacre was associated with a minor negative change in Japanese 
public attitudes towards South Korea of -5.3 percentage points in June 1980. In 
May 1980, the South Korean Government violently cracked down on 
86 Case 3 in Appendix 7. 
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pro-democracy protesters in the city ofKwangju, killing at least 200 people though 
the number is believed to have been higher ("Tribute to Kwangju massacred", BBC 
News, 18 May 2000). One month later, after the events had come to light, Japanese 
attitudes towards South Korea experienced a negative and minor change. In Japan, 
the Opposition Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and Korean students both were vocal in 
condemning the use of force by South Korea ("South Korean students stage rally in 
Tokyo", Kyodo, 31 May 1980). However, the Government was relatively quiet as 
it was attempting to build economic relations with South Korea at that time. This 
suggests that even without elite framing, so long as media attention is sufficiently 
high the public will respond to salient events. 
As was mentioned earlier, the assassination attempt of the South Korean President 
in Rangoon was viewed as an act of state terrorism and was related to a major 
change in Japanese attitudes towards North Korea of -6.5 percentage points in 
November 1983. 87 In November 1983, public attitudes towards North Korea 
experienced a negative and major change. Not surprisingly, the attempt to 
assassinate a head of state in a foreign nation was seen as a symbolic threat. 
Japanese elites also offered strong vocal support for South Korea following the 
event. Japan's Foreign Minister, Abe Shintaro, met with South Korean President 
Chon Tu-hwan and expressed his support for South Korea, as well as urging the 
Burmese Government to take some kind of diplomatic action against North Korea 
if it was found to be responsible ("Abe meets Chon Tu-Hwan, returns to Tokyo", 
Kyodo, 13 October 1983). The framing ofthe event as a case of state terrorism and 
the high media coverage was likely sufficient for it to be interpreted as a symbolic 
threat and for it to be salient. 
87 Case 2 in Appendix 7. 
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The destruction of KAL Flight 858 was related to a major negative change in 
public attitudes towards North Korea of -15.8 percentage points in February 
1988.88 In the late 1980s, North Korea was working to destabilise the South 
Korean Government, disrupt elections, and frighten foreign teams from attending 
the Seoul Olympics. On November 29, 1987, North Korean agents using Japanese 
passports planted a bomb on Korean Airlines Flight 858 bound from Abu Dhabi to 
Bangkok, killing all 115 passengers and crew aboard. The two North Korean 
agents had boarded the plane in Baghdad, left a time bomb, and then attempted to 
escape before being arrested in Bahrain (Bell, G. and Watts, G., 1987, "North 
Korea implicated in group that plotted crash", The Times (London), 3 December). 
The data show a change in attitudes towards North Korea in February 1988, two 
months after the incident, probably because it was the same month in which it was 
revealed that North Korean agents had used fake Japanese passports to conduct this 
act. In addition to the fact that North Korea indiscriminately killed all of the 
passengers on board the flight, the association of Japan with such an incident 
outraged both Japanese policymakers and the mass public. Like the Rangoon 
bombing, a case framed as state terrorism that receives high media coverage is 
likely to elicit anger among the public and result in an increase in negate public 
perceptions of the nation viewed as the source of the problem. 
The Tiananmen incident was associated with a massive negative change in 
attitudes towards China of -34.1 percentage points in June 1989.89 On June 6, 1989, 
the Chinese army shot hundreds of civilians in an attempt to squash the large-scale 
protests that had been gathering in Tiananmen Square in Beijing. The army fired at 
88 Case 4 in Appendix 7. 
89 Case 6 in Appendix 7. 
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the unarmed protesters, primarily students, killing approximately 2,000 people. 
Even though the Chinese government had warned protesters that it would do 
whatever it saw as necessary to disperse them, the scale of the sudden violence was 
unexpected. The actions of the Chinese Government were condemned by 
governments from all around the world, including Japan. June 1989 saw a major 
change in Japanese public perceptions of China. 
The high media coverage of the Tiananmen incident and its framing in the 
Japanese media were the primary reasons for its effect on public opinion. Japanese 
elites were very cautious in their criticism of China. According to the Diplomatic 
Bluebook (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan 1989), "the armed suppression by the 
Chinese authorities of the movement staged by students and citizens calling for 
democracy from April to June 1989 gave rise to denunciation of China mainly by 
countries of the West". In contrast to the rather subdued reaction of political elites, 
media reaction to the events was much stronger. The dominant frame of the 
Tiananmen incident was that it was a massacre. Asahi Shimbun, for example, 
accompanied all of its articles with the phrase "Tiananmen Bloodshed" (tenanmon 
ryuuketsu jiken) written in large text. Even without government elites to tell them 
how to interpret events, the salience of unarmed protesters being killed by soldiers 
was likely sufficient to capture the attention of Japanese citizens and activate 
negative emotions. 
One final example of a case in which the killing of civilians was correlated with a 
major negative change in public attitudes towards a foreign nation was that of the 
shooting down ofKAL Flight 007.90 Jiji reported a change in attitudes towards the 
9
° Case 10 in Appendix 7. 
156 
Soviet Union in September 1983 of -20 percentage points. That same month, 
Korean Airlines Flight 007 had wandered into restricted airspace over the Soviet 
Kamchatka Peninsula and near to Sakhalin Island, both areas that the Soviet Union 
considered to be highly sensitive. Soviet fighter jets intercepted the passenger plane 
and shot it down, resulting in the deaths of the 269 passengers and crewmembers. 
Although the Soviet Union first denied responsibility, it later admitted that it had 
shot down the plane and accused it of spying. In September 1983, public 
perceptions of the Soviet Union experienced a negative major change. 
The KAL 007 incident involved many factors that led it to resonate strongly with 
the Japanese public. The primary reason was the nature of the event itself. The 
shooting down of a civilian aircraft by military planes and the suggestion that this 
was intentional was bound to elicit negative emotions among Japanese citizens. It 
also elicited memories of a past event. In 1978, Korean Air Flight 902 was forced 
to land by Soviet jets in the Soviet Far East so it was not a stretch to believe that 
the actions of the Soviets had been intentional.91 In addition, Japanese citizens 
were on board so this may also have been interpreted as a realistic threat. One of 
the first statements by the Japanese Government was when Foreign Minister Abe 
stated: "We are concerned about the fate of 27 Japanese aboard the plane" 
("Reportage on Soviet role in missing ROK plane", Kyodo, 1 September 1983). 
Japanese elites also condemned the actions with Prime Minister Nakasone 
Yasuhiro calling the act "unpardonable" and "barbarous" ("Nakasone calls attack 
'barbarous"', Kyodo, 4 September 1983). Soon after the event, polls found that the 
majority of Japanese supported economic sanctions against the Soviet Union 
("Japanese people favour sanctions", Kyodo, 5 September 1983). The 
91 Case 5 in Appendix 7. 
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indiscriminate killing of civilians on board the flight, the high media coverage, the 
framing of the event as intentional, and the response by Japanese elites all meant 
that this incident was likely to be perceived as a violation of Japanese values and, 
therefore, a symbolic threat. These factors, along with the empirical fact that there 
was a change in public perceptions of the Soviet Union in the same month as the 
event, all point to the incident as having been the cause of the major change in 
public perceptions of the Soviet Union. This was yet another case in which a 
symbolic threat, moderated by media coverage, appears to have produced a 
negative change in public opinion towards a foreign nation. 
To summarise, this section has found support for the claims that the killing of 
civilians by a foreign nation is likely to cause a major change in public opinion of 
the nation involved and that high media coverage of such incidents is associated 
with greater magnitude changes in public opinion than lower media coverage. The 
one case of moderate media coverage was associated with no change in opinion 
while cases of high media coverage tended to be associated with major opinion 
change. Although the number of cases is small, this section has nonetheless 
provided support for the proposition that symbolic threats cause negative changes 
in public perceptions of foreign nations. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have shown that issues likely to be interpreted by the Japanese 
public as symbolic threats tend to have a negative effect on public perceptions of 
the nation perceived to be responsible. Media coverage is also important for 
increasing the magnitude of the effect of such incidents. Overall, these findings 
support the statistical analysis in Chapter Four which found that symbolic threats 
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can have a strong impact on public opinion, especially when media coverage is 
high. 
These case studies are an important contribution to the literature on public opinion 
and foreign policy because they show that even those events which may have no 
impact on the material wellbeing of citizens can nonetheless activate public 
opinion. When it comes to foreign affairs, it appears that citizens do not only take 
an interest in those events that directly affect their welfare but also those that 
contravene their basic beliefs. The notion that people react to symbolic threats 
raises interesting questions for the rational public hypothesis because it suggests 
that citizens may allow their attitudes towards a nation to be affected by those 
issues and events that have no direct effect on their material interests. Would it be 
considered rational, for example, for the public to respond negatively to a nuclear 
test conducted in a foreign nation far from Japan or should this be considered to be 
nothing more than an emotional, and thus, irrational, response? Would it be 
rational for the public to support sanctions against such a country even though it 
may have a negative effect on the Japanese economy? These are important 
questions that require future investigation. 
In conclusion, the theory and evidence suggest that symbolic threats have a 
negative effect on Japanese public perceptions of foreign nations. Japanese 
political elites play an important role in shaping whether a particular issue is 
perceived to be a threat or not and, therefore, on whether an issue has a negative 
effect on public perceptions. As suggested by theories of framing, rather than 
directly shaping public opinion, the influence of political elites comes from their 
ability to make moral judgments and attribute responsibility to particular countries. 
In sum, the proposition that symbolic threats can cause increases in negative public 
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perceptions of a foreign nation and the proposition that media coverage tends to 
increase the magnitude of the effect of such threats is supported by the findings in 
this chapter. 
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7. Media Coverage of Threats to Japanese Identity and 
Public Perceptions of Foreign Nations 
Introduction 
The main argument of this chapter is that events interpreted as threats to Japanese 
identity are associated with negative changes in public attitudes of the nation 
viewed as its source. The second argument is that those threats to Japanese identity 
that receive higher media coverage will be related to greater magnitude changes in 
public opinion. The chapter is divided into three sections that examine first, cases 
of criticism of Japan; second, violations of diplomatic protocol involving Japan; 
and third; anti-Japanese demonstrations. 
Events interpreted as threats to Japanese identity should cause negative changes in 
public perceptions towards the nation involved because citizens respond negatively 
to challenges to their group's esteem. When the actions of an out-group potentially 
decrease the esteem of the in-group, this will be interpreted as a threat. 
Branscombe et al. (1999:36) define this type of situation as a threat to the 
in-group's perceived value. These threats will tend to produce feelings of hostility 
towards the out-group viewed as the source of the threat. As applied to this study, 
the proposition that threats to social identity can produce hostility towards an 
out-group suggests that an issue perceived as a threat to Japanese identity should 
produce an increase in negative public perceptions of the nation viewed as the 
source of the threat. Since I assume that the Japanese public identifies with the 
Japanese nation, threats to national identity should be viewed as threats to their 
own self-esteem. When the image of their nation is disparaged by an out-group, 
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citizens can choose to denigrate the source of the threat. When this happens, public 
attitudes towards the nation associated with the threat turn negative. 
Hypotheses 
This chapter is concerned with testing the following two hypotheses. First, cases of 
threats to Japanese identity should be associated with negative changes in Japanese 
public attitudes of the nation involved as measured using the Jiji poll data. Second, 
cases of threats to Japanese identity that receive high media coverage should have a 
greater effect on public attitudes towards the nation involved than those that 
receive low media coverage. These hypotheses are tested with cases involving the 
three types of issues and events: criticism of Japan by a foreign government; 
violations of diplomatic protocol associated with Japan; and anti-Japanese 
demonstrations. 
Foreign Criticism of Japan 
Cases in which a foreign nation criticises Japan should be associated with negative 
changes in public attitudes towards the nation involved. The denigration of Japan 
by the political leadership of another country should cause feelings of anger and 
hostility among the public. In order to deal with these feelings, people will direct 
them towards the country perceived to be the source of the threat. If media 
coverage is high then this will signal to the public that a particular communication 
was important and should be given their attention. Public perceptions of a nation, 
which tend to be stable, will then shift in a negative direction at the same time. 
Foreign criticism of Japan, moderated by media coverage, causes changes in 
negative public perceptions of the nation involved. 
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Figure 7.1 shows a negative relationship between front page news stories in Asahi 
Shimbun and changes in Japanese public perceptions of the nation involved. A list 
of cases can be found in Appendix 8. 
Figure 7.1: Front Page Stories of Criticism of Japan and Change in Public Attitudes 
towards Nation Involved, 1960-2007 
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Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008), various Asahi 
Shimbun, and Jiji polls. 
The relationship between media coverage of foreign criticism of Japan and changes 
in public opinion is negative but weak. A typical case of low media coverage was 
when Premier Wen Jiaobao of China criticised Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi 
over his visits to Yasukuni Shrine (Case 1 ). This story received two front page 
news stories and was associated with a change in public attitudes towards China of 
only -0.9 percentage points. A typical case of high media coverage of criticism of 
163 
Japan was over what is known as the first history textbook issue dispute (Case 26). 
Despite receiving 30 front page stories in Asahi Shimbun, public opinion towards 
China only changed by -2.9 percentage points in August 1982. The small 
magnitude of change and the numerous outliers suggest that the impact of foreign 
criticism of Japan, even when media coverage is high, may not be very strong. 
Nonetheless, a few cases of foreign criticism of Japan do appear to be associated 
with negative changes in public perceptions of the nation involved. 
Table 7.1 shows the relationship between media coverage and opmwn change 
using ordinal variables. 
Table 7.1: Media Coverage and Negative Change in Japanese Public Attitudes 
toward Country Involved in Criticism of Japan 
High Media Moderate Media Low Media Total 
Major Change 0 0 0 0 
(0) (0) (0) (0) 
Minor Change 2 3 4 9 
(33 .33) (27.27) (40) (33 .33) 
No Change 4 8 6 18 
(66.67) (72.73) (60) (66.67) 
Total 6 11 10 27 
(100) (100) (100) (100) 
Note: Percentages in brackets. See Appendix 8 for list of cases. "Major Change" and "Minor Change" 
both refer to cases of negative change in opinion. See Chapter Three text for how the variables were 
generated. 
Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et a!. (2005), Kodama (2008), various Asahi 
Shimbun, and Jiji polls. 
Some cases of foreign criticism of Japan are associated with change in public 
attitudes towards the nation involved. In nine of the 27 cases, public attitudes 
towards the other nation experienced minor negative change. Interestingly, in no 
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cases was any criticism of Japan associated with a major change in public opinion. 
Furthermore, there is little evidence of the effects of the media in these cases. 
Although two cases of minor change were associated with high media coverage, 
four cases of low media coverage were also associated with a minor change in 
public attitudes. While the relatively small number of cases means that any 
inference has to be made with caution, the data do offer some support for the 
proposition that threats to Japanese identity produce negative changes in public 
attitudes towards a foreign nation. However, the magnitude of change in such cases 
tends to be minor. The Japanese public may simply not perceive such criticism to 
be a serious threat. Furthermore, the media coverage of such cases does not appear 
to be influential. To examine some of the reasons for these findings, a series of 
case studies are examined below. 
Low Media Coverage 
Despite criticism of Japan by South Korea and China over Prime Minister Koizumi 
Junichiro's visits to Yasukuni Shrine in April 2002 and January 2004, public 
attitudes towards neither of these countries changed in those particular months.92 
This suggests that the Japanese public did not see such criticism as a threat or insult 
to their country. From the time Koizumi made his first announcement in 2001 that 
he would visit Y asukuni, both China and South Korea repeatedly issued warnings 
that such high-level visits served to glorify Japan's past wars and aggression 
against Asian countries. For many Japanese, and certainly for Koizumi, Yasukuni 
"is basically a domestic matter as to when and how country's leader offers prayers 
to the war dead based on the traditions and customs of that country" and that "other 
92 Case 4 and Case 6 in Appendix 8. 
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countries have no right to interfere" ("Koizumi's decision a w1se one", Daily 
Yomiuri, 14 August 2001, p.1). While many people may not have agreed with the 
decision of Koizumi to visit Yasukuni, by 2002, the Japanese public had become 
accustomed to the automatic haranguing of their political leaders by the leaders of 
other Asian nations. As a result, such criticism was no longer salient and was 
basically ignored. The result was no change in public opinion. 
Furthermore, media coverage of these visits and the criticism by other nations was 
low. In 2002, Japan and South Korea were co-hosting the FIFA World Cup and so 
politicians in both countries, as well as the mass media, had strong incentives to 
reduce the salience ofKoizumi's visits. The same year, since Japan and China were 
also celebrating the 30 year anniversary of their establishment of diplomatic 
relations political elites had incentives to downplay any controversy over the visits. 
Meanwhile, in 2004, the timing of the visit may have reduced the volume of media 
coverage and, therefore, the salience of the event. Koizumi made his visit on New 
Year's Day when most of Japan was on holiday and, it may be assumed, would 
have been less attentive to political affairs than at other times. The suddenness of 
the visit caught many within the political and media establishment in Japan 
off-guard. As a result, Opposition parties, the Japanese media, and the governments 
of China and South Korea were forced to react quickly and in an ad-hoc manner. 
The end-result was low media coverage and a relatively subdued reaction within 
Japan and abroad to that particular visit. Although impossible to say whether this 
was his intention or not, the decision by Koizumi to visit on New Year's Day 
appears to have been a strategic move to reduce the salience of the visit and limit 
the negative reaction. In sum, the fact that the Japanese public had grown 
accustomed to the complaints by China and South Korea and the low volume of 
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media coverage meant that the criticism of Japan over Yasukuni was not salient 
and, therefore, it was not associated with a change in Japanese attitudes. 
Other cases of foreign criticism of Japan that received low media coverage were 
also not associated with any change in public opinion towards the nations involved. 
In December 2004, on the sidelines of an ASEAN summit meeting, Premier Wen 
Jiabao urged Koizumi not to visit Y asukuni Shrine and called on him to "take 
appropriate measures to deal with the problem" ("Wen calls for action on 
Yasukuni", Daily Yomiuri, 1 December 2004, p.1).93 In a meeting the previous 
month, Chinese President Hu Jintao had also criticised Koizumi for his visits to 
Yasukuni. The main explanation for the lack of change was again that the Japanese 
public did not find the constant criticism of Koizumi to be salient any longer. Yet 
despite this, public attitudes in December 2004 were not associated with any 
change. This was likely due to the low level of media coverage of Wen's 
comments as well as the fact that Japanese citizens may have just gotten 
accustomed to China's comments and so tended to ignore them. By constantly 
repeating the criticism of Japan over Yasukuni, it appears that the communicative 
value of China's comments declined. Since nothing ever happened after these 
comments, Japanese citizens may have simply learned to ignore them. The lack of 
a correlation between cases of criticism of Japan that receive low media coverage 
and changes in public attitudes suggest that such cases do not cause any negative 
changes in public attitudes towards the nation involved. 
93 Case 1 in Appendix 8. 
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Moderate Media Coverage 
The visit to Japan by President Jiang Zemin in 1998, where he made many 
comments about Japan's failure to properly recognize history, was not correlated 
with any change in public attitudes towards China.94 Public opinion towards China 
in November 1998, the month of his visit, did not change from the previous month. 
This suggests that the Japanese public did not feel a threat to Japanese identity by 
his comments. During his visit, Jiang requested from Japan a "deeper apology for 
past hostilities in China" and official recognition that China maintained sovereignty 
over Taiwan ("China seeks apology, sympathy on Taiwan", Daily Yomiuri, 12 
November 1998, p.2). During a speech at Waseda University he directly criticized 
Japan for its past actions, admonished its political leaders for making statements 
about history, and lectured it about its education system: 
Japan caused 35 million casualties and more than 600 billion dollars in 
damage and brought a huge national disaster to the Chinese people ... Japan's 
history of economic development owes everything to its choice of peaceful 
development, not development by military force. Japan should lead young 
people with a correct view of history, and must not allow a revival of 
militarism in any form .. .If Japan can stop people in high positions from 
making incorrect remarks .. .it will lead to a new development in China-Japan 
relations ("Jiang hails new era in Japan-China ties 3 hecklers held for 
interrupting Waseda speech", Daily Yomiuri, 29 November 1998, p.l). 
The Daily Yomiuri ("Chinese government to blame for booing", 5 August 2004, 
p.4) described how Jiang "one-sidedly and doggedly repeated that Japan must keep 
learning lessons from history". For a political leader to come to Japan and make 
such comments, this should have been considered to be quite rude. Yet, despite all 
of this, public opinion towards China did not change. 
94 Case 13 in Appendix 8. 
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The main reason for this lack of opinion change was likely due to the efforts by 
Japanese leaders to frame the visit as a successful step in improving Japan-China 
relations. At the end of the visit, both countries made a joint statement in which 
they promised to build a "friendly and cooperative partnership for peace and 
prosperity" ("New Start for Japan, China", Daily Yomiuri, 27 November 1998, p.8). 
Once back in China, Jiang also sent a letter of gratitude to the Japanese Emperor 
which included a positive statement about future Japan-China relations ("Jiang 
ends 6-day visit to Japan, thanks Emperor", Daily Yomiuri, 1 December 1998, p.2). 
When a Japanese weekly magazine accused Jiang of impoliteness because he wore 
a Chinese tunic at a banquet hosted by the Emperor, the Chief Cabinet Secretary 
admonished the magazine and accused it of being "rude to China" ("Nonaka slams 
criticism of Jiang tunic suit", Daily Yomiuri, 5 December 1998, p.2). Despite many 
of the negative comments made by Jiang about Japanese historical recognition, 
these were probably given less weight in the considerations of the Japanese public 
than the positive comments of the visit by both the media and political leaders. The 
Japanese public appeared to ignore Jiang's comments in favour of the more 
positive framing of his visit. Although it is often assumed that political elites will 
seek to generate negative impressions of other nations, this case suggests that they 
can also work to moderate such perceptions. 
On some occasiOns, criticism of Japan over Yasukuni has produced negative 
changes in attitudes towards China. Koizumi' s first visit to Y asukuni as Prime 
Minister, a highly salient event because past Japanese leaders had been so reluctant 
to visit, was such a case.95 Public attitudes towards China in July 2001, the month 
ofhis visit showed a minor negative change of -5.7 percentage points. Immediately 
95 Case 15 in Appendix 8. 
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after becoming Prime Minister in 2001, Koizumi Junichiro announced his plan for 
an August 15 visit to Yasukuni Shrine. China attempted to influence Koizumi's 
decision by personally appealing to Tanaka Makiko, Japan's Foreign Minister and 
the daughter of the Prime Minister who established relations between the two 
countries, to stop Koizumi from visiting ("Tanaka weathers diplomatic debut", 
Daily Yomiuri, 25 may 2001, p.6). In July, the three secretary-generals of Japan's 
ruling coalition visited China, only to be severely criticised by Premier Jiang 
Zemin who warned them that "history cannot be artificially changed", that such 
issues "must be addressed in a sincere manner", and that the Y asukuni issue "could 
ignite serious trouble". 96 Although Japanese political elites may have been 
restrained in their response to China, the media was not. This issue was framed as 
interference by an external power into Japan's domestic politics. The Daily 
Yomiuri praised Koizumi in his decision to visit Y asukuni because to not do so 
would mean that he was backing down in the face of foreign pressure over a 
domestic issue ("All over but the shouting", 9 August 2001, p.l6). Given the frame 
of "foreign interference in domestic matters", it is not surprising that many 
Japanese citizens, maybe even those who did not agree with the visits, were 
angered. The constant accusations that Japan was moving towards militarism, 
despite a defence budget of only around one per cent of GDP, likely produced 
negative emotions. What is more, the hypocritical nature of the criticism from 
China, a nation that jealously guards its own sovereignty and lashes out at any 
comments about what it considers to be "domestic" issues such as Tibet or Taiwan, 
did not go unnoticed. As suggested by the change in public attitudes towards China 
96 The secretaries general of Japan's three ruling coalition parties were Taku Yamasaki of the Liberal 
Democratic Party, Tetsuzo Fuyushiba of New Komeito, and Takeshi Noda of Hoshuto (New 
Conservative Party). 
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the same month as the visits, this criticism and its salience produced negative 
feelings among the public towards China. 
In another case, China and South Korea's severe criticism of Japan for the Ministry 
of Education's approval of history textbooks said to whitewash Japanese war 
responsibility was associated with a minor change in public attitudes towards the 
two countries.97 In July 1982, Asahi Shimbun ("'Nihon no kyokasyo kentei wa 
chugokujinmin eno chosen' kyanpein chugoku ga kaishi [China starts campaign 
'Japan's textbook approval defies the Chinese people']", 24 July, p.2) reported that 
the Japanese Ministry of Education had requested a textbook making various 
changes, such as stating that the Japanese army had "advanced" into, rather than 
"invaded", Northern China. China, South Korea, North Korea, Taiwan and 
Singapore all responded strongly to this report, arguing that Japan was seriously 
distorting history. China was the most vocal, saying that the decision to publish 
these was a violation of "the spirit of the 1972 Sino-Japanese joint statement" 
(Japan Economic Newswire, 27 July 1982). South Korea was not happy either and 
rejected a proposed Japanese mission to come to Seoul to discuss the issue (Japan 
Economic Newswire, 6 August 1982). In September 1982, the month that the 
dispute reached its highest pitch, public attitudes towards China showed a minor 
negative change from the previous month of -3.2 percentage points. 
The main reason for the minor change in public opinion towards China and South 
Korea in September 1982 was probably the framing of this issue as an attempt by 
foreign governments to interfere in Japanese domestic education policy. Just as 
97 For the sake of the case studies, I classify this as a case of high media coverage with a minor change 
in public opinion because this dispute went on from June to September 1982. The media coverage 
was low in July 1982, moderate in August 1982, and high in September 1982. 
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many citizens did not agree with Koizurni's visits to Yasukuni, most citizens 
probably did not agree with statements by the Minister of Education, who said that 
he wanted a "correct Japanese view" of World War II which he argued was ignored 
by the US Occupation and the left-wing dominated Japan Teacher's Union 
("Kyodo reviews textbook revision controversy", Kyodo, 10 August 1982). 
However, the claims by China and South Korea that the introduction of such a 
textbook represented a return to militarism and an attempt to distort history 
denigrated the Japanese public's sense of their country's accomplishments as a 
peaceful state during the post-war period. The attempted interference in domestic 
matters by two non-democratic nations may have been enough to anger citizens 
and generate hostility towards their source. As was shown in the cases of foreign 
criticism of official visits to Yasukuni, attempts to play the history card by China 
and South Korea can produce strong feelings of hostility towards those nations. As 
a result, public attitudes towards the nations associated with this dispute turned 
negative. 
High Media Coverage 
China's criticism of Japan for inviting Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui to the 
Asian Garnes being held in Hiroshima in 1994 did not produce a change in 
Japanese attitudes towards China.98 China said that it did "not welcome" the 
Japanese Government's invitation of Lee to Hiroshima, stating that "in disregard of 
the solemn positions of the Chinese government, the Japanese government decided 
to allow Hsu Li-the (Lee Teng-hui) ... to visit Japan" and that "the Chinese 
government cannot accept this" ("China's Asiad stance troublesome", Daily 
98 Case 22 in Appendix 8. 
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Yomiuri, 17 September 1994, p.6). Despite this criticism and attempt to influence 
who Japan could grant a visa to, Japanese public attitudes in September 1994 did 
not change. 
The fact that the criticism was based on a difference in policy over Taiwan rather 
than an attack on matters closer to Japanese identity, such as history, may have 
meant that citizens did not perceive this issue to be a particularly salient threat. As 
a result, public attitudes towards China did not change. Japanese policymakers also 
attempted to downplay the dispute with Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi saying 
that he hoped the problem would be resolved "amicably" ("Premier wants amicable 
solution, Daily Yomiuri, 9 September 1994, p.l ). This result has important 
implications for scholars of public opinion and foreign policy because it suggests 
that while direct criticism of Japan may cause a negative change in public attitudes 
towards a foreign nation, even when media coverage of a foreign policy is high, 
this may not. 
In another case, criticism of Japan over comments made to reporters by Eto Takami, 
the Director-General of the Management and Coordination Agency in the Japanese 
Cabinet, about Japan's period of colonisation of Korea from 1910 to 1945 
produced a change in public opinion about South Korea. 99 Public attitudes towards 
South Korea in November 1995, the month of his comments, showed a minor 
change from the previous month of -3.8 percentage points. South Korean political 
leaders were furious over off-the-record comments made to reporters by Eto who 
was quoted as saying, "I think Japan did some good, including educating Koreans 
and building ports and roads for them" ("Eto withdraws remark on Korea 
99 Case 24 in Appendix 8. 
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colonization", Daily Yomiuri, 9 November 1995, p.l). The South Korean Foreign 
Minister immediately summoned the Japanese Ambassador in Seoul and stated that 
"it is simply deplorable that a public figure, a Japanese politician or whomever, 
would make a remark that was different from the Japanese government's view and 
unfavourably influence Japan-South Korea relations" ("S. Korea 'demand' for Eto 
to resign stuns government", Daily Yomiuri, 10 November 1995, p.l). He 
continued that "it is not a matter that can be settled by retracting the remark after it 
had already become controversial". Soon afterwards, in an official statement, the 
South Korean foreign ministry stated that "if the remark was true, we can hardly 
restrain our shock and anger". These statements by South Korea were interpreted in 
Japan as demands that Eto resign from his post in the Cabinet. 
The change in attitudes towards South Korea was likely a function of the Japanese 
public viewing those comments as a threat to national identity. Although not 
necessarily approving of the comments by Eto, Japanese citizens appear to have 
been unhappy about what seemed to be an over-reaction to comments made off the 
record. Just as in the cases of the Yasukuni visits and the textbook issue, the 
Japanese media framed the issue as one of interference in Japanese domestic 
politics. The Daily Yomiuri ("Who's in charge of the Cabinet?", 12 November 1995, 
p.5) expressed concern that "the government's response gives the impression that it 
is willing to allow a foreign country to decide whether a cabinet minister should 
resign" and noted that "it has become almost an annual event for a cabinet member 
to make a controversial remark and then resign in the face of strong pressure from 
abroad". What is more, South Korea already had a history of public outrage over 
insensitive comments made by a Japanese politician. In 1986, Seoul had also 
demanded the resignation of Fujio Masayuki, the Japanese Minister of Education, 
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over an interview in which he stated that the colonisation of Korea by Japan in 
191 0 was approved by the Korean side. 100 The combination of anger over South 
Korea's attempted interference in Japanese domestic matters and the salience due 
to high media coverage were the likely reasons behind the minor change in 
opinion. 
To conclude, communications by a foreign nation critical of Japan can cause 
negative changes ofthe nation involved but not always. Furthermore, such changes 
tend to be minor. Even considering cases of high media coverage, such 
communications have never produced a major change in Japanese public opinion 
towards a foreign nation. In fact, the Japanese public appears to respond quite 
reasonably to those criticisms that come so often from China and South Korea, 
perhaps not viewing them as salient. Since most criticism only involves words 
rather than actions, citizens may simply disregard such criticism as cheap talk. 
After all, the public is well aware that political leaders are apt to use criticism of 
Japan to strengthen their nationalist credentials among domestic audiences so it 
makes sense to simply ignore such statements since they have no communicative 
value. These findings suggest a public that is not easily whipped up by nationalist 
or xenophobic feelings, even when comments do insult or denigrate Japan. In 
conclusion, these cases do offer some support for the proposition that symbolic 
threats cause increases in negative public attitudes towards foreign nations. 
Furthermore, media coverage does appear to moderate the effects of such criticism 
somewhat, but even when media coverage is high, this will still tend to only have a 
minor impact on public opinion. 
10
° Case 24 in Appendix 8. 
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Violations of Diplomatic Protocol 
Violations of diplomatic protocol that affect Japan should produce negative 
changes in public opinion towards the nation responsible. Cardozo (1963 :67) notes 
that diplomats are sensitive to diplomatic protocol because "these are the indicia of 
rank, not just the man, but the country he represents." Violations of such protocol, 
therefore, should be perceived by Japanese citizens as insults to their nation. Since 
a person's self-esteem is assumed to be linked to national identity, such events 
should be interpreted as a threat and lead to negative emotions directed towards the 
nation that is its source. High media coverage of such violations should increase 
their salience and, therefore, the magnitude of their effect. When this occurs, public 
attitudes towards the nation involved should turn negative. 
Violations of diplomatic protocol involving Japan are rare. Only three cases 
involving the countries in this study were coded as such events. Figure 7.2 shows 
that each of the events was associated with a negative change in attitudes towards 
the nation involved. 
176 
Figure 7.2: Front Page Stories of Violations of Diplomatic Protocol and Change in 
Public Attitudes towards Nation Involved, 1960-2007 
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Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008), various Asahi 
Shimbun, and Jiji polls. 
The lack of data points renders any inferences about whether the relationship is 
linear or whether it is strong or weak as highly uncertain. However, the data do 
show that high media coverage of such events is correlated with negative changes 
in public attitudes towards the nation viewed as responsible. In a typical case of 
low media coverage, Vice-Premier Wu Yi's sudden cancellation of a meeting with 
Prime Minister Koizumi attracted four front page stories (Case 1 ). Public attitudes 
towards China in the month that this occurred, May 2005, turned negative by -4.9 
percentage points. In the only case of high media coverage, President Boris 
Yeltsin's sudden cancellation of his visit to Japan received 19 front page stories in 
Asahi and was associated with a change in public attitudes towards Russia in 
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September 1992 of. -14.7 percentage points (Case 3). Violations of diplomatic 
protocol may have a negative effect on public attitudes towards the nation involved 
and the effect of such events appear to be magnified by high volumes of media 
coverage. This supports the propositions that first, threats to Japanese identity have 
a negative impact on public perceptions of foreign nations and second, media 
coverage moderates the effects of such events. 
Table 7.2 shows that violations of diplomatic protocol are sometimes associated 
with changes in public opinion and sometimes they are not. 
Table 7.2: Violations of Diplomatic Protocol, Media Coverage and Negative Change 
in Japanese Public Attitudes toward Country Involved, 1960-2007 
High Moderate Low Total 
Major Change 0 0 
(100) (0) (0) (33.33) 
Minor Change 0 0 
(0) (0) (100) (33.33) 
No Change 0 0 
(0) (100) (0) (33.33) 
Total 3 
(100) (100) (100) (100) 
Note: Percentages in brackets. See Appendix 9 for list of cases. "Major Change" and "Minor Change" 
both refer to cases of negative change in opinion. See Chapter Three text for how the variables were 
generated. 
Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et a!. (2005), Kodama (2008), various Asahi 
Shimbun, and Jiji polls. 
In the three cases of violations of diplomatic protocol, two of the three cases were 
associated with a change in public opinion. Further, as shown in the row marked 
"Major Change", the one case of major change in public opinion was associated 
with high media coverage so it is possible that media coverage of such events can 
178 
increase the magnitude of opinion change. Below is an examination in some more 
detail of the three cases in which diplomatic protocol was violated. 
Low Media Coverage 
The decision by Chinese Vice-Premier Wu Yi to suddenly cancel her meeting with 
Prime Minister Koizumi in May 2005 over his continued refusal to stop visiting 
Y asukuni Shrine caused a moderate negative change in public opinion towards 
China. 101 As was above, this incident was associated with a minor change in public 
opinion towards China in May 2005 of -4.9 percentage points. According to a 
Chinese foreign ministry spokesman in reference to Japan, "Have they thought of 
the feelings of the Chinese people, who suffered from the Japanese invasion and 
have not recovered from the damage?" ("China admits Yasukuni link to Wu's 
snub", Daily Yomiuri, 25 May 2005, p.l). The sudden cancellation of a meeting 
between the Japanese prime minister and an important foreign representative is a 
diplomatic snub that should be interpreted as an insult to Japan's prestige. Coming 
as it did just a month after the large-scale anti-Japanese demonstrations in China 
this incident resonated with the Japanese public. Both the Japanese media and 
political elites framed it as an act of rudeness directed at Japan. The Daily Yomiuri 
("China's Wu cancels meeting with Koizumi", 24 May 2005) quoted a Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs official who took grave offence to China's actions: 
Don't they [China] understand diplomatic manners and rules? They 
should follow a minimal level of international protocoL Their sudden 
cancellation of the meeting is similar to last month's stoning of 
Japanese diplomatic missions in China (p.l). 
101 Case 1 in Appendix 9. 
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Although the low media coverage may have reduced the salience of this action, the 
Japanese public still responded. The anger Japanese citizens would have felt over 
having their political leader treated so shabbily by a foreign guest and the minor 
change in public opinion the same month suggests that Wu's snub was the cause of 
the change in public opinion. 
Moderate Media Coverage 
The decision by Bill Clinton in June 1998 to skip Japan to spend nine days in 
China did not result in a change in Japanese public opinion about the United 
States. 102 Although not an intentional diplomatic signal by the US towards Japan, 
Clinton's trip to China was interpreted by some Japanese commentators as a case 
of "Japan passing." Reflecting on the period ten years later, a Daily Yomiuri 
editorial in 2008 ("Clinton diplomacy a concern for Japan", 3 December, p.4) 
stated that "the hard-line stance against Japan taken by the Democratic 
administration that took power in the early 1990s is still fresh in our memories". 
The concerns that Japan was being bypassed by the US in favour of China reflected 
a greater insecurity among domestic political elites over Japan's international 
environment in the post-Cold War era. However, despite elite concerns that Clinton 
had "snubbed" Japan, in the June 1998, the month of his visit to China, Japanese 
public perceptions of the United States did not change. 
The reason for the lack of attitude change was most likely due to the fact that most 
members of the Japanese public simply did not feel insulted by Clinton's decision 
to visit China. Unlike the previous case, the actions of Clinton and the United 
States did not appear to be intentional and did not represent any fundamental 
102 Case 2 in Appendix 9. 
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change in the US-Japan relationship. It was quite reasonable for the public to 
assume that President Clinton spending time in China would have little substantive 
effect on their country. What is interesting in this case is that the public responded 
with such indifference to Clinton's actions despite grumblings by certain members 
of the Japanese foreign policy elite. Most Japanese citizens may simply have not 
interpreted this event as a threat and the lack of opinion change following this 
event supports this argument. 
High Media Coverage 
In September 1992, Boris Y eltsin' s decision to suddenly cancel a high level 
meeting that included discussions of the highly contentious Northern Territories 
issue with his Japanese counterparts was associated with a major negative change 
in public attitudes towards Russia of -14.7 percentage points. 103 As in the Wu case, 
the unilateral and sudden cancellation of a high level meeting between foreign 
leaders over an important issue can be interpreted as a threat to national prestige. 
At the end of the Cold War, many commentators in Japan believed that the 
on-going Northern Territories issue could be resolved. It was with genuine 
excitement that Japanese political elites and the mass media greeted Y eltsin's 
planned three-day visit in September 1992 to Japan as an event that would usher in 
a new era for relations between the two nations. Despite these lofty expectations, 
however, Yeltsin suddenly, and without warning, postponed his planned trip to 
Japan, citing "changes in the international situation and mounting domestic 
problems" (Kurata, M., 1992, "Yeltsin Postpones Japan Visit", Daily Yomiuri, 10 
103 Case 3 in Appendix 9. 
181 
September, p.l ). In the month of his cancellation, September 1992, Japanese public 
attitudes towards Russia experienced a major negative change. 
The cancellation by Y eltsin of his visit was interpreted in Japan as a national insult. 
Japanese political elites and the mass media framed the issue as a violation of 
diplomatic protocol. The Chairman of the LDP Diet Affairs Committee, Kajiyama 
Seiroku, verbally attacked Russia by stating that "it does not make sense to expand 
our assistance to Russia after such disrespectful behaviour" ("Foreign Ministry raps 
Russia on Shikotan deal, Daily Yomiuri, 17 September 1992, p.l). The Japanese 
Ambassador to Russia stated that "the indefinite postponement of Y eltsin's visit to 
Japan goes against diplomatic etiquette and caused trouble not only for the 
Japanese government but also others concerned" ("Russia Rapped For Cancelling 
Japan Trip", Daily Yomiuri, 14 September 1992, p.l). Along with political elites, 
media organisations had also been hoping for a breakthrough in the Northern 
Territories dispute, building up Y eltsin' s visit and going so far as to cover what his 
wife would be doing during her time in Japan. Given the high level of attention to 
this incident by Japanese political elites and the mass media, and its framing as an 
insult to Japan, it is not surprising that the emotions of ordinary citizens were also 
activated and public attitudes towards Russia turned negative. 
To summarise, although the number of cases is small, violations of diplomatic 
protocol do appear to be associated with negative changes in public attitudes 
towards foreign nations. Such change is most likely to occur when media coverage 
is high. Although far from conclusive, these findings do support the propositions 
that threats to Japanese identity produce negative changes in public attitudes 
towards the nation involved and that media coverage moderates the magnitude of 
the impact of such events. 
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Anti-Japanese Demonstrations 
Anti-Japanese demonstrations should produce negative changes in Japanese public 
attitudes towards the nation involved. Large-scale protests and demonstrations by a 
group should be interpreted as a threat because they are a direct and salient 
expression of hostility towards Japan. This should result in negative emotions that 
are then directed towards the country viewed as the cause of the demonstrations. 
High media coverage of such demonstrations should increase their salience and, 
therefore, their impact on public opinion. 
Figure 7.3 shows almost no correlation between media coverage of anti-Japanese 
demonstrations and public attitudes towards foreign nations. The list of cases can 
be found in Appendix 10. 
Figure 7.3: Front Page Stories of Anti-Japanese Demonstrations and Change in Public 
Attitudes towards Nation Involved, 1960-2007 
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Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008), various Asahi 
Shimbun, and Jiji polls. 
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Six of the seven cases of anti-Japanese demonstrations were associated with a 
negative change in public opinion towards the nation involved. However, higher 
media coverage of anti-Japanese demonstrations was not correlated with greater 
changes in public opinion. One "typical" case of an anti-Japanese demonstration 
that received moderate media coverage was that of South Korean students against 
Japan just prior to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two 
countries (Case 5). In July 1965, this event received 23 front page stories and was 
correlated with a change in public attitudes towards South Korea of -8.1 percentage 
points. One other case that appears to be relatively "typical" was that of the 
anti-Japanese demonstrations in Seoul following the assassination attempt by a 
North Korean resident of Japan on the South Korean President (Case 7). This event 
received 85 front page stories and was associated with a change in public attitudes 
towards South Korea in September 197 4 of -7.9 ·percentage points. Three of the 
seven cases resulted in much larger changes in public attitudes towards the nation 
involved than predicted if media coverage was the main factor. 
Using ordinal variables, Table 7.3 shows the effects of anti-Japanese 
demonstrations on public opinion. 
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Table 7.3: Anti-Japanese demonstrations, Media Coverage and Negative Change in 
Japanese Public Attitudes toward Country Involved, 1960-2007 
High Media Moderate Media Low Media Total 
Major Change 3 5 
(100) (50) (50) (71.43) 
Minor Change 0 0 0 0 
(0) (0) (0) (0) 
No Change 0 2 
(0) (50) (50) (28.57) 
Total 3 2 2 7 
(100) (100) (100) (100) 
Note: Percentages in brackets. See Appendix 10 for list of cases. "Major Change" and "Minor 
Change" both refer to cases of negative change in opinion. See Chapter Three text for how the 
variables were generated. 
Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008), various Asahi 
Shimbun, and Jiji polls. 
As in all of the case studies, the small number of observations means that any 
results should be interpreted with caution. However, cases of anti-Japanese 
demonstrations do appear to have a negative relation with changes in public 
opinion. Five of the seven cases of anti-Japanese demonstrations were associated 
with major changes. Further, the argument that higher media coverage of such 
cases produces greater change is supported by the row marked "Major Change" 
which shows that three cases of major change in public opinion were associated 
with high media coverage while only a single case was associated with minor 
media coverage. These results support the argument that anti-Japanese 
demonstrations produce increases in negative public opinion. Below these cases are 
examined in some more detail. 
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Low Media Coverage 
The September 1985 demonstrations by Chinese students over Prime Minister 
Nakasone's August visit to Yasukuni Shrine did not cause a change in public 
opinion towards China. 104 As the first post-war prime minister to go to Yasukuni 
in an official capacity, Nakasone's visit elicited strong protests from two of Japan's 
most important geographical neighbours, China and the Soviet Union. ("Nakasone, 
cabinet members pay official visit to Yasukuni", Japan Economic Newswire, 
August 15, 1985). Two major demonstrations took place, one in Beijing and one in 
the city of Xian. The Beijing demonstrations consisted of approximately 1000 
students ("1000 Peking students march in resentment against Japan", New York 
Times, 19 September 1985, p.4). Beginning at Beijing University, the protesters 
held signs such as "Down with Japanese militarism" and "Strongly oppose the 
second invasion" and joined up with students from other universities to hold a 
two-hour demonstration in Tiananmen Square. The Xian demonstrations also 
involved about 1000 students and included protesters carrying Chinese flags and 
such placards as "Down with Nakasone" and "We protest Prime Minister 
Nakasone's worship at Yasukuni Shrine" ("Anti-Nakasone demonstration erupts 
again in China", Japan Economic Newswire, 3 October 1985). Students made 
speeches denouncing the revival of militarism in Japan and accused Japan of 
shipping low-quality goods to China. However, despite these protests, public 
attitudes towards China in September 1985 did not change. 
The main reason for the lack of opinion change was that the dominant frame 
attributed the cause of the demonstrations to Nakasone rather than to China. These 
104 Case 1 in Appendix 10. 
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demonstrations took place during a period in which Japan was split ideologically 
between left and right. Japanese Opposition parties used Nakasone's visit to attack 
him. His visit to Yasukuni was framed by these groups as the immediate cause of 
the Chinese demonstrations so it is likely that a large percentage of the Japanese 
public did not place as much blame on China as would have happened had they 
been spontaneous. The JSP linked the shrine visit to its criticism of Japan's recent 
defence build up and Komeito and the Democratic Socialist Party questioned its 
constitutionality (The Associated Press, 15 August 1985). The anti-Japanese 
demonstrations and the criticism by China were integrated in to this frame. 
What is more, Nakasone and the rest of the Japanese Government did nothing to 
counter this frame. When first asked about the anti-Japanese demonstrations, 
instead of criticising them, Nakasone declined comment ("Nakasone declines 
comment on Chinese demo", Japan Economic Newswire, 19 September 1985). 
When asked again later, he stated he had learned about the demonstrations through 
a newspaper but agreed that Japan had to do more to reflect on its actions during 
World War II, even going so far as to say that the Chinese demonstrations. were 
understandable ("Nakasone on anti-Japanese Rally in Beijing", Kyodo, 25 
September 1985). Although the Japanese Embassy in Beijing expressed surprise 
over the demonstrations, an official simply stated that though they did not like the 
demonstrations but they had heard that Chinese authorities had made all efforts to 
prevent them from happening ("AFP reports demonstration", Hong Kong AFP, 19 
September 1985). The attribution of responsibility to Nakasone rather than to 
China in the dominant frame and the lack of media coverage of the demonstrations 
may have meant the Japanese public did not view China as the source of the threat. 
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In contrast to the events described above, the anti-Japanese behaviour and chanting 
by Chinese soccer fans at the 2004 Asian Cup final in Beijing was associated with 
a major increase in negative attitudes towards China. 105 In August 2004, at the 
final of the Asian Cup soccer tournament at Beijing Worker's Stadium, many 
Chinese spectators booed so loudly during the singing of the Japanese national 
anthem that the song was barely audible ("Chinese fans boo during 'Kimigayo', 
Daily Yomiuri, 8 August 2004, p.l). Following the final, a few Chinese fans were 
reported to have chanted insulting comments about Japan, burned its national flag, 
broke some car windows, and surrounded the accommodation facility where the 
Japanese team was staying ("Anti-Japan feeling running high", Daily Yomiuri, 10 
August 2004, p.3). Attitudes towards China in August 2004, the same month as the 
tournament, experienced a major negative change of -12.6 percentage points. 
Political elites in both China and Japan tried to reduce the salience of the incident. 
China appeared to be quite embarrassed, with Beijing police apologising for their 
inability to control the crowd and the Chinese Ambassador to Japan quoted as 
saying that the action of the fans was "regrettable" and "very unpleasant" 
("Chinese ambassador expresses regret to Japan over rowdy soccer fans at Asian 
Cup", Associated Press Worldstream, 9 August 2004). Japan's Foreign Minister 
praised China, saying that the "government worked fairly hard to ensure that the 
safety (of Japanese tourists) would be protected" ("Anti-Japan feeling running 
high", Daily Yomiuri, 10 August, 2004, p.3). Any negative change in public 
attitudes could not be attributed to statements by elites in China and Japan over the 
ISSUe. 
105 Case 2 in Appendix 10. 
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The Japanese public was certainly upset at the behaviour ofthe Chinese fans which 
violated those norms associated with sportsmanship at international events. This 
was especially salient because China was due to hold the Summer Olympics in 
2008. As Zico, Japan's national coach, said, "I don't care about booing (by Chinese 
fans against the Japanese team) but any soccer fan in the world should pay due 
respect when a national anthem is played" ("Chinese government to blame for 
booing, Daily Yomiuri, 5 August 2004). 
However, the main reason for the change in public opinion was likely the framing 
of the event in the Japanese media as rather than a simple case of soccer 
hooliganism, as a case of systematic anti-Japanese sentiment that was common 
throughout all of China. The action of a few rude fans was generalised to all of 
China and this resonated with the Japanese public. Media organisations blamed the 
behaviour of the Chinese spectators on China's anti-Japanese patriotic education 
system. According to the dominant frame, the Chinese Communist Party 
purposefully generated negative feelings towards Japan because this would allow it 
to maintain its legitimacy. According to the Daily Yomiuri ("Behavior mirrors 
bilateral ties/Local fan attitudes at Asian Cup in China becomes diplomatic issue", 
7 August 2004, p.4), "undoubtedly this behaviour is partly caused by the 
anti-Japanese propaganda long promoted by the Chinese authorities" and that 
"Chinese society condones insulting Japan". It concluded that "the Chinese 
government should be blamed for developing such narrow-minded nationalism 
among the public" ("Chinese government to blame for booing", Daily Yomiuri, 5 
August 2004, p.4). This simple generalisation of anti-Japanese sentiment among 
a few loud and vocal people attending the soccer match to the entire nation 
resonated with the public. As a result, this may have led negative public attitudes 
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towards China to increase. This case suggests that even when media coverage is 
low, a strong frame of an anti-Japanese demonstration that allows for it to be 
generalised to an entire country may be sufficient for a negative change in 
attitudes. 
Moderate Media Coverage 
Anti-Japanese demonstrations between March and April 2005 were associated with 
a major negative change in public opinion towards South Korea. 106 The catalyst of 
these demonstrations was the introduction of an ordinance bill in the Shimane 
Prefectural Assembly, a regional government within Japan, officially recognising 
February 22nd as "Takeshima Day". Takeshima is a small island over which Japan 
and South Korea have a long-running sovereignty dispute. The purpose of the 
ordinance was to support efforts to establish Japan's sovereignty over the island 
and increase the awareness of the Japanese public. In response to the ordinance, the 
President of South Korea posted a message on this website promising that he 
would respond sternly to Japan's "efforts to justify the history of aggression and 
occupation and moves to obtain its object of hegemony" ("Japan vows efforts to 
rebuild trust after Roh's statement", Japan Economic Newswire, 24 March 2004). 
Public attitudes towards South Korea in April 2005 showed a major negative 
change of -10.8 percentage points. 
The salience of the demonstrations over what most Japanese saw as an extremely 
minor issue was the main reason for the change in negative attitudes towards South 
Korea. The actions of the South Korean demonstrators were framed as nationalistic, 
emotional and wholly disproportionate in their response to the issue. A South 
106 Case 3 in Appendix 10. 
190 
Korean citizens' group held a demonstration in front of Japan's consulate in Pusan 
holding placards reading "Unwelcome", in reference to Prime Minister Koizumi 
and a meeting planning to be held there in the following November ("Spring 
Warmth in Japan-South Korea Ties Turning Chilly", Jiji Press Ticker Service, 11 
March 2005). The BBC (Scanlon, C., 2005, "South Koreans vent fury at Japan" 18 
March)107 reported, rather sensationally, that "overwhelmed by fury, protesters 
have sliced off fingers, set themselves on fire, and in one case committed suicide 
by jumping off a bridge". At the Shimane Prefectural Assembly in Japan, before 
being taken into custody by the police, a Seoul Municipal Assembly member hung 
a banner that read, "Stop distorting history" and took out a box cutter which he said 
he was going to use to cut off his finger and write a letter of protest in blood 
("Takeshima bill draws protests, support", Daily Yomiuri, 17 March 2005, p.2). 
Given the media's emphasis on these types of protests, it is unsurprising that 
Japanese citizens began to have negative feelings towards South Korea. 
The dominant frame in Japan also attributed responsibility for the anti-Japanese 
demonstrations to the South Korean Government and its efforts to incite 
anti-Japanese sentiment for political benefit. President Roh was portrayed as a 
cynical politician attempting to "boost his administration's flagging popularity by 
emphasising its hard-line policy toward Japan" ("ROK interfering in Japan's 
affairs", Daily Yomiuri, 19 March 2005, p.4). Following these demonstrations, the 
Japanese public became quite pessimistic about relations between the two nations. 
In an Asahi Shimbun poll in April 2005 asking whether Japanese respondents 
thought that Japan-South Korea relations were going well, only 24 per cent of 
respondents said they were while 61 per cent said they were not ("Rekishi ninshiki 
107 Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4361343.stm [Accessed 16 June 2009] 
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okina mizo, nikkanchu sankakoku yoron chosa [Division on perceptions of history, 
Japan-Korea-China poll], Asahi Shimbun, 27 April 2005, p.9). The media coverage 
of these incidents and the seemingly irrational behaviour of many of the protesters, 
which were given the greatest attention in news reports, may have produced anger 
among Japanese citizens towards South Korea. 
High Media Coverage 
Each of the three cases of high media coverage of anti-Japanese demonstrations 
was associated with a major negative change in public opinion. In one case, just 
prior to the signing of the Japan-South Korea treaty to normalise diplomatic 
relations, anti-Japanese protests by nationalistic student groups over the treaty were 
associated with a negative major change in public attitudes towards South Korea in 
August 1965 of -8.1 percentage points. 108 In another case in August 1974, South 
Koreans engaged in anti-Japanese demonstrations in Seoul in front of the Japanese 
embassy over the attempted assassination of their president by a North Korean 
resident of Japan. 109 Attitudes towards South Korea in September 1974 showed a 
change of -7.9 percentage points from the previous month. 
The large-scale anti-Japanese demonstrations in various Chinese cities in April 
2005 were correlated with a major change in public attitudes towards China of 
-12.6 percentage points. 110 The demonstrations initially began as a protest against 
Japan's campaign to get a seat on the United Nations Security Council and the 
approval of history textbooks said to gloss over Japanese actions in World War II. 
The largest demonstration, organised by the Internet and mobile phone, took place 
108 Case 4 in Appendix 10. 
109 Case 7 in Appendix 10. 
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in Shanghai, where demonstrators threw stones, tomatoes, plastic bottles, and eggs 
at the Japanese consulate, reportedly damaging 20 windows. Although the building 
was guarded by about 2,000 Chinese police officers, the protesters seemed to be 
unmolested. The demonstrations got so bad that they became a serious diplomatic 
problem between the two countries, leading to a meeting between Koizumi and 
President Hu Jintao along the sidelines of a conference in Indonesia to discuss the 
problem. 
As part of the dominant frame, the Chinese Government was portrayed as giving 
tacit support for the demonstrations and failing to protect Japanese consular 
buildings. "The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and other 
international laws make parties responsible for maintaining peace and order around 
other countries' diplomatic facilities, and China is failing to fulfil that duty", said 
Japanese Vice-Foreign Minister Shotaro Yachi ("China owes Japan for riots", 
Daily Yomiuri, 20 April 2005, p.3). One Japanese politician stated that "throwing 
stones at the Japanese Embassy is almost equal to attacking Japan" ("China 
criticized across party lines", Daily Yomiuri, 12 April 2005, p.3). The framing of 
the event such that the Chinese Government appeared to condone the actions of the 
protesters was sure to infuriate the public. 
Furthermore, like in the case of the Asian Cup hooligans, the demonstrations were 
framed as a massive anti-Japanese movement resulting from the Chinese 
Government's anti-Japanese education policy. This thesis had even permeated 
official policy circles. Japanese Foreign Minister Machimura accused China's 
"patriotic education" as being anti-Japanese and the Daily Yomiuri ("Wen seeking 
to justify anti-Japan violence", 14 April2005, p.4) editorialised that the main cause 
of the problem was former Premier Jiang Zemin' s "patriotic education" which 
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"was almost synonymous with an anti-Japan campmgn primarily aimed at 
deflecting the public's criticism of the government, thereby maintaining the 
Communist Party's iron-fist rule". High levels of media coverage of the 
anti-Japanese demonstrations also played a significant role in causing public 
attitudes towards China to worsen. The media consistently referred to the 
demonstrations as "anti-Japanese" (hannichi demo) while television coverage and 
photos in newspapers emphasised crazed-looking demonstrators burning Japanese 
flags and throwing eggs at the Japanese consulates and embassy. According to an 
Asahi Shimbun poll ("Asahi Shimbunsha Kinkyu yoron chosa - sitsumon to kaito 
[Asahi Shimbun urgent poll- questions and answers]", 25 April2005, p.3), only 19 
per cent of respondents believed that Japan was the responsible for the 
demonstrations while 71 per cent said that it was not. The dominant frame, which 
portrayed the Chinese Government as responsible for encouraging anti-Japanese 
nationalism and generalised the feelings of the protesters to the entire country 
interacted with media coverage to produce a major change in public attitudes 
towards China. 
Generalising from the findings in the case studies above, events framed as 
anti-Japanese demonstrations do appear to be one cause of changes in public 
perceptions of foreign nations. This makes sense as they are likely to be interpreted 
as a direct threat to Japanese national identity. Although such demonstrations are 
unlikely to have any actual effect on Japan's material wellbeing, they are 
nonetheless an attack on national prestige and may tend to elicit a negative reaction. 
The public denigration of their country by such demonstrations, which are often 
then projected to the rest of the world by the international media, generates 
negative emotions and hostility among the Japanese public towards the nation in 
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which the demonstrations are taking place. These findings support the propositions 
that threats to Japanese identity produce negative changes in public attitudes 
towards the nation involved and media coverage moderates that effect. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that threats to Japanese identity cause increases in 
negative attitudes towards the foreign nations perceived to be responsible. High 
media coverage of such threats tends to increase the magnitude of their effect on 
public opinion. The findings support the proposition that threats to Japanese 
identity produce negative changes in public attitudes towards the nation involved. 
Furthermore, it supports the general proposition that higher media coverage 
increases public perceptions of a foreign nation. 
These findings have implications for the study of public opinion and foreign policy. 
The Japanese public does not appear to respond unreasonably to information that 
their country's national pride has been insulted. This chapter has provided further 
evidence that to understand short-term opinion change, it is necessary to 
understand the impact of exogenous events and how they are framed by political 
elites and the mass media. Even though such threats may have no real effect on 
policy or Japan's material wellbeing, they can nonetheless influence public 
perceptions of a foreign nation. These findings support the overall argument that 
perceived threats are a major cause of increases in negative public perceptions of a 
foreign nation. Like symbolic threats, it appears that, under the right conditions, 
public opinion can be activated by the actions of foreign nation that denigrates 
Japan, even when those actions may have no direct impact on the wellbeing of its 
citizens. 
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8. Long-Term Trends in Japanese Public Opinion about 
Ten Foreign Nations 1960-2007 
Introduction 
To this point, this study has been primarily concerned with changes in short-term 
public opinion. However, as mentioned in Chapter Two, Proposition 4 was that the 
effects of most threats should be short-term. In this chapter, I make three 
arguments. First, the Japanese public is generally rational when it comes to public 
perceptions of foreign nations. Over the long-term, attitudes towards particular 
nations are stable and when they do change tend to do so due to particular 
reasons. 
111 Second, since people are exposed to a wider variety of information 
about nations that are geographically nearby and politically important, public 
opinion towards these nations will tend to be less stable than that towards nations 
that are not as salient. Third, exogenous issues and events, such as threats, will 
often cause abrupt changes in opinion but this will tend to be short-term rather than 
long-term. On rare occasions however, when international events are extremely 
salient, the public can "learn" about a particular nation and long-term collective 
opinion will move in a positive or negative direction. 
To examine long-term collective opinion dynamics in Japan, this chapter uses the 
Jiji polls to examine trends in public attitudes towards the ten nations in the dataset. 
The following chapter is divided into three main sections. First, the descriptive 
statistics of the percentage of respondents with positive or negative public 
111 As King, Keohane and Verba (1994:56) state, the purpose of descriptive inference is to 
"distinguish the systematic component from the nonsystematic component of the phenomena we 
study". 
197 
perceptions ofthe ten nations in the Jiji polls are compared. Second, trends in what 
respondents say are their perceptions ofthe five non-salient nations in the Jiji polls 
and trends in what respondents say are their perceptions of the five salient nations 
in the Jiji polls are analyzed. Finally, the chapter concludes with a brief discussion 
ofthe findings. 
Cross-National Comparison of Public Perceptions of Foreign 
Nations in Japan 
It is logical to assume that the public should have different attitudes towards 
different nations. For various historical, cultural, social, political and economic 
reasons, some countries will be viewed positively while others will be viewed 
negatively. Table 8.1 shows the mean and the standard deviations in the public 
attitudes of respondents towards the nations in the Jiji dataset. 
Table 8.1: Public Perceptions ofTen Foreign Nations in Japan, 1960-2007 
Country Obs Mean SD 
Total 5501 3.73 28.61 
North Korea 443 -44.29 19.81 
Russia/Soviet Union 562 -36.68 11.03 
South Korea 562 -17.67 7.79 
China 562 -7.59 17.24 
India 562 -0.01 4.20 
Germany/West Germany 562 12.79 3.70 
France 562 25.42 5.76 
United Kingdom 562 26.91 6.06 
United States 562 31.35 9.70 
Switzerland 562 36.95 4.33 
NOTE: Compiled by author from Jiji polls, 1960-2007. 
As to be expected, the overall mean of responses and stability of public opinion 
varies substantially depending on each nation. The mean of public attitudes 
towards all ten nations was 3.73 per cent and the standard deviation was 28.61. The 
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large standard deviation suggests a high level of variation in how respondents 
viewed the different countries. For the period of 1960 to 2007, the mean of 
attitudes towards five nations was positive while the mean for the other five nations 
was negative. The means were most negative towards North Korea (-44.29 per 
cent); Russia/the Soviet Union (-36.68 per cent); South Korea (-17.67 per cent); 
China (-7.59 per cent); and India (-0.01 per cent). The countries viewed most 
positively were Switzerland (36.95 per cent); the United States (31.35 per cent); the 
United Kingdom (26.91 per cent); France (25.42 per cent) and Germany/West 
Germany (12.79 per cent). It is notable that the data shows that Western, 
democratic nations tended to be viewed more positively among the Japanese public 
than Asian nations. Not surprisingly, attitudes seem to be particularly negative 
towards those nations with which Japan has long historical animosity and 
outstanding territorial disputes. 
As Figure 8.1 shows, even over long periods of time, attitudes towards certain 
foreign nations barely moved while others moved substantially. 
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Figure 8.1: Cross-national Comparison of Trends in Japanese Public Opinion towards 
Ten Nations, 1960-2007 
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The data shows high levels of attitude stability towards Switzerland, Germany, the 
United Kingdom, France and India. Attitudes towards South Korea, the United 
States, and Russia show moderate levels of change. The two most interesting cases 
are attitudes towards China and North Korea, both of which show evidence of 
long-term change. 
Below, I use the Jiji poll data to examine in greater detail the continuity and change 
in Japanese attitudes towards the ten nations. Based on the findings in Figure 8.1, I 
divide the ten nations in this dataset into two subgroups-non-salient and salient 
nations. The non-salient nations are those countries towards which Japan is 
geographically distant and which are only of peripheral interest to its foreign policy. 
These include Switzerland, Germany/West Germany, France, India, and the United 
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Kingdom. The salient nations are those countries with geographical proximity to 
Japan and its alliance partner. These are South Korea, the Soviet Union/Russia, the 
United States, China, and North Korea. Each graph shows the trends in the 
attitudes of respondents in the Jiji polls using the same scale so as to allow for 
better comparisons between nations. 
Non-Salient Nations 
The nations least likely to be of interest to an inattentive public in Japan are 
Switzerland, Germany, France, India and the United Kingdom. Give their 
geographical distance and minimal political importance to Japan, I assume that 
most of the time these countries will receive only minimal attention in the Japanese 
press or by its political leaders. Without any new or interesting information, the 
attitudes ofthe public should remain stable. 
Switzerland 
Japanese public attitudes towards Switzerland were very positive and very stable 
between 1960 and 2007. The sample mean of attitudes in the Jiji polls was 36.95 
per cent-the highest of any of the ten countries in the dataset. Public opinion 
towards Switzerland reached its lowest point in July 1964 at 24.5 per cent and 
reached its highest point of 48.9 per cent in September 1995. Public attitudes in 
the Jiji polls were more positive towards Switzerland than any other nation, even 
the United States. 
Figure 8.2 shows the trend in Japanese attitudes towards Switzerland. 
201 
Figure 8.2: Japanese Public Attitudes towards Switzerland, 1960-2007 
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The data show that only did the Japanese public seem to view Switzerland as a 
very friendly country but opinion also displayed a remarkably high degree of 
stability over time. The standard deviation of public opinion was only 4.33. The 
case of Switzerland is a good one for showing that public opinion is highly stable 
over time for non-salient countries. The likely reason for this is that during this 
period Switzerland was never associated with an issue or event that could elicit a 
positive or negative emotional response from the Japanese public. 
Germany 
The data show that Japanese attitudes towards both West Germany and a reunified 
Germany were consistently positive between 1960 and 2007. The sample mean of 
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public perceptions from 1960 to 2007 was 12.79 per cent. Public attitudes rose to 
24.6 per cent in July 2006 while the minimum was 5.6 per cent in April 1984. 
As shown in Figure 8.3, Japanese perceptions of both Germany and West Germany 
were highly stable. 
Figure 8.3: Japanese Public Attitudes towards West Germany/Germany, 1960-2007 
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This claim to stability is supported by the standard deviation of 3.70. The absence 
of major change in public attitudes towards Germany following reunification 
suggests that even major international events may not have any long-term effect on 
public perceptions. Once again, the case of opinion towards Germany shows that 
non-salient nations tend to be viewed in Japan with a high level of stability. 
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France 
With the exceptions of the abrupt changes in the same months as its nuclear tests in 
1995 and 1996, the data show that the Japanese public had perceived France 
positively between 1960 and 2007. The mean of Japanese perceptions of France 
was 25.42 per cent. The maximum of Japanese perceptions of France rose to 36.8 
per cent in June 1995. However, the low point in perceptions was associated with 
France's nuclear tests in the South Pacific in September 1995 at -16.3 per cent. 
Excluding the period of the nuclear tests, the minimum in public opmwn was 
measured in May 1973 when it dropped to 15.9 per cent. 
Figure 8.4 shows, with the exception of some months in 1995 and 1996, a high 
level of stability of Japanese opinion about France. 
Figure 8.4: Japanese Public Attitudes towards France, 1960-2007 
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The standard deviation of 5.76 suggests a high level of stability. Although public 
attitudes towards France were positive, it is not a salient nation in Japan and so it is 
unsurprising to find that attitudes showed high levels of stability. The Japanese 
public is not usually exposed to salient information about France likely to elicit an 
emotional response. The exception was, of course, 1995 and 1996. The abrupt 
change in attitudes towards France occurred in the same months as its resumption 
of nuclear testing. When asked by Jiji what countries they liked or disliked in those 
months, a large percentage of respondents said that they disliked France. As 
discussed in Chapter Six, the remarks by Japanese political elites and the high 
media coverage probably primed citizens to use this in their evaluations of France. 
The data suggest that a salient event that activates negative emotions can produce a 
large and abrupt change in public opinion. However, just as interesting as the 
negative change in public attitudes is the rapid return in the percentage of 
respondents with positive perceptions of France in the months after the tests. This 
regression to the mean supports the hypothesis that issue salience is what matters. 
Once media coverage decreased and the public's attention began to wander to other 
matters, citizens no longer maintained negative percentages of France. In short, 
despite a strong negative reaction to the nuclear tests, this appears to have been 
only a salience effect. 
India 
Between 1960 and 2007, the data show that the Japanese public's views towards 
India were relatively ambivalent. The sample mean of public attitudes was -0.02 
per cent. The most favourable perception of India was 16.5 per cent in December 
1961 while the least favourable perception was in the month after India and 
Pakistan's tit-for-tat nuclear tests in June 1998 at -13.4 per cent. Excluding the 
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period of the nuclear tests, the lowest point in Japanese opinion was in August 
1979 at -4.6 per cent. 
Figure 8.5 shows a high level of stability in Japanese perceptions of India over a 
long period of time. 
Figure 8.5: Japanese Public Attitudes towards India, 1960-2007 
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With a standard deviation of 4.20, the data show that Japanese attitudes towards 
India were relatively stable. Attitudes towards India can be divided in to two 
periods. The first period from the early 1960s to about 1970 saw a gradual 
worsening of perceptions of India. It appears that no single event may have been 
responsible for this decline but it was the period in which India was involved in 
various military conflicts, including the invasion of Goa in 1961; a border dispute 
with China in 1962; the Second Kashmir War in 1965; and the Indo-Pakistani War 
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of 1971. Although not a salient nation in Japan, the accumulated effect of these 
conflicts may have been to produce a decrease in the percentage of respondents 
who saw India positively. The second period after 1970 saw Japanese views 
become much more stable. 
Figure 8.5 also shows an abrupt negative change in public perceptions of India in 
1998. This occurred in the same months as its nuclear tests. Compared to the 
change in public opinion in the months of the French tests, the change in public 
opinion in the months of the Indian tests was much smaller. The geographical 
distance of the tests from Japan, the lower media coverage, and the fact that the 
tests were being conducted in India rather than in a far away former colony may 
have contributed to a lower level of salience. The close association in the timing of 
the change in the number of respondents saying they had a positive view of India 
and the nuclear tests suggests that salient events can produce abrupt changes in 
public opinion. Although public attitudes towards India turned negative for a 
period after the tests, they had returned to their previous levels by 2001. This 
supports the argument that even when salient events occur their effects will not 
tend to last. 
United Kingdom 
The data show that the percentage of respondents with positive perceptions of the 
United Kingdom has remained relatively steady throughout the period of this study. 
The mean of public perceptions was 26.91 per cent. The most positive view ofthe 
UK was 42.5 per cent in May 2005 while the most negative was in June 1982, the 
second month ofthe Falklands War, at 10.3 per cent. Excluding the period ofthe 
Falklands War, the lowest point of Japanese impressions of the United Kingdom 
was in February 1974. 
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Figure 8.6, shows a high level of stability of Japanese attitudes towards the United 
Kingdom from 1960 to 2007. 
Figure 8.6: Japanese Public Attitudes towards the United Kingdom, 1960-2007 
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The standard deviation of 6.06 also suggests a high level of stability. Between the 
mid-1960s and the mid-1970s, the data show a gradual, but small, decline in the 
percentage of respondents with positive attitudes towards the United Kingdom. 
One possible reason for this change may have been an association of the United 
Kingdom with the Vietnam War during this period. From 1975, public opinion 
became gradually more positive. 
Examining Figure 8.6 closely, two large abrupt changes in public attitudes towards 
the United Kingdom can be seen in 1975 and 1982. The change in 1975 was 
positive and lasted two or three months. This coincided with the visit of Queen 
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Elizabeth II to Japan. The change in 1982 was negative and lasted about three or 
four months. This was the period of the Falklands War. As argued, public 
attitudes towards the United Kingdom, a non-salient nation, have been primarily 
stable throughout the period of this study. As predicted by theories of salience 
effects, although the visit by the Queen and the Falklands War were associated 
with abrupt changes in attitudes towards the United Kingdom both ofthese effects 
were temporary. 
Salient Nations 
Due to their historical, political and economic importance to Japan, the public is 
likely to be attentive to information about Russia, South Korea, North Korea, 
China and the United States. Two important factors likely play a role in this 
salience. First, political elites, including politicians, academics, interest groups, and 
media commentators, have more incentives to influence and manipulate public 
opinion towards those nations that may affect the national interest. Second, given 
that the public is interested in the actions of these nations since they may affect 
Japan, the media is also likely to take an interest. Since citizens are exposed to a 
greater volume and wider variety of information about these countries, including 
some issues with a positive valence and some with a negative valence, public 
attitudes should show greater levels of variability than that towards nations that are 
less salient. 
South Korea 
Between 1960 and 2007, Japanese public attitudes towards South Korea were 
negative. The mean of attitudes in the Jiji polls was -17.67 per cent. The minimum 
of public opinion was -45.2 per cent in June 1960 while the maximum reached 1.60 
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percent in January 2005. Throughout this period, public opinion towards South 
Korea has been negative but has shown quite substantial variation. 
As shown in Figure 8.7, between 1960 and 2007, the Japanese public's view of 
South Korea was consistently negative with relatively high levels of volatility 
between 1960 and 1975. 
Figure 8.7: Japanese Public Attitudes towards South Korea, 1960-2007 
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The standard deviation of 7. 79 suggests that perceptions of South Korea showed 
greater variation than those towards the non-salient nations discussed in the 
previous section. The trend in the data shows that while Japanese attitudes have 
remained negative over the past 47 years, they have been gradually moving in a 
positive direction, especially since the 1965 establishment of diplomatic relations. 
The years between 1970 and 1975, a period of various salient bilateral diplomatic 
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disputes between Japan and South Korea, including the abduction of Kim Dae Jung 
from a Tokyo hotel in 1973, the arrest of two Japanese democratic protesters in 
Seoul in 1974, and the attempted assassination of the President of South Korea by a 
North Korean resident of Japan, was marked by a volatility in public attitudes (Kim 
1976). This was also a period of an increasingly authoritarian regime in Seoul. 
Although the data show an abrupt negative change in public attitudes in early 2005 
at the same time as a large Korean anti-Japanese demonstration over the 
"Takeshima Day" dispute, the trend has been a gradual improvement in perceptions 
of South Korea from 1975 but a more rapid rate of improvement since 1995. 
There are various possible explanations for the positive changes in attitudes 
towards South Korea since the 1960s. One possibility for this may be an 
incremental process of learning. As person-to-person contacts and economic 
interactions between the two nations have increased from the mid-1960s, this may 
have resulted in a steady decrease in Japanese hostility towards its geographical 
neighbour. The rapid increase in positive attitudes towards South Korean from 
1995 may reflect the greater opening of South Korea to Japanese goods and the 
increase in South Korean goods in Japan. The decision to co-host the FIFA World 
Cup in 2002 may have also had some effect on reducing public hostility towards 
South Korea as it was broadly supported by political elites and the mass media. 
Some commentators attribute the improvement in public attitudes towards South 
Korea as a result of the attractiveness of Korean popular culture, the so-called 
"kanryu boom" (Brasor, P., "Korean wave may help erode discrimination", The 
Japan Times, 27 June 2004). This is possible but its effects perhaps should not be 
exaggerated. The rapid improvement in attitudes since the late 1990s is significant 
but it is important to note that it is actually a continuation of a broader trend that 
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began around 1965. The Jiji data show an even more rapid improvement in public 
attitudes towards South Korea between 1965 and 1970, the years immediately 
following the establishment of diplomatic relations. The overall improvement in 
attitudes towards South Korea appears to be a product of broader forces than just 
popular culture. It is more likely that as contact between the two nations has 
increased, part of which certainly includes contact with one another's popular 
culture, attitudes have become more positive. 
Another possible explanation for the gradual improvement in public attitudes 
towards South Korea may be generational change. The generation of citizens with 
memories of South Korea as a former colony of Japan has gradually faded away. 
The Jiji data begin in 1960, a mere 15 years following the end of Japanese 
colonialism in Korea and seven years after the end of the Korean War. A previous 
generation of Japanese who remembered South Korea as a poor and 
non-democratic country with which Japan had no diplomatic relations may have 
had more negative views of South Korea than later generations who only know 
South Korea as a relatively wealthy, technologically-advanced, and democratic 
nation with which Japan has relatively warm bilateral relations. 
With the exception of the period between 1970 and 1975, the data suggest that 
Japanese attitudes towards South Korea have been relatively stable. However, 
attitudes towards South Korea do show greater variation than that of attitudes 
towards non-salient nations. Furthermore, the trend in attitudes has been in an 
increasingly positive direction. Despite a large number of issues and events that 
could be perceived as threats by the Japanese public, none of these appear to have 
had a long-term effect on public opinion. Despite an abrupt increase in negative 
attitudes towards South Korea between 1973 and 1975, continuing a trend that 
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began in 1965, public attitudes towards South Korea began to gradually improve 
again. It appears that while having an overall negative view of South Korea, 
attitudes continue to gradually move in a more positive direction. This may reflect 
a growing interdependence between the two nations and, thus, could be considered 
to be a rational response to changing conditions. 
Russia/USSR 
Between 1960 and 2007, the Jiji poll data show that the majority of respondents 
have had a negative view of both the Soviet Union and Russia. The mean of public 
perceptions was -36.68 per cent. The most positive impression of Russia was -14.4 
per cent in June 2005 while the most negative impression was -68 per cent in 
September 1983. This was the same month that the Soviet Union fighter planes 
shot down the civilian airliner, Korean Airlines Flight 007. Excluding this event, 
the lowest point in public attitudes was -58.2 per cent in November 1980. This was 
shortly after the invasion of Afghanistan and a few months after the boycotted 
summer Olympics in Moscow. 
Figure 8.8 shows the trends in attitudes towards the Soviet Union and Russia. 
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Figure 8.8: Japanese Public Attitudes towards the Soviet Union/Russia, 1960-2007 
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While public opinion towards Russia/the Soviet Union has remained consistently 
negative, the percentage of respondents with negative views has varied, as shown 
by the standard deviation of 11.03. The data suggest that the trends in attitudes cah 
be divided into three periods. The first period from the early 1960s to the 
mid-1970s saw a gradual improvement in public opinion. One reason for this was 
likely the increase in negative attitudes towards its Cold War opponent, the United 
States, during the Vietnam War. Another factor may also have been detente 
between Moscow and Washington. The second period from 1975 to about 1985 
saw a gradual decline in positive attitudes. The late 1970s were a period in which 
Japanese policymakers became increasingly frustrated with Soviet obstinacy over a 
series of bilateral disputes related to fishing rights and territorial issues, as well as 
development of oil resources in the Soviet Far East. Following the Soviet invasion 
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of Afghanistan and rising tension between the USSR and the West, the early 1980s 
was the era of the so-called "second Cold War". The shooting down of KAL 007, 
an extremely salient event in Japan, enhanced this image of the Soviet Union as an 
aggressive nation. The third period from the mid-1980s to 2007 showed a gradual 
improvement in attitudes towards the Soviet Union and then a slightly more rapid 
improvement in attitudes after the year 2000. The decrease in tension between the 
US and the Soviet Union during Mikhail Gorbachev's presidency and the end of 
the Cold War may have increased the percentage of respondents who no longer 
saw Russia as a threat to Japan. 
Two possible explanations for the long-term negative attitudes towards Russia and 
the Soviet Union are the lack of a peace treaty between the two nations and the 
Northern Territories issue. Despite Japan's geographical proximity to the Russian 
Far East, these outstanding issues, along with the Cold War, have led Japanese 
elites and the Japanese media to be extremely critical of Russia and prevented a 
warming of relations between the two nations. Assuming that the public is 
influenced by these actors, it is likely that their attitudes will tend to reflect elite 
frames. 
The change in public perceptions of the Soviet Union and Russia following salient 
events were short-term. The abrupt increase in negative attitudes towards the 
Soviet Union following the acrimonious bilateral fishing negotiations in 1977 were 
followed by a gradual increase in attitudes. Even though the shooting down of 
KAL Flight 007 in 1983 was associated with a major drop in public attitudes 
towards the USSR, the data show a positive trend in opinion that went on until 
about 1992. The sudden decrease in positive attitudes towards Russia after Boris 
Y eltsin' s sudden cancellation of his visit to Japan was also followed by a gradual 
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increase in positive attitudes. While salient issues perceived as threats can have a 
powerful impact on public attitudes, their effects do not appear to be long-term. As 
the percentage of respondents who remember a particular event decreases, so too 
may its effect on public opinion. 
Arguably one of the most interesting aspects of the data concerns a change in 
public attitudes that did not happen. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, public attitudes towards Russia did not 
abruptly tum positive. Instead, they have gradually improved and, by 2007, had 
reached a similar level as in 1973 during the period of detente and the Vietnam 
War. This suggests two things. First, prior images of a nation may exert a powerful 
influence on attitudes even when circumstances dramatically change. Second, the 
process of image change, or learning, appears to be gradual. The percentage of 
respondents with negative perceptions of Russia was only slowly replaced by those 
with more positive perceptions. Although primarily negative, the case of 
Russia/USSR does suggest that collective opinion is relatively rational and that the 
public do respond in a reasonable manner to changes in external conditions. The 
variations in public attitudes also suggest that collective opinion was less stable 
than that towards the non-salient countries in the Jiji data. 
The United States 
Between 1960 and 2007, the data show that the Japanese public had positive 
attitudes towards the United States. The mean of the percentage of respondents 
with a positive view of the United States was 31.35 percent. The data show that 
Japanese perceptions of the United States reached its lowest point around the time 
of the Watergate scandal at 1.3 per cent in June 1973. On the other hand, its 
maximum was 48.6 per cent in June 1964. 
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Figure 8.9 shows overall positive attitudes towards the United States over time 
with two periods in which it showed a substantial decline. 
Figure 8.9: Japanese Public Attitudes towards the United States, 1960-2007 
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Although Japanese opinion towards the United States was positive throughout the 
period of this study, it has shown some variability with a standard deviation of9.70. 
The data show two periods where positive attitudes towards the United States 
declined. The first period from around 1964 until 1973 was associated with the 
years in which the two dominant foreign policy issues were the Vietnam War and 
the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty. Both of these issues were the 
subject of debate among Japanese domestic political elites and received high media 
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coverage, making them highly salient. 112 The improvement in attitudes was 
associated with the decision to withdraw American troops from Vietnam and the 
reversion of Okinawa back to Japan. The second period of decreasing attitudes was 
from 2000 to about 2004, the years in which the United States prosecuted its "war 
on terror" following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on Washington, 
D.C. and New York City. 113 Both of these periods were marked by American 
involvement in large military actions against small, poor and geographically distant 
nations. It is interesting to note that during both periods, the administrations of Sato 
Eisaku and Koizumi Junichiro were actually relatively supportive of the actions of 
the United States. Despite this, the decline in the percentage of respondents who 
viewed the United States favourably during these periods suggests that the public 
do not always agree with the policy decisions of political elites. 
The Japanese public has been exposed to vanous events involving the United 
States that could be perceived as threats. Given the interdependent economic and 
security relationship between the two nations, as well as the America's role as a 
superpower in the international system, frequent cases of abrupt negative changes 
in public opinion were bound to occur. During the 1980s, small fluctuations in 
attitudes were associated with a series of disputes between Japan and the US over 
trade and defence issues. The January 1991 First Gulf War was also correlated with 
an abrupt negative change in public perceptions. 
112 Under the San Francisco Peace Agreement, the United States maintained sovereignty over 
Okinawa, a prefecture of Japan. The negotiations over this issue were acrimonious with Japan 
demanding Okinawa's return but the US insisting that it continue to have basing rights. Okinawa was 
eventually returned to Japan in 1972 following an agreement between President Richard Nixon and 
Japanese Prime Minister Sato. 
113 For a comprehensive study of Japanese public opinion related to the "war on terror" see Eldridge 
and Midford (2008). 
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The case of the United States supports the claim that over the long-term, public 
attitudes towards a foreign nation are rational. But given the high salience of the 
United States in Japan, it is not surprising that the data show less stability than that 
towards Western European nations. Furthermore, the impact of even highly salient 
events does not appear to be long-term. The rapid rise in the percentage of 
respondents with positive attitudes of the United States following the Gulf War 
suggest a decline in the salience of this issue over a relatively short period of time. 
Public attitudes towards the United States appear to be relatively rational and 
responsive to changes in external conditions. In fact, both the increase in the 
percentage of respondents with negative perceptions of the United States in the late 
1960s and the early 2000s suggest that citizens may even be able to resist the 
frames of those political elites seeking support for their own policy interests. 
Whether this resistance is a product of public rationality or a lack of elite consensus 
is an area for future research. 
China 
Between 1960 and 2007, with the important exception of the seventeen-year period 
from 1972 to 1989, the Japanese public has had a generally negative view of 
China. 114 The mean of public perceptions was -7.59 per cent. The most positive 
impression of China was measured in November 1984 at 21.2 percent. Meanwhile, 
the most negative impression was -44.3 per cent in September 1967. 
As can be seen in Figure 8.1 0, the data show much greater variability in public 
attitudes towards China than any other case examined so far. 
114 Wang (2004) suggests that negative attitudes towards China are based on past images of China as 
a communist and poor nation mixed with more recent images associated with illegal immigrants in 
Japan committing crimes and anger over the numerous historical disputes that often damage relations. 
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Figure 8.10: Japanese Public Attitudes towards China, 1960-2007 
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The high variation is supported by the data showing a standard deviation of 17.23. 
For all ofthe nations included in the Jiji polls, the public's attitudes towards China 
were the only case in which views of a particular nation shifted from negative tb 
positive and then back to negative again. 
Public attitudes towards China can be divided into three periods. In the first period 
from 1960 to 1972, the data show highly negative attitudes towards China. The 
reasons for this likely included such factors as memories of the Pacific War, the 
image of China as a poor and backward nation, its testing of a nuclear device in 
1964 during the Tokyo Olympics, and the Cultural Revolution from 1966 onwards. 
Perhaps most importantly, the two nations did not have official diplomatic 
relations. 
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The second period shows an abrupt increase in positive attitudes from 1970 to 1972 
and then more gradual improvement from 1972 to 1989. The rapid improvement in 
attitudes in 1972 was associated with the establishment of diplomatic relations 
between the two nations following Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei's visit to Beijing. 
In no other case involving the ten countries in the Jiji data has public opinion 
towards a nation improved so rapidly and for such a long period of time. After the 
initial increase in positive attitudes, throughout the 1970s, the percentage of 
respondents with a positive view of China incrementally increased. Reasons for 
this may have been the improving relations between China and Japan, as well as 
the United States, and the increased economic interactions between the two 
countries. During this period, Japanese companies were increasing their investment 
to China and the Government was increasing its development aid. 
The third period from 1989 to the present is an era in which public attitudes 
towards China have become increasingly negative. The abrupt drop in positive 
attitudes occurred at the same time as the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. The 
Government's brutal and highly salient repression of democratic protesters appears 
to have had a significant and long-term effect on how China is perceived in Japan. 
The long term drop in public opinion following Tiananmen suggests that it may 
have been a case of learning. The vividness of the events on 6 June 2009 may have 
generated strong memories that citizens continued to associate China with, even 
long after the events themselves. 
What is more, even three years after the Tiananmen events, the percentage of 
respondents with positive views of China remained substantially lower than before 
1989. Since about 1993, attitudes have remained negative and even showed some 
signs of a gradual decline. It is somewhat ironic that even after the end of the Cold 
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War and increasing economic interdependence, perceptions of China as a threat 
may have actually increased. Pyle (2007) argues that the disappearance of the 
Soviet Union, a common threat which united Japan, China and the United States, 
has allowed various divisive issues to emerge. China may have reinforced threat 
perception among Japanese citizens with its nuclear tests, saber-rattling over 
Taiwan, buildup of military forces, and rapid economic growth. The data also show 
during this period one abrupt increase in negative attitudes in 2004 at the same time 
as the anti-Japanese behaviour by Chinese soccer fans at the Asian Cup final in 
Beijing and a second one correlated with the large-scale anti-Japanese 
demonstrations throughout China in April 2005. However, the data do suggest that 
by late 2005, public attitudes towards China were already beginning to improve. 
Although some commentators have blamed Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro and 
his visits to Yasukuni Shrine for recent increases in negative perceptions of China, 
the long-term trends in public attitudes towards China do not support this claim. 
The data show that public perceptions of China have been gradually becoming 
more negative since 1989. In contrast to the increasingly positive attitudes towards 
South Korea and Russia, attitudes towards China have been trending in a more 
negative direction. This gradual change associated with a China growing in 
economic and military power suggests a case of learning. As political elites and the 
mass media express increasing concern over China's intentions and capabilities, 
this may be filtering down to the public who are also coming to see China as a 
potential threat. Salient issues since 1989 such as Tiananmen Square, saber-rattling 
over Taiwan, nuclear tests, and public displays of anti-Japanese sentiment may 
have all contributed to this overall image. As expected, public attitudes towards 
China show a higher level of variation than that of most other nations included in 
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the Jiji data. While the long-term negative attitudes may be a concern, the 
correlation with changes in public attitudes and Chinese behaviour does suggest a 
public that is attentive to not only bilateral relations but also domestic conditions in 
China as well. 
North Korea 
Between 1970 and 2007, the Japanese public has consistently held negative views 
of North Korea with the degree of unfavourability increasing gradually since the 
early 1970s. The mean of public opinion towards North Korea was -44.29 per cent. 
The most positive attitudes towards North Korea were -12 per cent in May 1973 
while the most negative view came following a series of missile tests by 
Pyongyang in the Sea of Japan in July 2006 at -86.2 per cent. 
Although public attitudes towards North Korea have been negative throughout the 
period of the Jiji data, Figure 8.11 shows a gradual decline in attitudes towards 
North Korea since around 1973. 
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Figure 8.11: Japanese Public Attitudes about North Korea, 1970 to 2007 
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The standard deviation of public attitudes was 19.81, the largest for attitudes 
towards any country. The reasons for the high percentage of respondents with 
negative views of North Korea are complicated. North Korea is a poor, closed, 
Stalinist country with which Japan has never had diplomatic relations and which at 
times engages in aggressive actions and communications directed towards South 
Korea, the United States, and Japan. It has been a sponsor of state terrorism and 
abducted a number of Japanese citizens from Japanese territory. The behaviour of 
its leaders during this period, Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-11, has been the subject of 
various sensationalist reports in the Japanese media. Japanese political leaders have 
at times attempted to engage with Pyongyang but, more recently, have found it a 
good country to verbally attack so as to boost their nationalist credentials. The 
closed and belligerent nature of the North Korean state along with the lack of 
224 
contact with Japan appears to make it a target of high levels of hostility from the 
Japanese public. This is encouraged by political elites and media coverage of 
particular events and issues that produce feelings of threat. 
The gradual increase in the percentage of respondents stating that they have a 
negative attitude towards North Korea suggests a case of learning. The large 
number of issues perceived as threats involving North Korea may have led 
members of the public to increasingly update their image of North Korea more and 
more negatively. Some of the most salient events associated with North Korea 
from just prior to the period of the Jiji polls until 2007 included an attempt to 
assassinate South Korean President Park Chung-Hee in what is known as the "Blue 
House raid" in 1968; the hijacking of Japan Airlines Flight 351 by members of the 
Japanese Red Army who then were given asylum in Pyongyang in 1970; another 
attempt to assassinate Park by a North Korean resident of Japan which killed his 
wife in 1974; the "axe murder" killing of two United States army officers by North 
Korean soldiers along the border with South Korea in 1976; the Rangoon bombing 
in 1983; the destruction of KAL Flight 858 in 1988 by North Korean agents using 
Japanese passports; the nuclear crisis of 1993; the Taepodong missile test over 
Japan in 1998; admission to the abduction of Japanese citizens in 2002; and a 
nuclear test in 2006. The repeated threatening behaviour by North Korea may have 
captured the attention of an increasing number of Japanese citizens who began to 
increasingly see North Korea as a threat to not only their values but to their nation 
as well. 
The Jiji data do suggest that some of the conventional wisdom on Japanese public 
opinion towards North Korea is incomplete. The negative attitudes towards North 
Korea cannot be wholly attributed to recent actions by right-wing politicians and 
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the mass media. Nor are negative feelings solely the product of the abductions 
issue. Public attitudes towards North Korea became increasingly negative from the 
early 1970s, long before Japanese citizens had even been abducted. The abrupt 
increase in negative public attitudes in 2002 does suggest, however, that the 
increase in salience of the abductions issue has had a significant and long-term 
effect on public attitudes. The issue itself, along with statements by members of 
Japan's political elite and the mass media, are all likely factors in producing the 
increase in hostility towards Pyongyang. 
The Jiji polls do suggest that the effect of the abductions issue on Japanese opinion 
should be looked at in a wider context. The trend in public attitudes towards North 
Korea has long been in a negative direction. The association of this trend with the 
actions of North Korea suggests that the public is responding to its informational 
environment. In the face of information that North Korea may pose a threat to 
Japan, along with a lack of any kind of what Osgood (1962) calls a gradual 
reciprocal reduction in tension (GRIT) due to the absence of diplomatic relations, 
the image ofNorth Korea in Japan has only worsened. However, this appears to be 
a rational response to changing conditions, rather than the overreaction suggested 
by some like McCormack (2004) who argues that nationalist politicians seeking 
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) have played an important role in generating what 
he calls a "peculiar wave of Japanese fear and hatred for North Korea". Although 
Japanese citizens may see North Korea negatively, given the information that they 
receive about it, they may have good reason to. 
As a country that is particularly salient, it is not surprising to find attitudes towards 
North Korea show lower levels of stability than that towards other countries. 
However, it is interesting to find that the data suggest that negative attitudes did 
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abruptly drop in 2002. Despite all of the belligerent actions of North Korea from 
the 1970s to the 1990s, it was the abductions issue that appeared to really capture 
the attention of the Japanese public. The stability in attitudes following the salience 
of the abductions issue suggests that its effects on how citizen view North Korea is 
long-term. However, it is important to note that even if the abductions issue had 
never become salient, the data suggest that public attitudes towards North Korea 
would have still been more negative than that of any other country. The gradual 
nature of attitude change and the association of this change with a regime like 
North Korea suggest public responsiveness to its informational environment that 
could be classified as quite rational. 
Discussion 
An examination of the trends in the Jiji poll data shows that Japanese public 
perceptions of foreign nations over the long-term appear to be quite stable. Much 
of the conventional wisdom of Japanese opinion towards foreign nations, 
especially China and North Korea, is incomplete because it focuses too much on 
the dynamics of short-term public opinion and pays insufficient attention to 
long-term public opinion. Even over long periods of time, the systematic 
component of Japanese feelings towards particular nations shows high levels of 
stability with only gradual change. Although perceptions of a particular country 
can vary greatly in terms of the degree of favourability, attitudes do not tend to 
move back and forth between positive and negative. With the exception of India, 
positive attitudes towards a particular country in 1960 were related to positive 
attitudes in 2007. All cases of negative attitudes towards a foreign nation in 1960 
were associated with negative attitudes towards the same nation in 2007. 
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Public attitudes towards nations that are not salient tend to be stable over long 
periods of time. Public perceptions of Western European nations and India allowed 
for the examination of the dynamics of public opinion when subjected to a limited 
number of exogenous shocks. Various theoretical explanations may explain why 
attitudes are so stable. Hurwitz and Peffley's (1987) hierarchal model of foreign 
policy attitudes, in which more general beliefs influence more specific attitudes, 
suggests that attitudes may be influenced by country images. Hermann, et al.'s 
(1987) work on national images also predicts that public attitudes should be 
resistant to change and, therefore, stable. The data also support Page and Shapiro's 
( 1992) rational public hypothesis, lending support for the generalisability of their 
theory beyond the American case. 
As suggested by Proposition 4 derived from the theoretical framework in Chapter 
Two, threats and other exogenous events are associated with short-term effects on 
public attitudes. Examples of changes in attitudes towards the nation associated 
with exogenous shock included the French nuclear tests in 1995 and 1996, the 
shooting down of KAL Flight 007 in 1983, and the Falklands War in 1982. The 
major exceptions to this finding appear to be the Tiananmen Square and abductions 
issues, both of which were extremely salient and, therefore, likely to attract the 
attention of a large percentage of usually inattentive citizens. 
With the exceptions of Tiananmen Square and the North Korean abductions issue, 
most gradual changes in long-term public attitudes, however, are not associated 
with single issues. At the aggregate level where education levels and attentiveness 
to foreign affairs varies, it is unlikely that a large number of citizens will continue 
to use a single issue in their evaluations of a foreign nation for a long period of 
time. The short-term effects of threats on public opinion lend support to the 
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proposition that their effects will tend to be limited to amount of time that they are 
salient. While the public may experience negative emotions towards the nation 
viewed as the source of a particular problem, the intensity of these emotions should 
fade relatively quickly as public attention shifts away and people forget. 
Any discussion of public attitudes towards foreign nations should be cautious not 
to confuse short-term change due to salience effects with long-term change due to 
other factors. The tendency to focus on outliers such as public attitudes towards the 
United States during the Iraq War or towards China during the anti-Japanese 
demonstrations of 2005 means that commentators may end up making 
generalisations based on temporary opinion dynamics. Although both short-term 
and long-term change is important, their causes differ. The negative change in 
attitudes following a particular threat, such as a nuclear test, is associated with 
different factors than long-term and gradual changes. The first seems to reflect a 
salience or priming effect caused by a surge in information that captures the 
attention of, and elicits negative emotions from, a large number of people at the 
same time. The second appears to be a function of long-term and systematic cl).ange 
in the underlying image of a nation by a large percentage of the population. One 
implication is that while the volume of media coverage of a particular issue may be 
important for short-term attitude change, it may be less important for long-term 
attitude change. 
In sum, this chapter has shown that public attitudes towards the ten foreign nations 
in the Jiji polls display relative stability over time and that, when change does 
occur, it tends to do so only gradually. Attitudes tend to be more stable towards 
countries that are not salient than countries that are salient. When public opinion 
does change over the long-term, it does so only slowly. Although rare, exogenous 
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shocks can cause abrupt increases in public attitudes but they are only associated 
with short-term opinion change. The implication is that while threats and the mass 
media may be important causes of short-term opinion change they are limited in 
explaining the causes of long-term opinion change. It seems that this question 
requires a different theory and, thus, can be considered as a topic suitable for future 
research. 
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9. Conclusion 
Changes in Public Perceptions of Foreign Nations in Japan 
This study has examined the question of the conditions under which the Japanese 
public's perceptions of a foreign nation will change in a negative direction. The 
theoretical framework was derived from the literature on intergroup relations, 
which suggests that perceived threats to an in-group generate negative emotions 
towards the out-group believed to be their source, and agenda-setting, which 
suggests that higher media coverage of an issue will increase its salience. As 
applied to this study, it was hypothesized that public perceptions of a foreign nation 
would tum negative when it was perceived to be the source of a salient foreign 
affairs issue or event perceived as a threat and that the magnitude of change would 
be greater when media coverage was high. Threats generate negative emotions 
which then tum in to feelings of hostility towards the nation viewed as the source 
ofthe problem. 
The concept of threat was not conceptualized as unitary but in such a way that it 
could apply to a wide range of issues. In this study, these were divided in to 
realistic threats, symbolic threats, and threats to national identity. A content 
analysis of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008) was used to generate a list of 
issues and events that could be classified as threats from the perspective of the 
Japanese public. The questions in the monthly Jiji polls asking respondents what 
countries they liked and what countries they disliked were used as the measure of 
public attitudes towards ten foreign nations. The Jiji poll data was examined for 
evidence of a regular association of the presence of a threat and attitude change in 
the same month. The results of both the statistical analysis and the case studies 
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showed evidence of a relationship between the presence of a threat in a particular 
month and a negative change in attitudes towards the nation associated with the 
threat. In addition, higher volumes of media coverage were found to be correlated 
with greater magnitude changes in collective opinion. Although threats and media 
coverage were associated with changes in attitudes about foreign nations mainly 
over the short-term, on rare occasions when events are extremely salient, they were 
also associated with long-term changes. 
The empirical evidence supports each of the four propositions presented in Chapter 
Two. Proposition 1 was that threats produce negative changes in public perceptions 
of the nation viewed as its source. Proposition 2 was that high media coverage of 
threats increases the magnitude of their effect on public opinion. Proposition 3 was 
that each of the three types of threats had a negative effect on public perceptions of 
the nation involved. Proposition 4 was that the duration of negative changes in 
public attitudes about a foreign nation due to threats will tend to be short-term. 
Theoretical Significance 
Using polling and media data from Japan, this study has shown the theoretical 
robustness and generalisability of the work done on public opinion and foreign 
policy in the United States. The Jiji data show that the best predictor of public 
attitudes in one month is public attitudes in the previous month, suggesting 
long-term public opinion stability. Like its American counterpart, the Japanese 
public appears to only pay attention to foreign affairs under certain conditions. It 
also suggests that only a small amount of the massive stream of information about 
foreign affairs is able to capture public attention. However, when an issue or event 
interpreted as a threat does become salient, public opinion appears to move in the 
same direction as the valence of the information. The high level of opinion stability 
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and responsiveness to information about foreign affairs suggests support for Page 
and Shapiro's (1992) rational public hypothesis in Japan. In the past, what scholars 
have referred to as "moodiness", may actually have been a product of salience 
effects produced by information about threats and, therefore, temporary. 115 
When it comes to foreign affairs, citizens seem to care about a wider variety of 
issues than is usually thought. Scholars of public opinion and foreign policy 
generally assume that the public only take an interest in foreign affairs when it 
affects their country's "vital interests". For example, the literature on casualty 
aversion posits that citizens views on a particular conflict are shaped by the number 
of their fellow citizens who have been killed (Mueller 1971 ). The emphasis on 
issues such as national security and international trade may be too narrow. Despite 
the public's reputation as being uninterested and uninformed about foreign affairs, 
ordinary citizens do appear to take an interest in three broad types of foreign policy 
issues: those likely to have an impact on their material wellbeing; those that violate 
their world view or their values; and those that insult or denigrate the value of their 
nation. Despite the importance of symbolic issues to politics, this has yet to be a 
major area of interest in studies of public opinion and foreign policy. While 
citizens certainly pay attention to those issues that may impact on their self-interest, 
they also care about those events that violate their nation's values. This view 
suggests a public that is much more aware of the outside world than is usually 
thought. 
115 For a review of the literature on the "Almond-Lippmann consensus" see Holsti (1992). 
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Policy Implications 
As the world's second largest economy and a major player in East Asian political 
and economic issues, understanding the dynamics of Japanese public opinion about 
foreign nations is important. While recent studies by Green (200 1 ), Pyle (2007), 
and Samuels (2008) have all provided important analyses of contemporary 
Japanese foreign policy, they have devoted limited attention to examining what 
ordinary citizens think. Eldridge and Midford' s (2008) collection on Japanese 
public opinion and the "war on terror" fills in this gap by contributing to the 
understanding of how Japanese views of foreign policy have shifted from pacifism 
towards what they call "defensive realism". I have attempted to build on their work 
by examining how the Japanese public responds to a wider range of issues, greater 
number of countries, and longer period of time. 
If, at least in some part, Japanese policymakers respond to public opinion then 
understanding the causes of such change is vital. The massive public interest in the 
North Korean abductions issue and concerns over its nuclear program has made 
foreign policy issues more salient in Japan than at any other time in the post-Cold 
War period. In the coming years, the future of Japan's alliance with the United 
States and how it deals with the rise of China will certainly depend on what the 
public feels about these issues. What is more, it may be that the loss of power of 
the Liberal Democratic Party in August 2009 may mark a new era in which 
political leaders seeking to be reelected will have no choice but to pay greater 
attention to what citizens think. 
Understanding that perceived threats are a pnmary, but temporary, factor in 
producing negative feelings towards specific countries is also important because 
some observers of Japan use public opinion polls as indicators of nationalism. 
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Specifically, signs of anti-Chinese and anti-Korean sentiment among ordinary 
citizens are often used to imply a more nationalistic Japan. The Japanese 
government's concern over this view led the Japanese minister of public affairs in 
the embassy in Washington, D.C. to write an opinion piece in the International 
Herald Tribune (Kitano, M., "The myth of rising Japanese nationalism", 12 
January 2006, p.6) saying that "reports of excessive Japanese nationalism are 
fashionable today in some U.S. news media" because of charges "that an extreme 
Japanese antipathy toward South Korea and China is on the rise". Moon and Suh 
(2008:200) also argue that one form of Japanese neo-nationalism has increasingly 
taken the shape of a xenophobic populism broadly shared by the Japanese masses. 
However, if the goal is an accurate understanding of the underlying, systemic 
aspects of Japanese public opinion then it must be measured over much longer 
periods of time and with regard to a much larger selection of cases. Evidence that 
Japanese public attitudes towards China have become hostile due to findings in a 
poll conducted immediately after a large-scale anti-Japanese demonstration is not a 
valid indicator of long-term trends but of information that is salient at a particular 
point in time. 
Evidence of salience effects suggests that the use of public opinion by political 
leaders as a guide to policy should be done cautiously especially if it is based on 
polls conducted immediately after the occurrence of an event interpreted as a threat. 
Public attitudes will tend to be more negative than they usually are because they 
are overly influenced by negative emotions. Political leaders would be wise to 
ignore such activated public opinion since first, it is almost always temporary, and 
second, it reflects an emotional rather than deliberative response to an issue. It 
should never be a factor in international negotiations where it is necessary for 
235 
conflicting parties to engage in rational processes with logic taking precedence 
over emotional processes (Carol Gordon and Asher Arian 2001 :213). Politicians 
should also be careful in the comments that they make following such events 
because the evidence in this study does suggest that they can increase or decrease 
the perceptions of threat. 
Generalising from the case of Japan, it may be that the publics of other nations will 
also react negatively to those issues and events perceived as threats. This has 
implications for governments concerned about their image abroad. They should be 
aware that a wide variety of actions or communications can be interpreted as 
realistic threats, symbolic threats, or threats to the national identity of people in 
other nations. Since threats involve not only objective conditions but also 
perceptions, political leaders should not be surprised when some of their policies 
elicit feelings of hostility by foreign publics. Publics do not experience issue or 
events themselves. Information is mediated by domestic elites and local media who 
filter information in such a way that such actions may be interpreted as threats. 
Political actors should at least be conscious of how their actions and words may be 
perceived, or misperceived, and to behave with some prudence. Mass publics do 
not only respond to threats directed towards them or their countries but also to 
those issues which they consider to be violations of their values. Therefore, while a 
government may argue that how it treats its own citizens or how it conducts its 
affairs are "domestic matters", it should also not be surprised when some actions 
produce a strong negative reaction from publics abroad. The importance of 
symbolic threats suggests that those leaders dabbling in issues related to morality, 
nationalism and religion should be especially careful because these may set of a 
reaction that they do not anticipate. 
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Those policymakers seeking to improve the image of their country among mass 
publics through public diplomacy face a difficult battle. Although countries are 
spending increasing amounts of money and effort to communicate to the people of 
other nations, the Jiji data suggest that long-term attitudes towards nations appear 
to be fairly resistant to change. If the goals of public diplomacy are more modest, 
such as the targeting individuals who are most likely to affect policy, enough 
evidence exists to suggest that this may be an effective strategy. However, if the 
goal is to change collective opinion, the standard prescriptions of public diplomacy 
activities such as cultural exchanges and state visits are unlikely to be sufficient for 
the simple reason that they are not salient enough. As the Jiji polls showed, 
between 1960 and 2007 the only case of an event associated with a large and 
long-term positive change in Japanese public attitudes towards a foreign nation was 
that of China and the period after Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei's visit to Beijing 
in 1972. No other evidence in the data of the ten nations and 4 7 years of 
observations suggests that it would be possible for a government to generate 
positive changes in public attitudes in Japan through any kind of public diplomacy 
activities. 
Future Research 
The most important goal of any future research on threats and public opinion is to 
identify what elements of a threat have the greatest effect on public attitudes. In 
other words, since citizens do not directly experience threats, what exactly is it that 
they are responding to? Although this study has treated threats as exogenous, they 
are clearly related to domestic media coverage and elite rhetoric. Objective 
conditions may be the immediate cause of negative changes in public attitudes but 
they are only part of the explanation. Many other factors in the causal chain prior to 
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the particular issue or event should also be considered, especially those related to 
why a particular issue is interpreted as a threat in the first place. In some ways, 
rather than simplifying matters, the suggestion that threats matter actually makes 
the study of public opinion and foreign policy more complicated. However, most 
importantly, it does show that short-term changes in public opinion are primarily a 
reactive phenomenon so focusing solely on the incentives of domestic political 
leaders and the domestic mass media is insufficient. 
It is also important to develop a typology of issues that could be used to predict 
positive changes in public opinion. Extremely positive events such as the opening 
of diplomatic relations with China in September 1972 and the visits of Queen 
Elizabeth in May 1975 and Princess Diana in May 1986 were associated with 
increases in positive public perceptions of China and the United Kingdom. The 
question is whether these were special cases or whether some other systematic 
factors are also at work. As suggested by the gradual improvement in Japanese 
public opinion towards China in the 1970s and South Korea and Russia in the 
1990s, increased cooperation between states and increased interdependence 
involving people and goods may be a factor in improving public attitudes. This is 
an especially important area of research for those interested in public diplomacy. 
In closing, this study has shown that trying to understand how the Japanese public 
thinks about something as ambiguous as a foreign nation is no simple task. While I 
have shown that threats are associated with changes in public attitudes, much 
remains unknown as to why they are associated with such changes. However, it is 
reassuring to find that even though citizens may be faced with a torrent of 
confusing information about foreign affairs, they still manage to cope pretty well. 
The Japanese public appears rational and "pretty prudent". Although public 
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opinion will occasionally abruptly change, such volatility is rare and changes in 
attitudes can usually be explained by examining what information was available to 
the public at a particular time. 
It does not make sense to fault the Japanese public for negative responses to 
perceived threats. People have always used attitudes towards particular objects to 
make important decisions about approach or avoidance (Chen and Bargh 1999). 
Furthermore, why should people not feel negative emotions towards a nation that 
threatens Japan directly or violates the values that citizens consider to be 
important? So long as political leaders are careful when reacting to such public 
opinion, this is not something that should be of great concern. In fact, knowing that 
citizens respond in a regular and predictable manner to an issue area as distant from 
their daily lives as foreign affairs is reassuring. 
Finally, my findings suggest that even when it comes to an issue area as ambiguous 
as foreign affairs, a sphere in which information can activate strong negative 
emotions, people's reaction to events can be explained and understood. Although 
negative attitudes towards a particular country can increase, this tends to be 
associated with the presence of a threat. However, such events are not only rare, 
but the magnitude of their effects is usually minor and usually temporary. In a 
democracy like Japan, where the country is faced with complex foreign policy 
issues and surrounded by nations that could be perceived as threats, it is somewhat 
reassuring to find that, over the long-term anyway, the Japanese public, like that in 
other nations, is pretty rational. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: List of Threats to Japan, Classification of Threat Type, Media 
Coverage and Monthly Change in Public Attitudes towards Nation Involved, 
1960-2007 
Threat Change 
Year/Month Country Issue/Event Media 
Type (%points) 
1960/10 Korea Meeting with ROK over Lee Line realistic 4 -4.9 
1960/12 Korea Meeting with ROK over Lee Line realistic 14 -2.5 
196111 Korea Fishing boat incident at Lee line realistic 3 3.4 
196114 USSR Laos Crisis symbolic 21 -2.1 
196115 France Algeria-France war symbolic 6 -9.3 
1961/5 us Bay of Pigs symbolic 9 -8.2 
1961/6 UK Aircraft carrier to Persian Gulf symbolic 0 0.0 
1961/7 USSR Berlin crisis symbolic 24 -3.4 
1961/7 France France-Tunisia War symbolic 67 3.7 
1961/7 UK Troops to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait symbolic 21 1.8 
196118 USSR Berlin crisis symbolic 31 -2.0 
1961/9 USSR Nuclear test symbolic 48 -4.5 
1961/11 us Nuclear test symbolic 25 -3.4 
1961111 USSR Nuclear test symbolic 26 -7.6 
1962/1 India Portuguese-Indian War symbolic 50 -6.9 
1962/2 USSR Nuclear test symbolic 10 8.5 
1962/2 us Nuclear test symbolic 19 -1.6 
1962/2 UK Nuclear test symbolic 10 -2.4 
1962/3 UK Nuclear test symbolic 11 -3.2 
1962/3 us Nuclear test symbolic 45 -5.6 
1962/5 USSR Nuclear test symbolic -4.7 
1962/6 Korea Anti-govt protesters arrested symbolic 32 -6.9 
1962/7 USSR Nuclear test symbolic 19 -4.8 
1962/10 USSR Cuban missile crisis symbolic 91 3.1 
1962110 us Cuban missile crisis symbolic 76 -4.6 
1962/11 us Cuban missile crisis symbolic 53 -3.5 
252 
1962/11 India Border dispute with China symbolic 24 0.9 
1962/12 China Border dispute with India symbolic 24 -14.0 
1962/12 India Border dispute with China symbolic 8 -2.3 
1962/12 Korea Japanese fishing boat seized by ROK realistic 2 -8.9 
1963/2 us US nuclear submarine in Japan realistic 7 -2.8 
1963/2 Korea Anti-govt protesters arrested symbolic 17 -2.1 
1964/4 Korea Japan-ROK meeting realistic 22 -4.7 
1964/5 USSR Northern Territories discussion realistic 59 -3.9 
1964/7 us Gulf of Tonkin symbolic 59 -5.7 
1964/8 Korea Japan-ROK meeting realistic 3 -5.5 
1964/9 Korea Fishing boat seized by South Korea realistic 6 1.5 
1964/10 Korea Fishing boat seized by South Korea realistic 10 -2.2 
1964/10 China Nuclear test symbolic 57 -3.7 
1964/11 us US nuclear submarine in Sasebo realistic 24 0.9 
1965/1 us Okinawa negotiations realistic 68 -6.0 
1965/3 us First combat troops to Vietnam symbolic 160 -6.3 
1965/4 us More combat troops to Vietnam symbolic 131 -6.6 
1965/7 Korea Anti-Japan demonstrations identity 23 -8.1 
1965/7 us More troops sent to Vietnam symbolic 37 -1.8 
1965/8 Korea Anti-Japan demonstrations identity 12 0.1 
1965/9 India Kashmir dispute symbolic 295 -4.9 
1965/10 Korea Dispute over diplomatic relations realistic 133 -6.0 
1965/11 us Bombing of North Vietnam symbolic 7 -4.1 
1966/1 USSR Aid for North Vietnam symbolic 3 -6.6 
1966/2 France Participates in Vietnam war symbolic 5 -3.1 
1966/2 us Bombing of North Vietnam symbolic 37 -6.1 
1966/2 Korea South Korean soldiers to Vietnam symbolic 3 1.6 
1966/3 Korea Fishing boat seized by South Korea realistic 42 -2.2 
1966/5 France Nuclear test symbolic 5 -3.0 
1966/6 China Cultural Revolution begins symbolic 8 -0.7 
1966/7 us Bombing of North Vietnam symbolic 84 -3.3 
1966/7 France Nuclear test symbolic 17 -0.4 
1966/9 us US plane enters Chinese airspace symbolic 9 -2.4 
1966/9 France Nuclear test symbolic 5 1.7 
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1966/12 us US plane crashes in Hanoi symbolic 19 -5.4 
1967/1 China Nuclear test symbolic 2 -4.6 
1967/2 us Bombing ofNorth Vietnam symbolic 0 3.0 
1967/2 China Border dispute with USSR symbolic 29 0.0 
1967/4 us Bombing of North Vietnam symbolic 2 -0.4 
1967/5 China US plane enters airspace symbolic -3.9 
1967/7 China Nuclear test symbolic 3 -4.5 
1967/9 China Border dispute with India symbolic 6 -6.2 
1967/10 us Okinawa negotiations realistic 32 -5.3 
1967/11 us Okinawa negotiations realistic 47 -6.8 
1967111 UK Devaluation of Pound realistic 29 -6.2 
1967112 us Bombing of North Vietnam symbolic 0 2.8 
1968/2 us Tet Offensive symbolic 55 -6.7 
1968/3 us Bombing of North Vietnam symbolic 21 -0.8 
1968/4 us General strike in Okinawa realistic 8 -3.5 
1968/5 France Paris demonstrations symbolic 85 -2.0 
1968/6 France Paris demonstrations symbolic 20 -3.6 
1968/6 us US plane crashes at university realistic 44 -0.8 
1968/7 USSR Dispute with Czechoslovakia symbolic 40 1.7 
1968/8 France Hydrogen bomb test symbolic 6 3.0 
1968/9 USSR Invasion of Czechoslovakia symbolic 157 -12.2 
1969/3 USSR Border dispute with China symbolic 20 -0.9 
1969/4 China Border dispute with USSR symbolic 3 -9.3 
1969/5 us Okinawa dispute realistic 27 -9.2 
1969/7 us Poison gas stored in Okinawa realistic 29 1.5 
1969/10 us Discussion of Okinawa return realistic 30 5.5 
1969/11 us Okinawa negotiations realistic 179 -10.6 
1970/1 us Okinawa negotiations realistic 13 0.8 
1970/6 us US invades Cambodia symbolic 104 -11.3 
1970/11 us US-Japan textile dispute realistic 78 -1.1 
1970/12 us US-Japan textile dispute realistic 40 -1.9 
1971/1 us US poison gas stored in Okinawa realistic 62 -3.5 
197112 us Okinawa negotiations realistic 9 -0.3 
1971/3 us Okinawa negotiations realistic 9 -1.0 
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197118 France Nuclear test symbolic 3 1.1 
1971111 India India-Pakistan War symbolic 13 -0.5 
1971112 India India-Pakistan War symbolic 104 -2.2 
1972/3 China Nuclear test symbolic 2 0.5 
1972/3 us Bombing of North Vietnam symbolic 36 -3.5 
1972/5 us Bombing ofNorth Vietnam symbolic 18 -6.2 
1972/6 France Nuclear test symbolic 10 -3.7 
1972/8 us Anti-Vietnam protests symbolic 43 -3.8 
1973/1 us End of Vietnam War symbolic 185 -5.2 
1973/9 Korea Abduction of Kim Dae Jung realistic 136 -5.9 
1973/10 Korea Kim Dae Jung incident realistic 13 3.1 
1973/10 USSR Northern Territories meeting realistic 19 -3.7 
1974/3 USSR Disagreement over fishing rights realistic 8 -5.8 
1974/4 Korea Japanese citizens arrested realistic 10 1.9 
1974/4 USSR Negotiations over fishing rights realistic 9 -2.1 
1974/5 India Nuclear test symbolic 10 -0.7 
1974/6 France Nuclear test symbolic 10 -0.5 
1974/7 us Watergate symbolic 20 -0.7 
1974/7 Korea Trial oftwo Japanese citizens realistic 28 -2.5 
1974/9 Korea President assassination attempt realistic 85 -7.9 
1974/10 us LaRoque Statement realistic 54 -3.5 
1975/6 France Underground Nuclear test symbolic 3 -1.8 
1975/9 North Korea Fishing boat incident realistic 36 -3.4 
1976/8 North Korea Operation Paul Bunyan symbolic 5 2.3 
1976/9 USSR Pilot defects in MIG-25 realistic 60 -4.7 
1976/11 China Mao secession crisis symbolic 2 -6.2 
1977/2 Korea Discussions over Takeshima realistic 8 -1.7 
1977/4 USSR Negotiations over Fishing rights realistic 147 -11.1 
1977/6 us Inspection of nuclear plants realistic 39 -1.8 
1977/6 USSR Negotiations over Fishing rights realistic 29 1.2 
1977/7 North Korea Fishing limits dispute realistic 13 -2.4 
1977/7 USSR Negotiations over Fishing rights realistic 25 1.9 
1977/10 USSR Negotiations over Fishing Issue realistic 10 1.0 
1977112 us Japan-US trade dispute realistic 35 -0.2 
255 
1978/1 us Japan-US trade dispute realistic 35 0.5 
1978/4 USSR KAL902 incident symbolic 37 -3.1 
1978/5 China Dispute over Senkaku Islands realistic 64 -5.1 
1978111 USSR Soviet MIGs in Cuba symbolic -4.1 
1979/3 China Sino-Vietnamese War symbolic 35 -8.6 
1979/3 us Three Mile Island symbolic 42 -4.2 
1979/9 USSR Base built in Northern Territories realistic 5 -0.4 
1980/1 USSR Invasion of Afghanistan symbolic 85 -4.9 
1980/2 us Restrictions on Japanese cars realistic 6 -2.3 
1980/5 us US fails to rescue hostages symbolic -4.3 
1980/6 Korea Kwangju incident symbolic 57 -5.3 
1980/9 Korea Death penalty Kim Dae Jung symbolic 32 -3.5 
1980/12 us US demands Japanese burden realistic -3.3 
1981/2 USSR Northern Territories Day realistic 8 -4.4 
198112 China Cancels Japanese factory contract realistic 9 -5.9 
1981/4 us Submarine & fishing boat collision realistic 27 3.7 
1981/5 us US-Japan car negotiations realistic 6 2.3 
1981/6 us US-Japan security negotiations realistic 21 -3.9 
198118 us US shoots down two Libyan jets symbolic 7 -2.7 
1981/9 Korea Dispute with Japan over loan/aid realistic 27 -4.7 
198119 North Korea Missile at US military plane symbolic 4 -4.8 
1982/4 UK Falklands War symbolic 72 -4.7 
1982/5 UK Falklands War symbolic 203 -5.9 
1982/6 UK Falklands War symbolic 26 -2.2 
1982/7 China Textbook issue identity 5 -3.8 
1982/8 China Textbook issue identity 32 -0.7 
1982/8 Korea Textbook issue identity 30 -2.9 
1982/9 Korea Textbook issue identity 4 -3.2 
1982/9 China Textbook issue identity 14 -5.0 
1982/11 Korea Textbook issue identity 3 -0.5 
1982/12 us US announces Middle East symbolic 0 -1.4 Headquarters 
1983/1 Korea Dispute with Japan over loan/aid realistic 25 -1.5 
1983/4 China Border dispute with Vietnam symbolic 3 -1.3 
1983/6 us Japan criticized on pager imports realistic 0 -2.8 
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1983/8 us US accuses Japan of dumping realistic 0 -1.0 
1983/9 USSR KAL007 symbolic 126 -20.0 
1983/10 us Invasion of Grenada symbolic 25 0.9 
I983/ll North Korea Rangoon Bombing symbolic 27 -6.5 
1983/12 UK Nuclear weapons on British ship in symbolic 10 -1.0 Japan 
1984/4 us Trade dispute over beef and citrus realistic 26 -2.1 
1984/5 USSR Boycott LA Olympics symbolic 18 -5.5 
1984/12 us Steel dispute realistic 0 -0.2 
1985/4 us US bill limits Japanese imports realistic 28 -3.7 
1985/9 China Anti-Japanese Demonstration identity -2.6 
1986/5 USSR Chemobyl symbolic 35 -4.4 
1986/5 China Textbook issue identity 5 -4.2 
1986/9 Korea Fujio comments identity 18 1.2 
1987/2 North Korea Seizes Japanese fishing boat realistic 13 -2.2 
1987/6 Korea Anti-govt protesters arrested symbolic 25 -0.1 
1988/2 North Korea KAL858 symbolic 36 -15.8 
1988/4 USSR End of Afghanistan War symbolic 20 -5.6 
1988/7 us Iran Air 655 symbolic 13 2.0 
1988/9 North Korea Negotiations over fishing boat realistic 7 -0.2 
1988/11 us US navy exercises in Tokyo Bay realistic 3 -5.4 
1989/6 China Tiananmen Square symbolic 40 -34.1 
1990/1 USSR Repression of AzerbaUan symbolic 42 -4.1 
1990!1 us US invades Panama symbolic II -1.2 
1990/4 USSR Repression of Lithuania symbolic 52 -5.1 
1990/5 Korea Colonisation apology identity 28 -3.7 
1990/8 France Gulf Crisis symbolic 20 -3.0 
1990/8 us Iraq Crisis symbolic 127 -1.4 
1990/8 UK Iraq Crisis symbolic 29 1.5 
1990/9 us Iraq Crisis symbolic 56 -2.2 
1990/9 UK Iraq Crisis symbolic 6 -3.2 
1990/10 us Iraq Crisis symbolic 19 -3.3 
1990/11 us Iraq Crisis symbolic 46 -4.9 
1990/12 us Iraq Crisis symbolic 37 5.1 
1991!1 us Gulf War symbolic Ill 2.0 
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1991/1 UK Gu1fWar symbolic 9 3.5 
1991/1 France Gu1fWar symbolic 27 -1.1 
1991/2 USSR January Events symbolic 34 -8.1 
199112 us Gu1fWar symbolic 112 -6.7 
199118 USSR Coup d'etat in USSR symbolic 49 2.7 
1991112 us No apology for atomic bombings identity 3 -1.6 
1992/1 Korea Apology over Comfort Women identity 14 -0.6 
1992/2 us Bush trip to Japan realistic 20 -7.9 
1992/4 China Jiang Zemin visits Japan identity 6 -1.8 
1992/7 Russia Discussion ofNorthern Territories realistic 24 -5.0 
1992/9 Russia Yeltsin cancels visit to Japan identity 19 -14.7 
1993/1 us US strikes on Iraq symbolic 29 5.5 
1993/3 Russia G7 Summit- Aid to Russia realistic 28 1.2 
1993/4 Russia Northern Territories discussion realistic 41 -4.8 
1993/10 North Korea Refuses IAEA inspections realistic 12 -5.7 
1993/10 Russia Dumps nuclear waste in Japan Sea realistic 22 -8.8 
1993/11 Korea Apology over colonisation identity 5 2.6 
1994/2 North Korea Inspectors to North Korea realistic 10 -1.1 
1994/2 us Japan ordered to open markets realistic 11 -3.6 
1994/5 us Trade talks with US realistic 11 -4.7 
1994/6 North Korea Nuclear Crisis realistic 89 -6.3 
1994/6 China Nuclear test symbolic 2 -5.9 
1994/9 China Asian Games dispute over Taiwan realistic 17 1.3 
1994/10 North Korea Nuclear Crisis realistic 28 -6.4 
1994/10 China Nuclear test symbolic 5 -2.2 
1995/1 Russia First Chechen War symbolic 26 -5.1 
1995/4 us Oklahoma City symbolic 7 -7.4 
1995/6 China Nuclear test symbolic 7 -3.8 
1995/7 France Nuclear test symbolic 20 -13.4 
1995/7 us Enola Gay exhibit in Smithsonian identity 2 2.3 
1995/8 France Nuclear test symbolic 35 -10.0 
1995/8 Korea Apology for WWII identity 2 2.1 
1995/9 China Nuclear test symbolic 18 -7.3 
1995/9 France Nuclear test symbolic 63 -29.7 
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1995/9 us Okinawa Rape incident realistic 7 4.1 
1995/10 us Discussions about Okinawa realistic 14 -0.8 
1995/11 us Discussions about Okinawa realistic 7 0.6 
1995/11 Korea Eto comments identity 22 -3.8 
1995/12 France Nuclear test symbolic 13 -8.5 
1996/1 France Nuclear test symbolic 15 1.7 
1996/2 China China-Taiwan crisis realistic 9 -7.0 
1996/3 us Discussions about Okinawa realistic 7 -4.1 
1996/3 China China-Taiwan crisis realistic 7 -6.6 
1996/6 China Nuclear test symbolic 16 -1.4 
1996/7 China Nuclear test symbolic 9 0.9 
1996/9 China Senkaku lighthouse issue realistic 12 3.1 
1996/9 us Discussions about Okinawa realistic 17 -5.2 
1997/2 North Korea Abductions issue realistic 30 -5.9 
1997/10 North Korea Japanese wives issue realistic 8 -0.5 
1998/4 Russia Northern Territories discussion realistic 12 -2.6 
1998/6 India Nuclear test symbolic 59 -11.4 
1998/6 us Clinton skips Japan for China identity II -2.1 
1998/8 us Missile attacks on a! Qaeda symbolic 7 -0.8 
1998/9 North Korea Taepodong Test realistic 31 -13.1 
1998/11 China Jiang Zemin and history issue identity II -2.3 
1998/12 us Missile attack on Iraq symbolic 10 0.5 
1999/2 us Clinton impeachment symbolic 3 0.4 
1999/4 us NATO attacks Serbia symbolic 17 1.4 
1999/4 North Korea Mystery ships issue realistic 3 -2.2 
1999/5 us Bombing of China embassy symbolic 14 -2.8 
1999/5 India Kargil War symbolic -0.6 
1999/8 China China tests long-range missile realistic 2 -2.5 
2000/7 us Sexual assault by serviceman realistic 2 -3.6 
2000/9 Russia Putin discusses peace treaty realistic 5 -8.0 
2001/2 us Ehime Maru realistic 21 -5.5 
2001/4 China US spy plane incident realistic II -1.6 
2001/6 China Dispute over safeguards realistic 4 3.0 
2001/7 Korea Criticism ofKoizumi's visit to identity 7 -4.5 Yasukuni 
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2001/7 China Criticism of Koizumi's visit to identity 8 -5.7 Yasukuni 
2001/8 China Koizumi visits Yasukuni identity 9 -0.6 
2001110 us Invasion of Afghanistan symbolic 43 -6.7 
2001111 us Invasion of Afghanistan symbolic 22 -2.6 
200211 North Korea North Korean ship sunk realistic 18 -7.1 
2002/2 UK Subcritical nuclear test symbolic 3 -0.2 
2002/3 us Dispute over steel safeguards realistic 5 -2.1 
2002/4 China Koizumi visits Yasukuni identity 5 2.2 
2002/5 China Shenyang incident realistic 42 -12.8 
2002/8 us Buildup to Iraq War symbolic 6 -7.8 
2002/9 North Korea Koizumi visits Pyongyang realistic 54 -1.1 
2002/10 North Korea Abductions issue realistic 74 -7.5 
2002111 North Korea Abductions issue realistic 22 -2.5 
2002/12 North Korea Yongbyon reactivated realistic 31 -4.7 
200311 China Koizumi visits Yasukuni iaentity 6 3.7 
2003/1 Korea Koizumi visits Yasukuni identity 6 3.5 
2003/1 North Korea NPT withdrawal realistic 38 -3.2 
2003/2 us Preparation for Iraq symbolic 62 -4.0 
2003/3 UK Iraq War symbolic 31 -1.8 
2003/3 us Iraq War symbolic 90 -3.4 
2003/4 North Korea Admission of nuclear weapons realistic 45 -0.5 
2003/4 us Iraq War symbolic 57 0.9 
2003/4 China SARS crisis realistic 22 -1.6 
2003/5 China SARS crisis realistic 30 -3.1 
2003/12 us BSE dispute realistic 7 -4.7 
200411 Korea Koizumi visits Yasukuni identity 3 -0.4 
2004/1 China Koizumi visits Yasukuni identity 4 -4.0 
2004/2 us SDF arrive in Samawah realistic 29 -2.4 
2004/3 China Senkaku Dispute realistic 7 0.0 
2004/4 us Abu Ghraib symbolic 5 -4.0 
2004/5 North Korea Koizumi visits Pyongyang realistic 35 0.7 
2004/5 us Japanese journalists killed in Iraq realistic 10 -1.0 
2004/6 North Korea Soga family reunion realistic 7 -5.3 
2004/6 us Battle ofFallujah symbolic 7 3.0 
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2004/8 China Booing at Asian Cup identity 2 -15.3 
2004/9 Korea Uranium enrichment symbolic 6 2.9 
2004/10 us Escalation of violence in Iraq symbolic 45 -2.9 
2004/11 China Chinese submarine near Japan realistic 6 -3.7 
2004/12 China Premier Wen comments on Yasukuni identity 2 -0.9 
2005/4 China Anti-Japan demonstrations identity 41 -12.6 
2005/4 Korea Takeshima Day identity 10 -10.8 
2005/5 China Vice-Premier Wu snubs Koizumi identity 4 -4.9 
2005/6 Korea Japanese coast guard standoff realistic 5 -2.6 
2005/10 China Koizumi visits Yasukuni identity 10 -0.7 
2005/10 Korea Koizumi visits Yasukuni identity 10 1.0 
2005/1 I France Paris Riots symbolic 5 -6.8 
2006/3 China Dispute over East China Sea realistic 2 -8.6 
2006/4 Korea Survey ship to Takeshima realistic 13 1.3 
2006/7 North Korea Missile tests realistic 40 -7.1 
2006/10 North Korea Nuclear test realistic 69 -5.6 
Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (Chen and Bargh 1999)(Chen and Bargh 
1999)(2005), Kodama (2008), various Asahi Shimbun, and Jiji polls. 
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Appendix 2: List of Cases Coded as Economic Threats to Japan, Media 
Coverage and Change in Public Opinion, 1960-2007 
Y e a r I 
Case Country Issue Media Opinion Front 
Change 
Month (%points) 
1984/12 us Steel dispute Low No Change 0 -0.2 
2 1983/6 us Japan criticised on pager Low No Change 0 -2.8 imports 
3 1983/8 us US accuses Japan of Low No Change 0 -I 
dumping 
4 2001/6 China Dispute over safeguards Low No Change 4 3.0 
5 2002/3 us Dispute over steel Low No Change 5 -2.1 
safeguards 
6 1980/2 us Restrictions on Japanese 
cars 
Moderate No Change 6 -2.3 
7 1981/5 us US-Japan car negotiations Moderate No Change 6 2.3 
8 2003/12 us BSE dispute Moderate Minor Change 7 -4.7 
9 1974/3 USSR 
Disagreement over fishing 
Moderate Minor Change 8 -5.8 
rights 
10 1981/2 China 
Cancels Japanese factory 
Moderate Minor Change 9 -5.9 
contract 
II 1974/4 USSR 
Negotiations over fishing 
Moderate No Change 9 -2.1 
rights 
12 1977110 USSR 
Negotiations over Fishing 
Issue 
Moderate No Change 10 
13 1994/2 us Japan ordered to open Moderate Minor Change II -3.6 
markets 
14 1994/5 us Trade talks with US Moderate Minor Change II -4.7 
15 1977/7 North Korea Fishing limits dispute · Moderate No Change 13 -2.4 
16 1977/7 USSR 
Negotiations over Fishing 
High No Change 25 1.9 
rights 
17 1983/1 Korea 
Dispute with Japan over 
High No Change 25 -1.5 
loan/aid 
18 1984/4 us Trade dispute over beef High No Change 26 -2.1 
and citrus 
19 1981/9 Korea 
Dispute with Japan over 
loan/aid 
High Minor Change 27 -4.7 
20 1985/4 us US bill limits Japanese High Minor 28 -3.7 
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imports Change 
21 1993/3 Russia 
07 Summit- Aid to 
High No Change 28 1.2 
Russia 
22 1967 /II UK Devaluation ofPound High 
Major 
29 -6.2 
Change 
23 1977/6 USSR 
Negotiations over Fishing 
High No Change 29 1.2 
rights 
24 1977/12 us Japan-US trade dispute High No Change 35 -0.2 
25 197811 us Japan-US trade dispute High No Change 35 0.5 
26 1970112 us US-Japan textile dispute High No Change 40 -1.9 
27 1970111 us US-Japan textile dispute High No Change 78 -1.1 
28 1977/4 USSR 
Negotiations over Fishing 
High 
Major 
147 -11.1 
rights Change 
Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et a!. (2005), Kodama (2008), various Asahi 
Shimbun, and Jiji polls. 
263 
Appendix 3: List of Cases Coded as Threats to Japanese Sovereignty, Media 
Coverage and Change in Public Opinion, 1960-2007 
Year I Change 
Case Country Issue Media Opinion Front 
Month (%points) 
2006/3 China 
Dispute over East China 
Low 
Major 
2 -8.6 
Sea Change 
2 1961/1 Korea 
Fishing boat incident at 
Low No Change 3 3.4 
Lee line 
3 1999/4 North Korea Mystery ships issue Low No Change 3 -2.2 
4 1960/10 Korea 
Meeting with ROK over 
Low 
Minor 
4 -4.9 
Lee Line Change 
5 2005/6 Korea 
Japanese coast guard 
standoff 
Low No Change 5 -2.6 
6 2004/3 China Senkaku Dispute Moderate No Change 7 0 
7 1977/2 Korea 
Discussions over 
Moderate No Change 8 -1.7 
Takeshima 
8 1971/3 us Okinawa negotiations Moderate No Change 9 -I 
9 197112 us Okinawa negotiations Moderate No Change 9 -0.3 
10 1996/9 China Senkaku lighthouse issue Moderate No Change 12 3.1 
II 1998/4 Russia 
Northern Territories 
Moderate No Change 12 -2.6 
discussion 
12 2006/4 Korea Survey ship to Takeshima Moderate No Change 13 1.3 
13 1973110 Korea Kim Dae Jung incident Moderate No Change 13 3.1 
14 197011 us Okinawa negotiations Moderate No Change 13 0.8 
15 1960/12 Korea 
Meeting with ROK over 
Moderate No Change 14 -2.5 
Lee Line 
16 1973110 USSR 
Northern Territories 
High 
Minor 
19 -3.7 
meeting Change 
17 2002111 North Korea Abductions issue High No Change 22 -2.5 
18 1992/7 Russia 
Discussion ofNorthern 
High 
Minor 
24 -5 
Territories Change 
19 1969/5 us Okinawa dispute High Major 27 -9.2 
Change 
20 199712 North Korea Abductions issue High 
Minor 
30 -5.9 
Change 
21 1969/10 us Discussion of Okinawa High No Change 30 5.5 
return 
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22 1967/10 us Okinawa negotiations High 
Minor 
32 -5.3 Change 
23 1993/4 Russia 
Northern Territories 
High Minor 41 -4.8 
discussion Change 
24 2002/5 China Shenyang incident High 
Major 
42 -12.8 
Change 
25 1967111 us Okinawa negotiations High 
Major 
47 -6.8 
Change 
26 2002/9 North Korea Koizumi visits Pyongyang High No Change 54 -1.1 
1964/5 USSR 
Northern Territories 
High 
Minor 
59 -3.9 27 discussion Change 
28 1978/5 China 
Dispute over Senkaku 
High 
Minor 
64 -5.1 
Islands Change 
29 1965/1 us Okinawa negotiations High 
Minor 
68 -6 Change 
30 2002110 North Korea Abductions issue High 
Major 
74 -7.5 
Change 
Dispute over diplomatic 
High 
Minor 
133 -6 31 1965110 Korea 
relations Change 
1973/9 
Abduction of Kim Dae 
High 
Minor 
136 -5.9 32 Korea 
Jung Change 
33 1969111 us Okinawa negotiations High 
Major 
179 -10.6 
Change 
Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et a!. (2005), Kodama (2008), various Asahi 
Shimbun, and Jiji polls. 
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Appendix 4: List of Cases Coded as Military Threat to Japan, Media Coverage 
and Change in Public Opinion, 1960-2007 
Y e a r I Change 
Case Country Issue Media Opinion Front 
M on I h (%points) 
1999/8 China China tests long-range Low No 2 -2.5 
missile Change 
2 1979/9 USSR 
Base built in Northern 
Low 
No 
5 -0.4 
Territories Change 
3 2004/11 China 
Chinese submarine near 
Japan 
Moderate 
Minor 
6 -3.7 Change 
4 2002/1 
North 
North Korean ship sunk Major 
Korea 
High 
Change 
18 -7.1 
5 1998/9 North 
Korea 
Taepodong Test Major High 
Change 
31 -13.1 
6 2006/7 
North 
Missile tests 
Korea 
High 
Major 
Change 
40 -7.1 
Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et a!. (2005), Kodama (2008), various Asahi 
Shimbun, and Jiji polls. 
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Appendix 5: List of Cases Coded as Nuclear Tests, Media Coverage and 
Change in Public Opinion, 1960-2007 
Year I 
Case Country Issue Media Opinion Front 
Change 
Month (%points) 
1962/5 USSR Nuclear test Low Minor -4.7 
Change 
2 196711 China Nuclear test Low Minor 2 -4.6 Change 
3 1972/3 China Nuclear test Low No 2 0.5 Change 
4 1994/6 China Nuclear test Low Minor 2 -5.9 
Change 
5 2002/2 UK Subcritical nuclear test Low No 3 -0.2 
Change 
1975/6 Underground Nuclear test Low No 3 -1.8 6 France 
Change 
7 196717 China Nuclear test Low Minor 3 -4.5 Change 
8 197118 France Nuclear test Low 
No 
3 1.1 Change 
9 1994110 China Nuclear test Low No 5 -2.2 Change 
10 1966/5 France Nuclear test Low Minor 
Change 5 -3 
11 1966/9 France Nuclear test Low 
No 
5 1.7 Change 
1968/8 Hydrogen bomb test No 6 3 12 France Moderate 
Change 
13 1995/6 China Nuclear test Moderate Minor 7 -3.8 
Change 
No 
9 0.9 14 1996/7 China Nuclear test Moderate 
Change 
15 1974/6 France Nuclear test Moderate 
No 
Change 
10 -0.5 
16 1962/2 USSR Nuclear test Moderate 
No 
10 8.5 
Change 
1962/2 No 10 -2.4 17 UK Nuclear test Moderate 
Change 
No 
10 -0.7 18 1974/5 India Nuclear test Moderate 
Chan e 
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19 1972/6 France Nuclear test Moderate 
Minor 
10 -3.7 
Change 
20 1962/3 UK Nuclear test Moderate 
Minor 
II -3.2 
Change 
21 1995/12 France Nuclear test Moderate 
Major 
13 -8.5 
Change 
22 1996!1 France Nuclear test High 
No 
15 1.7 
Change 
23 1996/6 China Nuclear test High 
No 
16 -1.4 
Change 
24 1966/7 France Nuclear test High 
No 
17 -0.4 
Change 
25 1995/9 China Nuclear test High 
Major 
18 -7.3 
Change 
26 1962/7 Russia Nuclear test High 
Minor 
19 -4.8 
Change 
27 1962/2 us Nuclear test High No 19 -1.6 
Change 
28 1995/7 France Nuclear test High 
Major 
20 -13.4 
Change 
29 1961!11 us Nuclear test High Minor 25 -3.4 Change 
30 1961!11 USSR Nuclear test High 
Major 
26 -7.6 Change 
31 1995/8 France Nuclear test High 
Major 
35 -10 Change 
32 1962/3 us Nuclear test High Minor 45 -5.6 
Change 
33 1961/9 USSR Nuclear test High 
Minor 
48 -4.5 
Change 
34 1964/10 China Nuclear test High 
Minor 
57 -3.7 
Change 
35 1998/6 India Nuclear test High 
Major 
59 -11.4 
Change 
36 1995/9 France Nuclear test High 
Major 
63 -29.7 Change 
37 2006!10 
North 
Nuclear test High 
Minor 
69 -5.6 
Korea Change 
Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et a!. (2005), Kodama (2008), various Asahi 
Shimbun, and Jiji polls. 
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Appendix 6: List of Cases Coded as the Use of Military Force, Media 
Coverage and Change in Public Opinion, 1960-2007 
Y e a r I Change 
Case Country Issue Media Opinion Front 
Month (%points) 
1967/12 us 
Bombing of North 
Low 
No 
0 2.8 Vietnam Change 
2 1967/2 us Bombing of North Low No 0 3.0 Vietnam Change 
3 1999/5 India Kargil War Low No -0.6 Change 
4 1967/4 us Bombing of North Low No 2 -0.4 Vietnam Change 
5 1966/2 Korea South Korean soldiers to Low No 3 1.6 Vietnam Change 
6 1983/4 China Border dispute with No 3 -1.3 Vietnam Low Change 
7 1966/1 USSR Aid for North Vietnam Low 
Major 
3 -6.6 Change 
8 1969/4 China Border dispute with USSR Low Major 3 -9.3 Change 
9 1981/9 North Missile at US military Minor -4.8 
Korea plane Low Change 4 
10 1966/2 France 
Participates in Vietnam Minor 
-3.1 Low 5 
war Change 
II 1967/9 China Border dispute with India Moderate Major 6 . -6.2 Change 
12 1961/5 France Algeria-France war Moderate Major 6 -9.3 Change 
13 1981/8 us US shoots down two Moderate No 7 -2.7 
Libyan jets Change 
14 1998/8 us 
Missile attacks on 
Moderate 
No 
-0.8 
al-Qaeda Change 7 
15 2004/6 us Battle ofFallujah Moderate No 7 3.0 Change 
16 1996/3 China China-Taiwan crisis Moderate Major 7 -6.6 Change 
17 1965/11 us Bombing of North Moderate Minor 7 -4.1 Vietnam Change 
18 1962/12 India Border dispute with China Moderate 
No 
8 -2.3 
Change 
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I9 I99I/1 UK Gulf War Moderate 
No 
9 3.5 
Change 
20 I961/5 us Bay of Pigs Moderate Major 9 -8.2 Change 
2I I996/2 China China-Taiwan crisis Moderate 
Major 
9 -7.0 
Change 
22 I998/12 us Missile attack on Iraq Moderate No IO 0.5 
Change 
23 I990/1 us US invades Panama Moderate No II -1.2 Change 
24 I97I/1I India India-Pakistan War Moderate No I3 -0.5 
Change 
25 I999/5 us Bombing of China Moderate No I4 -2.8 
embassy Change 
26 I999/4 us NATO attacks Serbia High No I7 1.4 Change 
27 I972/5 us Bombing ofNorth High Major I8 -6.2 
Vietnam Change 
28 I966/I2 us US plane crashes in Hanoi High Minor I9 -5.4 
Change 
29 I969/3 USSR Border dispute with China High 
No 
20 ~0.9 
Change 
30 I988/4 USSR End of Afghanistan War High 
Minor 
20 -5.6 
Change 
3I I968/3 us Bombing ofNorth High No 2I -0.8 
Vietnam Change 
32 200I/1I us Invasion of Afghanistan High No 22 -2.6 
Change 
33 I962!12 China Border dispute with India High Major 24 -I4.0 
Change 
34 I98311 0 us Invasion of Grenada High No 25 0.9 
Change 
35 I995/1 Russia First Chechen War High Minor 26 -5.I 
Change 
36 I982/6 UK Falklands War High 
No 
26 -2.2 
Change 
37 I991/I France Gulf War High No 27 -1.1 
Change 
38 I993/1 us US strikes on Iraq High No 29 5.5 Change 
39 2003/3 UK Iraq War High No 3I -1.8 
Change 
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40 1979/3 China Sino-Vietnamese War High 
Major 
35 -8.6 Change 
41 1972/3 us Bombing ofNorth High Minor 36 Vietnam Change -3.5 
42 !965/7 us More troops sent to High No 37 -1.8 Vietnam Change 
43 !966/2 us Bombing ofNorth High Major 37 -6.1 Vietnam Change 
44 2001/10 us Invasion of Afghanistan High Major 43 -6.7 
Change 
45 1972/8 us Anti-Vietnam protests High Minor 43 -3.8 
Change 
46 2004/10 us Escalation of violence in High No 45 -2.9 
Iraq Change 
47 1962/1 India Portuguese-Indian War High Major 50 -6.9 
Change 
48 1968/2 us Tet Offensive High Major 55 -6.7 
Change 
49 2003/4 us Iraq War High No 57 0.9 Change 
50 1964/7 us Gulf of Tonkin High Minor 59 -5.7 
Change 
51 1961/7 France France-Tunisia War High No 67 3.7 
Change 
52 1982/4 UK Falklands War High Minor 72 -4.7 Change 
53 1966/7 us Bombing of North High Minor 84 -3.3 
Vietnam Change 
54 1980/1 USSR Invasion of Afghanistan High Minor 85 -4.9 
Change 
55 2003/3 us Iraq War High Minor 90 -3.4 
Change 
56 1970/6 us US invades Cambodia High Major 104 -11.3 
Change 
57 1971/12 India India-Pakistan War High No 104 -2.2 
Change 
58 1991/1 us Gulf War High No Ill 2.0 
Change 
59 1991/2 us Gulf War High Major 112 -6.7 Change 
60 1965/4 us More combat troops to High Major 131 -6.6 Vietnam Change 
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61 1968/9 USSR 
Invasion of 
Czechoslovakia 
62 1965/3 us First combat troops to Vietnam 
63 197311 us End of Vietnam War 
64 1982/5 UK Falklands War 
High 
High 
High 
High 
Major 
Change 
Major 
Change 
Minor 
Change 
Minor 
Change 
157 -12.2 
160 -6.3 
185 -5.2 
203 -5.9 
Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008), various Asahi 
Shimbun, and Jiji polls. 
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Appendix 7: List of Cases Coded as the Killing of Civilians, Media Coverage 
and Change in Public Opinion, 1960-2007 
Year I Change 
Case Country Issue Media Opinion Front 
Month (%points) 
1988/7 us Iran Air 655 Moderate No 13 2 Change 
2 1983/11 
North 
Rangoon Bombing High Major 27 -6.5 
Korea Change 
3 1991/2 USSR January Events High 
Major 34 -8.1 Change 
4 1988/2 North KAL858 High Major 36 -15.8 
Korea Change 
5 1978/4 USSR KAL902 incident High 
Minor 
37 -3.1 Change 
6 1989/6 China Tiananmen Square High 
Major 
40 -34.1 Change 
7 1990/1 USSR Repression of Azerbaijan High Minor 42 -4.1 Change 
8 1990/4 Russia Repression ofLithuania High 
Minor 52 -5.1 Change 
9 1980/6 Korea K wangj u incident High Minor 57 -5.3 Change 
10 1983/9 USSR KAL007 High 
Major 
126 -20 Change 
Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et a!. (2005), Kodama (2008), various Asahi 
Shimbun, and Jiji polls. 
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Appendix 8: List of Cases Coded as Criticism of Japan, Media Coverage and 
Change in Public Opinion, 1960-2007 
Y e a r I Change 
Case Country Issue Media Opinion Front 
Month (%points) 
2004/12 China Premier Wen on Yasukuni Low No 2 -0.9 
Change 
2 1995/8 Korea Apology for WWII Low 
No 
2 2.1 
Change 
3 1982/11 Korea Textbook issue Low 
No 
Change 
3 -0.5 
4 2004/1 Korea Koizumi visits Yasukuni Low 
No 
Change 
3 -0.4 
5 1982/9 Korea Textbook issue Low 
Minor 
Change 
4 -3.2 
6 200411 China Koizumi visits Yasukuni Low 
Minor 
Change 
4 -4 
7 1993/11 Korea Apology over colonization Low 
No 
5 2.6 
Change 
8 1982/7 China Textbook issue Low 
Minor 
5 -3.8 
Change 
9 2002/4 China Koizumi visits Yasukuni Low 
No 
5 2.2 
Change 
10 1986/5 China Textbook issue Low 
Minor 
5 -4.2 
Change 
II 200311 China Koizumi visits Yasukuni Moderate 
No 
6 3.7 Change 
12 200311 Korea Koizumi visits Yasukuni Moderate 
No 
6 3.5 Change 
13 1992/4 China Jiang Zemin visits Japan Moderate No 6 -1.8 
Change 
14 2001/7 Korea Koizumi to Yasukuni Moderate 
Minor 
7 -4.5 
Change 
15 2001/7 China Koizumi to Yasukuni Moderate 
Minor 
8 -5.7 
Change 
16 2001/8 China Koizumi visits Yasukuni Moderate 
No 
Change 
9 -0.6 
17 2005110 Korea Koizumi visits Yasukuni Moderate 
No 
10 
Change 
18 2005/10 China Koizumi visits Yasukuni Moderate 
No 
Change 
10 -0.7 
274 
19 1998/11 China 
Jiang Zemin and history 
Moderate 
No 
II -2.3 issue Change 
20 1982/9 China Textbook issue Moderate 
Minor 
14 -5 Change 
21 1992/1 Korea 
Apology over Comfort 
Moderate 
No 
14 -0.6 
Women Change 
22 1994/9 China 
Asian Games dispute over 
High No 17 1.3 
Taiwan Change 
23 1986/9 Korea Fujio comments High No 18 1.2 Change 
24 1995/11 Korea Eto comments High 
Minor 
22 -3.8 
Change 
25 1990/5 Korea Colonization apology High 
Minor 
28 -3.7 
Change 
26 1982/8 Korea Textbook issue High 
No 
30 -2.9 
Change 
27 1982/8 China Textbook issue High 
No 
32 -0.7 
Change 
Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008), various Asahi 
Shimbun, and Jiji polls. 
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Appendix 9: List of Cased Coded as Violation of Diplomatic Protocol, Media 
Coverage and Change in Public Opinion, 1960-2007 
Y e a r I Change 
· Case Country Issue Media Opinion Front 
Month (%points) 
2005/5 China 
Vice-Premier Wu snubs 
Low 
Minor 
4 -4.9 
Koizumi Change 
2 I998/6 us Clinton skips Japan for Moderate No Change I I -2. I 
China 
3 I 992/9 Russia 
Yeltsin cancels visit to . 
H1gh 
Japan Change 
Major 
I9 -I4.7 
Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et a!. (2005), Kodama (2008), various Asahi 
Shimbun, and Jiji polls. 
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Appendix 10: List of Cases Coded as Anti-Japanese Demonstrations, Media 
Coverage and Change in Public Opinion, 1960-2007 
Y e a r I Change 
Case Country Issue Media Opinion Front 
Month (%points) 
I 985/9 China 
Anti-Japanese 
Low No Change -2.6 
Demonstration 
2 2004/8 China Booing at Asian Cup Low 
Major 
2 -15.3 
Change 
3 2005/4 Korea Takeshima Day Moderate 
Major 
10 -10.8 
Change 
4 1965/8 Korea Anti-Japan demonstrations Moderate No Change 12 0.1 
5 1965/7 Korea Anti-Japan demonstrations High 
Major 
23 -8.1 
Change 
6 2005/4 China Anti-Japan demonstrations High 
Major 
41 -12.6 
Change 
7 1974/9 Korea President assassination High Major 85 -7.9 
attempt Change 
Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et a!. (2005), various Asahi Shimbun, and Jiji 
polls. 
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